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ABSTRACT
Hypothesis: Foreign direct investment can have an ambiguous effect on trade flows. 
Industry, country o f  origin, and country o f destination matter in determining the effects 
o f foreign direct investment on export flows. As a result, the real effects from NAFTA  
can be obscured if these factors are not taken into account.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is expected to alter trade 
flows between the United States and M exico and therefore it provides the perfect 
opportunity to study the effects o f foreign direct investment (FDI) on export flows.
There were several special events and issues that occurred during the period 
leading up to and during implementation o f NAFTA. These events and issues have 
been accounted for in the empirical model.
The gravity model, first prescribed by Jan Tinbergen, which uses national 
income as a central variable, is then an excellent candidate model to analyze export 
flows. The inclusion o f exchange rates helps to account for the shocks from the 
M exican currency crisis and currency devaluation. Foreign direct investment is 
included as one possible alternative method o f capital transfer between countries. There 
are several factors which influence the sign o f foreign direct investment in the empirical 
model. Som e stylized facts explaining certain countries' or industries' predispositions 
are developed in the theoretical model to explain the FDI - exports relationship.
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Several "predispositions" are supported by the empirical results. For capital- 
intensive firms which invest in capital-intensive industries abroad, there is a 
predisposition for exports to increase in this industry. The same holds for labor- 
intensive firms that invest in industries with labor-intensive goods. The empirical 
results are in favor o f the theoretical model in 25 o f the 28 single-industry models. For 
three o f the single-industry models, where M exico, a labor-abundant country, is 
exporting and investing in a capital-intensive good, this theoretical relationship breaks 
down.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT - EXPORT RELATIONSHIP: 
A  US-M EXICO ANALYSIS USING THE GRAVITY MODEL
A DISSERTATION SUBM ITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTM ENT OF ECONOMICS 
BY
THOMAS ALLEN JONES 
© Thomas Allen Jones
DEKALB, ILLINOIS 
AUGUST 2007
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 3279186
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
®
UMI
UMI Microform 3279186 
Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Certification: In accordance with departmental and Graduate 
School policies, this dissertation is accepted in 
partial fulfillment o f degree requirements.
LSI
Dissertation Director
l o o l _________________
Date
ANY U SE O F  MATERIAL CONTAINED 
HEREIN M UST BE DULY ACKNOWLEDGED. 
THE AUTHOR'S PERM ISSION M UST BE OBTAINED 
IF ANY PORTION IS TO BE PUBLISHED OR 
INCLUDED IN A PUBLICATION.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to express sincere appreciation to Professors Carl Campbell, 
Ardeshir Dalai, and George Slotsve for their assistance in the preparation o f this 
manuscript. Sincere thanks are due to Maria Borga, Reba Higbee, and W illiam  Zeile 
for assistance with data collection at the Bureau o f the Census and Bureau o f Econom ic 
Analysis. In addition, special thanks are due to Dr. Oral Capps, Greg Harkenrider, Dr. 
Susan Porter-Hudak, Dr. Charles Martie, and Dr. Maurice Obstfeld for helpful 
comments.
This research project was supported in a different manner by m y w ife and 
children, who endured numerous personal costs resulting from m y frequent absences 
while pursuing this research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DEDICATION
To m y wife, Susanne, and my children, Amanda, Sara, and Matthias
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF T A B L E S ....................................................................................  vii
LIST OF FIG U R E S................................................................................... ix
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................  1
Sum m ary.......................................................................................... 9
2. THE GRAVITY E Q U A T IO N .......................................................  11
Sum m ary.......................................................................................... 47
3. THEORETICAL M O D E L ............................................................... 50
Comparative S ta tics   ....................................................  68
Sum m ary.......................................................................................... 76
4. US-M EXICAN TRADE A N D INVESTMENT HISTORY .. 79
Sum m ary.......................................................................................... 83
5. NAFTA NEGOTIATION A N D  F E A T U R E S............................ 84
Sum m ary.......................................................................................... 97
6. KEY US-M EXICO EXPORT SE C T O R S...................................  99
US Comparative Advantage Industries.................................  102
M exican Comparative Advantage Industries....................... 110
High Capital-Labor Ratio Industries......................................  112
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Page
Low Capital-Labor Ratio Industries........................................... 114
Sum m ary........................................................    116
7. FOREIGN DIRECT IN V EST M E N T...........................................  117
Sum m ary............................................................................................. 123
8. D A T A .........................................................................................................  124
Sum m ary............................................................................................. 128
9. MODEL A N D  M ETH O DO LO G Y...................................................  130
Sum m ary............................................................................................. 134
10. EMPIRICAL R E SU L T S....................................................................  136
Aggregated Industries.....................................................................  136
US Comparative Advantage Industries .................................... 141
M exican Comparative Advantage Industries..........................  153
Low Capital-Labor Ratio Industries.......................................  159
High Capital-Labor Ratio Industries......................................  162
World-Without-NAFTA C om parison....................................... 165
Sum m ary........................................................................................  169
11. CONCLUSIONS A N D FINAL TH O U G H T S............................. 171
BIBLIOGRAPHY  ........................................................................................  176
APPENDIX A Acronyms and Definitions o f Econom ic Terms ...  185
APPENDIX B Chronology o f World Trade E v en ts ..........................  186
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Total US Exports and US Exports to M exico
Com parison......................................................................................  100
2. Top 5 US Exports to M exico Ten Years After
NAFTA ............................................................................................  100
3. Top 5 US Exports to M exico Pre and Post N A F T A   106
4. Average Annual Growth Rates by P eriod ................................  107
5. Capital-Labor Ratios for K ey Industries.................................. 108
6. Export Growth Rate Comparison for Select Industries  114
7. Regression Results for Total Exports o f all G o o d s................. 138
8. Regression Results for Aggregated 1993 Top 5 US 
Exports to M exico and 1993 Top 5 M exican
Exports to the U S ............................................................................ 139
9. Regression Results for Top 5 1993 US Exports to
M exico (part 1 ) ...............................................................................  142
10. Regression Results for Top 5 1993 US Exports to
M exico (part 2 ) ...............................................................................  149
11. Summary o f Foreign Direct Investment Regression
R esu lts ................................................................................................ 152
12. Regression Results for Top 5 1993 M exican Exports
to the U S ...........................................................................................  155
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
viii
Table Page
13. Regression Results for Aggregate Low Capital
Intensity and High Capital Intensity Industries........................  158
14. Regression Results for Low Capital Intensity Industries  160
15. Regression Results for High Capital Intensive
Industries.............................................................................................. 163
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. US Exports to M exico and M exican Exports to the US ... 7
2. US Foreign Direct Investment into M e x ic o ........................ 82
3. US Exports to M exico by S IT C ............................................... 101
4. M exican Exports to the US by S IT C ..................................... 102
5. Top 5 M exican Exports to the U S ........................................... 111
6. M exican Foreign Direct Investment into the U S ................ 128
7. Share o f Total US Exports that go to M ex ico ...................... . 167
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
"And now, after eight years, Am erica is back in the business o f  prom oting open trade to 
build our prosperity  and to spur our economic grow th ." - President G eorge  Vk. Bush, 
August 6, 2002.
There are two common approaches to measuring the effects o f  free trade 
agreements. First, there is the class o f models called applied general equilibrium  
models (sometimes called computable equilibrium models). This class o f models relies 
on a set o f equations that define a complete economy, including prices, production, and 
consumption. This class o f models was used extensively in the pre-NAFTA  
negotiations to determine probable econom y-wide impacts and trade flow  impacts that 
would result from a reduction in tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Applied general 
equilibrium models are considered to be very precise and valuable because they can be 
performed in an experimental fashion. Most importantly, actual (historical) values for 
the variables are not necessary to compute results for these models. There are two 
major drawbacks o f the applied general equilibrium class o f models. First, they require 
massive data sets on employment, consumption patterns, outputs, and prices. Data at 
this level o f detail is very hard to acquire and in many cases is not available at all. The 
second drawback is that the results from these models are very sensitive to the 
assumptions in the model. Small changes in assumptions can lead to large changes in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the results.1 This can be problematic for trade administrators, negotiators, analysts, 
and politicians because two very similar models can lead to very different results and 
conclusions.
The second class o f models used to measure trade flow is called gravity models. 
Gravity models get their name because their general structure is very similar to Sir Isaac 
Newton's Law o f Universal Gravitation equation, which is written:
F  = G
ml * m 2
~ r F ~
( 1.1)
where F is the magnitude o f the gravitational force or pull, G is a constant, mi and m2 
are the masses o f the two bodies asserting a force on one another, and r is the distance 
between the two bodies. The gravity equation structure has been used for a variety o f  
purposes, e.g., to measure city-to-city migration, immigration, tourism, shopping 
patterns, and traffic patterns. For many years the gravity equation suffered from the 
lack o f  an underlying economic theory to support its use in policy analyses. During the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s numerous authors developed several different theoretical 
derivations for the gravity model. It could be said that the gravity equation now has an 
overabundance o f  theories associated with it.
The gravity equation was introduced into economic literature by a Dutch 
economist, Jan Tinbergen (1962), in his book Shaping the W orld Economy. Tinbergen's 
gravity equation was very simple and was developed to explain world trade flows. 
Tinbergen provided a brief explanation o f the variables but no rigorous theory was
1 Hufbauer and Schott (2005, p. 69).
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presented. Shortly thereafter, Hans Linnemann (1966), a junior colleague o f  Professor 
Tinbergen's, wrote a compelling explanation and non-technical theory o f  the gravity 
equation structure. B y the time Anderson (1979) provided the first in-depth economic 
theory supporting the gravity equation, it had been widely used for almost 18 years. 
During that time and after, the gravity equation has been empirically very successful by  
most measures.
Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) developed rigorous theoretical 
derivations for the gravity equation emphasizing product differentiation and increasing 
returns to scale in production. Later, Deardorff (1998) proposed two cases o f  the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model in which the gravity equation can be derived. These two  
theoretical frameworks are cited the most in the literature, as they have appealing 
properties for analysis o f regional trade agreements and trade barriers.
Over the years, the gravity model has been estimated using several different 
specifications and different econometric techniques. Initially the gravity equation was 
estimated only in a cross-sectional framework and frequently included several dozen  
countries. Over time, as the level o f econometric sophistication increased, the gravity 
model was estimated with panel data sets (also called time series cross-sectional data 
sets or longitudinal data). After it was pointed out that using a common intercept for 
panel datasets leads to biased coefficients, the models incorporated fixed effects and 
random effects to capture the separate effects o f time in the constant term.3 Cross- 
sectional and panel frameworks are suited to measuring the trade flow s in free trade
2 The model possesses a high goodness o f fit (R2) across many different specifications and containing 
many different dimensions including bilateral trade flows, regional trade agreements and different levels 
o f aggregation o f  export products.
3 Matyas (1997).
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areas with a single coefficient representing all countries involved in the trade area or 
agreement. It may be desirable to do this in some cases, but it can limit its ability to 
capture effects which are unique to a single country pairing. It can be econometrically 
expensive to add additional dummy variables to single out specific country-to-country 
export effects. Moreover, cross-sectional and panel structures are not suited to capture 
the temporal effects o f bilateral trade in the way that time series can.4 Time series 
models are well-suited for capturing temporal effects o f trade agreements and other 
changes in trade flow s over time. The main drawback to using time series is the loss o f  
information gained from the distance variable between countries. In this model the 
distance variable would have been lost anyway because there are only two countries in 
the analysis. So there is much to be gained and little lost by using time series for this 
analysis.
Many studies have looked at the impacts o f NAFTA. Som e studies have
widened their viewpoint and measured the effects o f NAFTA with a large sampling o f
countries like in Krueger (1999) and Rose (2005). However, only one study, Gould
(1998), has examined the explicit bilateral effects o f NAFTA in a gravity framework.
The computed NAFTA-impacts in all o f  these studies relative to total US trade are very
small, but they vary considerably with respect to bilateral U S-M exico trade flow s. The
Congressional Budget O ffice (CBO) was saddled with the official responsibility to
provide estimates o f the impact o f NAFTA to Congress. The first official CBO report
4 Bergstrand (1985) uses multiple cross-sectional gravity models where each equation contains data for a 
different year for 15 countries. The exchange rate is a regressor in each equation. In 1975, exchange rate 
mechanisms changed to free-moving rates for some countries. The coefficients and statistical 
significance changed greatly across years for the exchange rate variables. The problem is that there is no 
way to be sure that the coefficients are picking up on the mechanism change and not some other factors 
occurring during that year or with the exchanges rates. In the same way, a dummy NAFTA variable 
might pick up other unrelated factors in a cross-sectional model. This is not desirable.
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on the effects o f NAFTA was completed in 1993. Later, Congress requested three 
more progress reports on the impact o f NAFTA on the US economy. These were 
published in 1997, 1999 and 2003, respectively.
There are two particular difficulties in measuring the impact o f NAFTA on US 
trade flow s. First, trade between the US and M exico had been expanding before 
NAFTA took effect. So it is necessary to account for this trade growth that would have 
occurred had NAFTA not been enacted. Second, there were several political and fiscal 
issues occurring in 1994, right after NAFTA was enacted. M exico's problems centered 
around the fact that the peso was greatly overvalued. Nineteen ninety-four was the last 
year o f President Salinas de Gortiro's term. At the time it was customary in Salinas' 
party for the President to select his own successor for party candidate. Salinas selected  
Luis Donaldo Colosio, who was his social development secretary.5 A  rebel group from  
southern M exico, the Zapatista rebellion, were angry about the poor living conditions in 
the south, while the northern states continued to modernize. A  series o f  assassinations 
occurred during 1994, including the assassinations o f Colosio in March. The m otive for 
his assassination is still unknown. The impact o f the assassinations and the southern 
rebellion on the M exican econom y is unclear, but may have influenced some investors 
to leave or discouraged som e potential investors from investing.6
It had also becom e something o f a trend for the exiting administration to spend 
lots o f money during their last year in office.7 The excess spending contributed to the 
existing current account crisis. At its highest point, the current account deficit grew to
5 Hufbauer and Schott (2005, p. 9).
6 See Blank and Haar (1998), Robert (2000) and Hufbauer and Schott (2005) for more.
7 Hufbauer and Schott (2005, p. 9).
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seven percent o f GDP in 1994. The M exican government needed to raise money 
quickly. So Salinas created the Tesobonos, the equivalent o f a short-term treasury bill, 
to help solve the budget problem. The Tesobonos were an attractive investment for 
foreign investors. They were denominated in pesos but were indexed in US dollars. 
Therefore, if  the peso crashed, the investor could still receive the US dollar value o f the 
bill. Between the political turmoil and the overvaluation o f the peso, investors started to 
flee. Since several events occurred during 1994, it is difficult to isolate the individual 
effects o f political unrest or the peso depreciation. Regardless o f the exact causation, 
these factors affected foreign direct investment. The peso exchange rate fell from 3.4 
pesos to the dollar to 7.2 pesos to the dollar in less than four months. B y April 1995, 
the peso regained some ground and seemed to stabilize at 5.8 pesos to the dollar.8 
Inflation surged to a high of 24 percent in the first four months o f 1995 and aggregate
demand fell in real terms.9 With M exico in a fiscal crisis the Clinton administration
loaned M exico a combined $50 billion. Twenty billion was given over immediately and 
the other $30 billion was given later. The fiscal crisis in M exico lasted until at least the 
end o f 1995.
The peso crisis and the political unrest make it particularly difficult to model the 
effects o f NAFTA. In a casual glance o f the data, it appears that the peso crisis and 
M exican recession occurred at the same time that the US started a trade imbalance with 
M exico (see Figure 1). Extra precautions need to be taken therefore in order to keep the 
NAFTA effect pure and free o f the other effects occurring at the same time. It is 
necessary to use variables in any model which will account for these other events. The
8 Hufbauer and Schott (2005, p. 10).
9 Hufbauer and Schott (2005, p. 10).
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peso crisis can be accounted for with exchange rate variables. The peso crisis and the 
political unrest, while not directly quantifiable, had some secondary effects on foreign 
direct investment. So it would be w ise to include foreign direct investment to account 
for this as a proxy or secondary effect. There is another more important reason to 
include foreign direct investment into a model measuring free trade areas and exports, 
because o f the potential for exporters to use foreign direct investment as a trade barrier- 
jumping strategy to provide goods to a foreign market. This effect will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4.















1989q1 1991q1 1993q1 1995q1 1997q1 1999q1 2001q1 2003q1 2005q1
Verticle bands indicate US econom y contractions (NBER)
Figure 1. US Exports to M exico and M exican Exports to the US 
Source: US International Trade Commission
Vertical bands represent official US contraction periods. Source: NBER
The gravity equation is well-suited for US-M exican trade analysis because it 
naturally includes many o f  the variables which we will need to zoom  in on the pure
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NAFTA effects. The gravity model has been used extensively to measure the effects 
o f trade agreements. In this paper, many important empirical studies will be described 
which have used the gravity model to examine trade liberalization agreements, 
specifically NAFTA. A history o f the gravity model w ill be provided, by examining the 
important articles and studies which have added to the gravity model's development. 
Finally, this paper will examine some o f the studies which have specifically looked at 
the effects o f NAFTA on M exican-US trade flow s. Only one other study, Gould 
(1998), has used the gravity model in the same way that this dissertation has, to 
investigate the bilateral trade flow s between M exico and the US in a time series 
framework.
Gould (1998) uses a very similar research design and model specification as in 
this paper. His gravity equation specification does not use the tradition population 
variables. His model uses GDP price deflators in an effort to capture more o f the price 
effects. Gould also only analyzes total exports. So in that sense, the design o f this 
paper investigates the U S-M exico trade flow  from multiple levels o f aggregation.
The authors discussed in the general gravity model literature review do not 
account for the effects o f foreign direct investment on export flows. These authors are 
primarily interested in the free trade area impacts on exports. This paper will include 
foreign direct investment in the gravity model as a potentially important variable in 
explaining exports. Foreign direct investment affects export flows in a seem ingly 
ambiguous way. Numerous studies show that this relationship is sometimes negative, 
sometimes positive, sometimes statistically significant, and sometimes nonsignificant. 
This paper will attempt to generate some stylized facts relating to this relationship,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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which will help to explain the often ambiguous relationship that is found between  
foreign direct investment and exports.
The structure o f this dissertation will be in chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the 
general discussion topics and key issues o f the paper. Chapter 2 defines and details the 
empirical specification o f the gravity equation. This chapter presents the important 
literature in the development and usage o f the gravity equation. The derivation and 
assumptions o f the econom ic theories underlying the gravity model w ill also be 
discussed. A  theoretical model is generated which presents some useful comparative 
statics regarding the foreign direct investment-export relationship. This is presented in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 is a detailed look at the history o f  trade and investment between 
the United States and M exico. Chapter 5 describes the negotiation process leading up 
to NAFTA and also examines the key features o f the final agreement. Details about 
select industries in this study are explored in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses the status 
and importance o f  foreign direct investment in the United States and M exico. Chapter 8 
describes the process o f  data selection and sources. Chapter 9 describes the empirical 
methods involved in the gravity equation specification, the expected signs o f the 
coefficients, and the econometric procedures and tests that are performed in the 
empirical model. Chapter 10 contains an analysis o f the results. Som e final thoughts 
and conclusions are given in Chapter 11.
Summary
The gravity model has been used for many different purposes in the past. Most 
recently, it has been used extensively in international economics to model free trade
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
areas. Exports are influenced by many of the usual demand factors in an econom y  
including income. It is also important to control for exchange rates when attempting to 
measure exports. It is especially important to control for the exchange rate when 
examining any US-M exican exports because the exchange rate variable w ill help 
capture the effects o f the peso crisis which adversely affected the M exican econom y  
during the time o f NAFTA's implementation. Foreign direct investment w ill be added 
to the general gravity model to test the general hypothesis that foreign direct investment 
has a relationship with exports. The exact nature o f this relationship w ill also be 
investigated.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2
THE GRAVITY EQUATION
Jan Tinbergen (1962) wrote the first trade flow  equation which would later be 
called the gravity equation. Tinbergen's goal was to describe a simple model o f  trade 
flows in the absence o f any trade impediments. There is only one aspect o f his model 
and that is that it explains deviations from the normal trade pattern. According to 
Tinbergen, three factors determine the normal trade pattern: 1) supply is governed by 
the exporter's economic size ,10 2) potential sales are determined by the importer's 
market size, and 3) transportation costs determine the value o f trade where 
transportation costs correspond with geographic distance between two countries. 
Tinbergen suggests that the third factor may also represent "an index o f information 
about export markets."11 The trade flow  equation is written as:
Eij = a 0Y?lYja2Di; \  (3.1)
where Ey represents the exports o f country i to country j, Yj is the GNP o f country i, Yj 
is the GNP o f country j, and Dy is the distance between country i and country j. No
10 Tinbergen uses gross national product to measure economic size. His book was written in 1962 when 
there was hardly any difference between gross national product (GNP) and gross domestic product 
(GDP). Since then the number o f  firms which have located production facilities to foreign lands has 
increased dramatically and now it is more appropriate to use GDP to capture the intended measure.
11 Tinbergen (1962, p. 263).
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effort is made to provide a general theory for this specification. Nor does he provide 
any theoretical basis for the functional form o f his trade flow equation, besides defining 
the variables in a rudimentary supply and demand sense. Several authors since then 
have created very detailed theoretical bases for the gravity model approach. The next 
sections elaborate on the most important theoretical contributions.
Tinbergen uses the log-linear equation to analyze 18 countries, which are 
primarily developed countries during the time o f  the study. The majority o f  these 
countries are in western Europe. In this regression, he includes a dummy variable for 
countries that border one another, a dummy variable for members o f the British 
Commonwealth trading group and a dummy variable for favored trade nations,
Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg, who share a common trade status with all other 
nations. A ll six coefficients were statistically significant from zero and had the expected 
sign. Tinbergen then used the coefficients to determine what trade would have occurred 
without transportation costs and compared those to the actual values. This is how he 
generates the deviations from the norm for each country. In a second model, Tinbergen 
used a larger, more diverse sample o f countries to test his specification. In the second 
specification 42 countries were used that were more spread out geographically and 
included many developing countries. The combined trade o f  these 42 countries make 
up 70 percent o f  world trade.
In addition to the standard three variables in the second model, he again includes 
a dummy variable for countries that share a common physical border and a dummy 
variable for any trade preferences that two countries may have. Again all his 
coefficients were statistically significant with the expected sign. Again he uses the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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coefficients to compute the trade that would have occurred and subtracts that from  
the actual exports to get the deviation.
In his third specification he uses the same 42 countries from the second model.
In the third equation he creates a new variable which he calls the "degree o f  one­
sidedness" o f exports. This Variable is calculated as the Gini coefficient on export 
variety. That is, if a country only exports one good then the Gini coefficient would be 
100. The more goods that are exported the smaller the Gini coefficient would be. All 
four coefficients in the third specification were statistically significant. The degree o f  
one-sidedness was found to have a negative sign, indicating that the larger the number 
o f different goods a country exports, the greater the trade flow  will be. This is the first 
piece o f  weak evidence that is found supporting the hypothesis that export 
diversification or country o f origin product differentiation increases trade.
The border effect was found to be responsible for about 5 percent o f normal 
trade volume, according to the first specification. The border effect in the second 
specification showed that it represented 75 percent o f the normal trade flow s. The 
majority o f the 18 countries in the first specification were all in Europe; therefore there 
was very little variance in the distance dummy variable in that equation. That may help 
explain the low  coefficient. The preferential partner dummy was found to represent 10 
to 12 percent o f normal trade flow s in the first specification. However, in the second 
specification, preferential treatment accounts for an increase o f 1000 percent in trade 
volume. That is, without trade preferences, trade values are 10 times lower than with 
them. This is strong evidence that trade barriers strongly impact trade flow s. This is
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not surprising, but the magnitude is much larger than Tinbergen or the average reader 
would expect.
Tinbergen observes that the coefficients for importer and exporter incomes are 
close to one in the second and third models. He believes that this implies that trade 
flows are proportional to incomes o f the exporting and importing countries. He also 
notes that in both specifications the Yj coefficient is less than one. This implies that as 
income increases, imports increase at a slightly smaller proportion because o f more 
varied home production.12 In every specification the coefficient on Yj was about 10 
percent lower than for Y;. He concludes that export volume depends somewhat more on 
the income o f the exporting country than on the importing country's income. This has 
two interesting implications: 1) countries with different incomes do not have a balance 
o f trade equilibrium, and 2) high income countries will always export more to lower 
income countries than they import from them.13
Tinbergen does not consider capital flows directly in his model. However, in 
discussing the potential causes for the high amount o f unexplained variance in his 
m odels,14 he considers that the role o f capital flow  probably has a greater importance.
He observes that during the period o f investigation there were considerable capital 
flows from developed countries into developing countries. Therefore these countries 
imported more than they otherwise could have without the boost to income from outside 
capital. Tinbergen indirectly suggests that foreign direct investment should be
12 Tinbergen (1962, p. 289).
13 This result is inconsistent with the balance o f  trade history o f the United States in the last 20 years. For 
the most part, the US has the larger income relative to all its trade partners and yet it still imports more 
than it exports. In fact, it is difficult to find individual countries where the US has a positive balance of  
trade. In 1962, however, Tinbergen's result was supported by the US balance o f  trade figures.
14 R2 equals approximately 0.8 in each o f his models.
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accounted for directly in the model. He also suggests that foreign direct investment 
is important to developing countries' trade by providing additional income. This is 
something that has still not been examined in the gravity model literature. This 
om ission will end with this paper.
Linnemann (1966) adds to the basic structure presented by Tinbergen by  
developing some theoretical underpinnings for the gravity equation and provides an 
explanation for the absence o f prices in the model. Linnemann's book focuses on the 
general question "what factors cause countries to trade?" and to a lesser extent, once the 
factors are identified, he wants to measure the weights that these factors have in 
determining trade flows. He begins by stating that trade occurs because domestic 
production falls short o f  domestic demand. Dom estic production does not increase to 
meet domestic demand because it has arranged and engaged its resources in the 
production o f goods in which it has a comparative advantage.15
Linnemann does not discuss whether the comparative advantage design came 
about over time as countries "learned" the optimal trade patterns that lead to higher total 
output o f all goods, came about because the resource-controller, usually firms, refused' 
to disengage their resources from the production o f their profitable good thereby 
creating an inherent supply shortage o f other goods which the firm(s) perceived as less 
profitable, or came about for some other reason. Nonetheless, he accepts the principles 
o f Ricardo's comparative advantage.16
15 Linnemann (1966, p. 12). Linnemann never directly mentions Ricardo in the whole book, but all o f  
Linnemann's theories are heavily influenced by him nonetheless.
16 For example, it is not immediately obvious in the classic Ricardo example that Portugal should produce 
wine and England should produce cloth. It is certainly not obvious from Portugal's perspective, for whom  
the production o f  both goods is considered "easy" and equally "easy" to produce. Since both countries do
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Linnemann does not really address why countries trade, but rather gives an 
excellent econom ic explanation o f why trade is beneficial. Linnemann then identifies 
the concept o f potential trade, which is a function o f potential supply and potential 
demand. It is defined as that trade that would occur "when all impediments to trade are 
absent." The impediments or countervailing forces are defined as "resistance factors";
17that is, those factors which reduce trade flow s. Specifically, Linnemann is thinking of
transportation costs and tariffs, but his analysis could equally well relate to non-tariff
barriers like import quotas and import licensing and certification fees. Linnemann also
1 8considers an alternative case where "resistance" is positive and equal for all countries.
In the simple construct in which production is split between domestic sales and foreign 
sales, we expect domestic demand to be satisfied first and therefore, foreign supply 
depends upon the domestic level o f demand.19 It becomes immediately obvious that the 
size o f the domestic market then determines supply potential. Size is measured by 
population. Underlying this pure "size" measure are also some implications that 
economies o f scale play a role and tend to generate a diversity o f tastes. Therefore, the 
econom y demands a larger variety o f goods.20 The assumption here is that regardless o f  
how large the population becomes, the number of different goods that it demands is
not observe the production functions or factor price ratios o f all other countries, it is unlikely that a 
country will immediately come to this result without some extra information or learning process involved. 
Moreover, how popular do you think this decision would be to Portugal's cloth producers? Will they be 
happy about it? So there may even be resistance in moving towards the optimal income-maximizing 
production structure. Linnemann does not discuss these issues. But his description o f  potential demand 
leaves some unanswered questions about the equilibrium domestic consumption levels.
17 Linnemann uses many basic physics terminologies in his book to highlight the physics roots o f  the 
gravity equation.
18 It is not clear that his resulting conclusions require this alteration. But it is a reasonable change 
considering that in the future we may wish to investigate a case when a resistance is lowered.
19 Linnemann (1966, p. 12).
20 Linnemann (1966, p. 13).
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always greater than the number o f goods that it can produce, resulting in further 
increased demand for foreign goods. Linnemann uses this framework to rule out per 
capita incomes as a determinant o f potential trade. He argues that given two countries 
with the same population but different per capita incomes, the higher per capita income 
country w ill have greater resources per person but will not lead to greater export 
production which satisfies a larger share o f the domestic market relative to market 
demand. The increased income creates more domestic demand and in turn creates more
domestically consumed goods in equal proportions such that the market share o f
21domestically produced goods remains unchanged. Later Linnemann imposes many of  
the standard assumptions o f the Heckscher-Ohlin model, specifically, 1) countries have 
different factor endowments, 2) factors are immobile across countries, 3) production 
functions have fixed coefficients and no substitution o f inputs is allowed in fixed  
production,22 and 4) demand structure is the same in each country and no country has 
demand which coincidentally matches autarky production. Countries are assumed to 
reach equilibrium as soon as trade is permitted. Potential supply is therefore based on 
domestic production and population. Potential demand is equal to potential supply, as 
both are governed by the same forces. In the long run the general prices w ill not affect 
potential supply and demand. The short-term effects are ignored in Linnemann's 
analysis.
Transportation costs, it is noted, vary between countries by good type, weight, 
distance, type o f terrain between countries, and the existence o f other exports along the
21 Linnemann (1966, pp. 12-13).
22 Production functions are o f the Leontief type. This assumption is not part o f the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, which assumes neoclassical production functions.
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sea route. Duration o f shipments, especially for sea-route trade, is also an 
impediment to trade. As distance increases so too does the duration o f shipment. 
"Economic horizon" is described as those impediments to trade due to lack o f  
knowledge about markets, lack o f communications between distant countries, and 
cultural "nearness" or similarity. These three categories are all functions o f distance 
and therefore it i s appropriate to use distance as the measure for this group of  
impediments. The second category o f  trade impediments are called "artificial" because 
they are not naturally occurring but rather imposed by governments; that is, tariffs and 
other import restrictions. For purposes o f specifying the model it is assumed that these
'j'l
impediments are uniform across countries. The quantitative expression o f the model 
is given by:
A  ' •  ( 3 ' 2 )
where Xy is the individual trade flow , E; is potential supply, Mj is potential demand, and 
Rij is the generic resistance factor. After numerous substitutions for the explicit forms 
o f the three variables, we get the follow ing trade flow  equation:
O y 8\ y 82p M
_  o * * i  I j  r ij
j N ? 4 N/--  D / 6 ’
where the Y's are national incomes, the Ns are populations, P is the preferential trade 
factor, and D is the geographical distance. Once he has constructed this foundation he
23 Linnemann (1966, p. 33).
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then starts over and analyzes the equations and their derivation by comparing it to a 
Walrasian model. He builds a Walrasian universe with three countries and three goods. 
There are nine trade flow s in this model, where X u represents sales in the domestic 
market o f dom estically produced goods. M ost subsequent authors do away with this 
convention and only analyze trade flow s with foreign countries and do not consider 
domestic consumption. He generates general demand and supply equations and equates 
them, substituting in we have:
for the general demand and supply equations, where y and to are constant terms, the Ws 
are the potential supply or demand which are a function of income, Y , population is N, 
the p's are the prices, and t is the transport cost between countries i and j for a product 
unit from country i. Prices and trade resistances are removed from the demand equation 
since pi is a function o f world prices facing each country. Price is no longer present in 
the combined demand and supply equation:
This is the "volume" o f trade equation. Using some notation simplification letting ^ = 




X.. = y n~£(on~£W.n~£W n~£t. n~£ . (3.6)





v®  ' 1 u j
(3.7)
Now to get the final gravity equation, the equilibrium price is multiplied by the volume 
o f trade equation written by:
X -  =  (3 8)
This is the essential form o f the gravity equation. In the long run price equals the world 
price. The primary deficiency o f this derivation is that in the short run deviations from  
the world price lead to mis specification o f the other coefficients, particularly the trade 
resistance variable.25
Aitken (1973) used the gravity model to explain the intra-member and non­
member effects o f free trade areas. He used a separate cross-sectional model for each 
year 1951 to 1967 to estimate the effects o f the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) on exports among the countries.
Aitken notes that it is important in empirical studies o f free trade areas to 
include variables on income to avoid inadvertently assigning increases in import 
demand due to increases in income growth onto the effects o f the trade agreement 
variables. Aitken believes that the two most commonly used methods o f sorting out
'7 ftthese effects in the past have been flawed or inefficient. Som e studies have examined
24 This is the result for the bilateral version. The multilateral version has essentially the same form.
25 Linnemann (1966, pp. 43-44).
26 Edwin Truman (1969).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
changes in market-share o f imports (or consumption) to measure the effect o f
97
integration. Other studies examine income in the analysis by calculating income 
elasticities o f import demand in the pre and post agreement periods. Aitken feels that 
these types o f  analyses compute trade flow  effects via "residuals" and therefore other
98unexplained effects on exports could be counted as trade agreement effects. Aitken 
uses a purely econometric approach to capture the effects from free trade agreements. 
First, he estimates an augmented gravity equation with distance between traders, GDP 
o f importer, GDP o f exporter, population o f importer, population o f exporter, an 
adjacency dummy (for countries that share a common physical border) and dummies for 
EEC and EFTA when trade is explicitly between EEC or EFTA members, respectively. 
Then he estimates the same equation for a base year, 1958 in his case, without the EEC 
and EFTA dummies. He then uses these estimated coefficients with the 1959 to 1967 
data to compute exports that would have occurred without the two free trade areas. This 
is a very clever innovation. He compares those results to the actual values for those 
years to get measures o f the intra-member effects for the two free trade areas and cross­
member effects between the two free trade areas.
The nature o f the two free trade areas provides an additional layer o f interest to 
this analysis. The EEC agreement also lowers tariffs toward non-member countries. 
Therefore the EEC generates positive effects on intra-EEC trade and small but positive 
effects with EFTA members also. The EFTA, which has no tariff lowering policy with 
non-member countries, shows positive trade effects among EFTA members and small 
and negative trade impacts with EEC members. Aitken calls this negative effect "trade
27 Bela Balassa (1967).
28 Aitken (1973, p. 888).
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diversion", as countries shift imports away from non-member countries to those 
imports from member countries.
Aitken also provides an interesting interpretation for the inclusion o f the 
exporter's population and income variables. He says that income and population 
together represent the potential export supply o f that country. Income represents 
economic capacity and population represents the production ratio between domestic and 
foreign markets. Therefore the larger the exporter's population, the larger is their 
domestic market for goods relative to a foreign market, and hence the smaller their 
potential export supply. This explanation provides a solid theoretical basis for the 
expected negative sign for population.
Aitken's results are rich and robust across time. His cross-sectional approach is 
useful for observing the lagged effects o f the trade agreement variables through time or 
in his case across equations, but does not lend itself well to interpreting the magnitudes 
o f those changes over time. A lso, econometrically he does not address som e issues. 
Aitken does not address any potential heteroskedasticity problems that are likely  
inherent in a cross-sectional work like this. Likewise, his empirical design is not well- 
suited to explain the export effects o f  trade agreements. A time series model would be 
more appropriate to address this issue directly.
Anderson (1979) uses a Cobb-Douglass expenditure form to construct a gravity 
model. Each country is assumed to completely specialize in the production o f one 
good. There are no transportation costs or trade barriers. The most important 
restriction (assumption) is that the share o f income spent on imports is the same for
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OQeach country. Prices are assumed to be constant in the cross-section analysis. The 
import equation is given by:
(3.9)
where My is imports from country j by country i and bj is the share o f incom e spent on 




In his model based on Cobb Douglas preferences, income elasticities equal one. This is 
not a desirable constraint for international trade analysis. There are no distance or 
population terms in this simple model.
In order to remove the unitary income elasticity restrictions, it is replaced with a 
traded goods/non-traded goods framework. In the new framework, Anderson assumes 
that each country produces one traded good and one non-traded good. Preferences for 
traded and non-traded goods are identical across countries. Each country follow s a 
homothetic utility function for traded goods. A lso, it is assumed that expenditure shares 
spent on any good are identical for each country. This gives the definition o f country i's 
balance o f trade:
29 This is called Cobb-Douglas preferences.




Yj and Yj are the incomes o f country i and j, respectively, where exports to 
multiple country j's are allowed for,
(|>i is country i's share o f expenditure on all traded goods from country j relative 
to total expenditure,
0i is expenditure on country i's traded good divided by the total expenditure in 
country j on tradable goods, and
cj>j is country j's share o f expenditure on all traded goods from country i relative 
to total expenditure.
This means that the value o f country i's imports plus domestic spending on domestic 
tradables equals country i's exports plus domestic spending on domestic tradables. 
After some simplifying substitutions, Anderson arrives at the first modified gravity 
equation given by:
where
Mjj is imports in country i from country j and
m; is a measure o f trade imbalance due to long-term capital account transactions. 
Income elasticities are no longer restricted to one, but preferences for traded (and non- 
traded goods) are still identical and expenditure shares for any import are identical to 
other country's shares o f income spent on that import. This seems to explain the pattern 
o f  trade but does not really explain the variation in baskets o f imported goods in the real
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world. Moreover, this framework does not have any transportation costs or trade 
barriers. This is still not desirable.
N ow  the model is expanded to allow each country to produce and export more
TOthan one good and allow for transportation costs. Again preferences for traded goods 
are identical and homothetic across all countries. The imported good's share o f  income 
is a function o f income and population. In this model adding positive transportation 
costs adds bias to the results. However, the bias w ill be small if  the transportation costs 
across countries are the same. For most transactions, transportation costs between 
M exico and the US are the same, so this is a reasonable assumption for this empirical 
construct. Distance shows up only once in the constant term in this model, reflecting 
both the fixed distance and similar transportation costs. Anderson’s resulting gravity 
equation allowing for multiple exports and including transportation costs is given by the 
equation:
mi(piYi<pjYj i
My  =  — J  E~lu in (3.13)
where
f(djj) is the distance function when transportation costs are an increasing 
function o f distance,
E'1 represents a large algebraic term for the econom ic distance relative to the 
trade-weighted average o f all economic distances from country i, and 
Uij is a log-normal disturbance term.
30 These transportation costs will ultimately be proxied by distance.
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Ultimately, the theoretical foundation for the gravity equation is suitable for countries
31which have similar preferences and similar transport costs. These are reasonable 
assumptions, since the US and M exico have similar tastes for those goods which are
T9traded and similar transportation costs. The disparity occurs in that the US and 
M exico each face different levels o f trade barriers. So in this respect they are not 
similar. Linnemann's explanation is appealing for this reason.
The various theoretical foundations for the gravity model have complex 
assumptions. The gravity model has had robust success in modeling trade flow s. This 
is undeniable. The problems seem  to occur when theorists try to impose a "fit" o f  an 
existing theoretical framework (with restrictions) to an empirical model that simply 
thrives on the simple relationship between income, population, distance, and trade 
flows. Besides Linnemann, it is not entirely clear that a theory has been well-defined  
which represents this successful four-way relationship, although Anderson, Bergstrand, 
Deardorff and others make very good cases for their theories.
The underlying relationship is the unified equation o f supply and demand that 
Linnemann spoke of. That seems to be the real foundation o f  the gravity model and that 
is why it has been so successful empirically. Moreover, the case o f differentiated goods 
is also a likely candidate for why the gravity equation has been empirically successful. 
This assumption is given in several gravity model derivations. In reality, while many 
countries trade homogenous goods, they also trade many heterogeneous goods. It may
31 Anderson (1979, p. 114.)
32 Two industries are both in the top five exports for each nation and both nations have moderate to high 
volumes o f trade for the other eight industries.
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be that the mix o f heterogeneous goods is a natural part o f the mix o f exported goods. 
This m ix is "picked up" in the regression results and therefore the model performs well.
Bergstrand (1985) builds on Linnemann’s informal partial equilibrium model o f  
export supply and import demand. The gravity model falls out o f this set o f equations 
in a more formal manner. With some assumptions and substitutions, Bergstrand builds 
a general equilibrium explanation around the gravity model.
One basic objection to the gravity model is that the model lacks prices. Several 
authors reply to this objection that “[prices] merely adjust to equate supply and 
demand.”33 Bergstrand goes one step further and derives the gravity equations from a 
general equilibrium model, which has price equations built in.
Bergstrand's model has a very standard (classical) framework. All actors are 
utility maximizers and profit maximizers. There are N  countries with a single factor o f  
production. In Bergstrand's derivation o f the gravity equation, each country has 
constant elasticity o f substitution (CES) utility functions and goods are differentiated by  
their country o f origin.34 Bergstrand uses a "two-level" CES function, which allows the 
consumer to have one elasticity o f substitution between domestic goods and imports and 
another elasticity o f substitution among various imports. This assumption does not 
really affect the ultimate specification o f the model.
Bergstrand derives two gravity model specifications in his paper, the generalized 
gravity model and the reduced gravity model. The generalized gravity equation is based 
on the first two assumptions. And the reduced gravity model is based on all six explicit
33 Linnemann (1 9 6 6 ), Learner and Stern (1970), et. al.
34 More recently in the literature this latter assumption about differentiated goods based on country o f  
origin has been called the Armington assumption.
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assumptions. The first assumption is that the import market for good k is small 
relative to the other markets in the system. This assumption is common in many o f the 
international trade model derivations. This is the equivalent o f the classic assumption 
o f a small open economy. This assumption is necessary so that domestic prices, 
domestic interest rates, and domestic income levels may be considered exogenous. This 
reduces the huge system of equations substantially. Second, he assumes identical tastes 
(utility) and production functions in each country. This assumption is also present in 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model, among others. Using the first two assumptions alone, 
Bergstrand generates the "generalized" gravity model. The "generalized gravity 
equation" is written as:
g  1 A+1 .^+1 A+l /2+1
  _ —  - a   - < r - —  <7- —
(c-i)(r-v)





jj, is the CES between domestic goods and importable goods,
G is the CES among different importable goods,
T| is the constant elasticity o f transformation for production for home and
35 Some notation has been simplified for this presentation, with no changes made to the content. For 
specifics see Bergstrand (1985, pp. 475-476).
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export markets,
y  is the constant elasticity o f transformation for production among different 
export markets,
PXjj is the value o f exports,
Y  are national incomes,
C is transportation costs,
T is equal to one plus the tariff rate,
E is the exchange rate o f  i to j's currency, and
Pik and Pjk are the prices o f good k in country i and j, respectively.
This equation can be estimated with ordinary least squares, given a constant term and
log-normal error term. N o constraints are placed on the parameters, except that they are
equal across all country pairings. This model bears the same problems as many o f the
applied general equilibrium m odels, as it requires a large amount o f data for each
country at the production and consumption levels and for prices. W hile this may be a
good specification and shares the same multiplicative form as the gravity equation, this
is not an empirically friendly model.
The third assumption is that goods are perfectly substitutable in production and
consumption. This implies that the elasticities o f substitution and elasticities o f
transformation are equal to infinity. Fourth, there is perfect commodity arbitrage. This
implies that prices everywhere are equal. Fifth, there are zero tariffs. Therefore T is
equal to zero. And sixth, there are zero transportation costs. Therefore C is equal to
zero. Using all six assumptions and making appropriate substitutions the generalized
gravity equation becom es the reduced gravity equation:
<3 1 5 >
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For practical and empirical purposes, one can then use dummy variables to proxy for 
tariffs and other trade barriers and distance can be used to proxy for transportation 
costs. He also suggests a dummy variable for geographical adjacency.
A  modified reduced gravity model is run for four separate nonconsecutive years 
for 210 countries. Distance is used as a proxy for transportation costs and an adjacency 
dummy is included for adjacent countries. Dummy variables for European Economic 
Community (EEC) and European Free Trade Area (EFTA) members are also included. 
Incomes, distance, and the adjacency dummy were statistically significant in all four 
model-years. The EEC and EFTA coefficients were statistically significant in all but 
one case. In each case the coefficients had the correct (Tinbergen/Linnemann) 
theoretically predicted signs.
Bergstrand runs his same four models again with a slightly different 
specification. This time he adds variables for the exchange rate, the export unit value 
index, the import unit value index, the importer GDP deflator, and the exporter GDP 
deflator. These latter four new variables are an attempt to capture (or proxy for) some 
o f the price terms of the generalized gravity equation, defined above. The exchange 
rate is a straightforward attempt to capture some terms o f trade effects that do not 
necessarily have anything to do with import demand or export supply.
Bergstrand's secondary contribution from his article is that he provides intuitive 
explanations (derived from his generalized gravity equation derivation) o f the expected 
signs for the latter four new variables. If the elasticity o f  substitution among imported 
goods (a ) is greater than one, then the importer's income coefficient should be 
positively signed and the GDP deflator coefficient should be negatively signed. If the
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elasticity o f transformation among exports (y) is greater than the elasticity o f  
transformation between domestic goods and imported goods (r|), then the importer's 
unit value index will be negatively signed. If the elasticity o f substitution among 
imported goods (o ) is greater than the elasticity o f substitution between domestic goods 
and imported goods (|i), then the coefficient for the importer's unit value index w ill be 
positively signed. If the elasticity o f substitution between domestic goods and imported 
goods (fi) is greater than one, then the coefficient for the importer's GDP deflator will 
be positively signed.
Again his equations all have the theoretically expected signs and many o f  the 
coefficients are statistically significant with the notable exception o f exchange rates, the 
import unit value index, and the export unit value index.
The exchange rate index (specified as increasing when the importer's currency 
appreciates relative to the base year) served as a proxy for exchange rate and was not 
statistically significant from zero in the first two models, but it was significant in the 
1975 and 1976 models. Bergstrand points out that exchange rates operated under fixed  
mechanisms before 1975, and that after they m oved to more flexible or floating 
systems, the coefficients becom e significant. This is an important observation for doing 
historical time series. If your history contains the cutoff point 1970 (about when many 
countries moved to a non-fixed mechanism), then you should account for exchange 
rates differently in the two periods.
The export unit value index was significant for only half o f  the coefficients. The 
GDP deflator variables were significant for two o f the eight coefficients. The exchange 
rate variable became significant at only the 10 percent level in 1975. Bergstrand
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concludes that his coefficient estimates support the belief that export products are 
differentiated by country and commodity arbitrage is imperfect.
Bergstrand recognized the restrictiveness o f the last four assumptions and 
suggests that the "generalized gravity equation" is the more appropriate specification.
In fact, assumptions three to six were all rejected in tests o f the reduced gravity 
equation.
Thursby and Thursby (1987) derive a gravity-type equation from reduced supply 
and demand equations. The general form o f their reduced model is given by:
P Q  =  f ( P D ,  PI, CPI, GNP, P j ,P S ,Z ,  HI, HE, T, C ) ,  (3.16)
where
Q is the quantity o f exports from i to j,
PD is the import price o f i's exports to j,
PI is the index o f import prices o f exports o f other countries,
CPI is the consumer price index,
GNP is gross national product,
Pj is the export price o f i's exports to j,
PS is an index o f net export prices o f i's exports to other countries,
Z is a variable reflecting tastes in country j for i's exports (the absolute value o f  
the difference in per capita GNP between country i and j),
HI is a hedging dummy, such that if  importers hedge in the forward market, then 
HI=0,
HE is a factor reflecting the extent o f hedging in the forward market which 
alters the own currency receipts o f exports o f  country i to country j,
T is one plus the tariff rate on good k, and 
C is the transportation cost on good k.
Data for income, CPI and exchange rates are available. So they use proxy variables for
the other elements o f the reduced supply and demand equation. The proxy variables
used were: a dummy variable for adjacency, EEC and EFTA dummies instead o f the
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tariff rate variable, unit value o f  imports (same as Bergstrand [1985]) instead of  
import prices and unit value o f exports instead o f export prices.
Their models consist o f 17 countries over nine years. They m ove away from the 
common practice o f  pooling all countries into one model and estimate one export 
equation for each country. The dependent variable for each equation is the exports from 
one country to each o f the other 16 countries for nine years. A  Wald test was performed 
to determine a priori whether pooling the country data was appropriate. The Wald test 
failed in each o f the 136 cases (i times j tests for (i,j= l,...,17; i^j). This is a major 
departure from past literature which pooled country data routinely.36 Their paper helps 
reveal the theoretical tradeoff between single-exporter models and multi-country 
exporter models. The multi-country exporter models have the benefit o f greater 
variability among dependent variables and independent variables because o f the 
diversity inherent across multiple countries. Likewise, the multi-country exporter 
models benefit by having a large number o f observations; more degrees o f freedom  
provides power to the hypothesis (f-tests, etc.) and offers the ability to test more highly 
specified models with more parameters. Multi-country export models' coefficients may 
only be interpreted for general trade flow  relationships among all countries in the 
sample. Single-exporter models' coefficients provide concise meanings and 
interpretations. In single-exporter models, statistically significant variables can be 
directly linked to the trade flow s between specific country pairings.
Thursby and Thursby also showcase two other features in their model. Many 
other studies alternate freely between the nominal and real exchange rate variables (in
36 Linneman (1966), Aitken (1973), Abrams (1980) and Bergstrand (1985) all pool countries in their 
empirical design.
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this case, Thursby and Thursby test variability measures o f exchange rates). Thursby 
and Thursby set up a specific comparison o f two exchange rate variables. They used a 
JA test in each specification. The test did not find statistical evidence for nominal or 
real exchange rates. That is, the test could not distinguish between the two variables. 
Thursby and Thursby ultimately settle on the nominal exchange rate. In the results, the 
exchange rate variable was not statistically significant for the three countries Canada, 
South Africa, and the United States.
Thursby and Thursby compute a variability measure o f exchange rates based on 
a monthly m oving average o f the quadratic trend. This exchange rate variability 
variable was found to be negative and statistically significant in only 9 o f the 17 
models. M eanwhile, the spot price for exchange rates was found to be significant in 11 
o f the 17 models. The inclusion o f exchange rates, real or nominal, which intuitively 
are important to terms o f trade, seem  to be overwhelmed by other aspects o f the gravity 
specification. This is true for some countries and not for others. But in a single-export 
model like this one, there is no guarantee that exchange rate w ill be correlated with 
exports in a statistically significant way.
About 50 percent o f the GNP coefficients are statistically significant and the 
same percent are positive. In Thursby and Thursby's reduced form, exporter GNP is 
written as:
GNP = — 5 (^' + 1 ) , (3.17)
where
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05 is the coefficient o f GNP in the supply equation,
(Xi is the coefficient o f price in the demand equation, and 
D is equal to the distance between country i and j.
"Since w e expect D and (3s to be positive, a negative coefficient implies that the
"XI
elasticity, a i ,  is less than 1 in magnitude." So for values o f ai less than negative one, 
this equation generates the correct inference for the sign o f the GNP coefficient. This 
gives us the common result in gravity models that the coefficient for GNP or GDP is 
positive.
Deardorff (1998) constructs a theoretical basis for the gravity model rooted in 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model. He derives two versions o f the gravity model, relaxing 
different sets o f assumptions in each. In the first derivation, he starts with a Heckscher- 
Ohlin model with "frictionless trade." It is useful to disregard a common conception o f  
exports as being the net o f total goods produced in a country less the amount o f goods 
consumed in the domestic market. The primary restriction in the first derivation is that 
transportation costs and all other trade barriers are equal to zero. As a result this 
restricted framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin model does not identify patterns o f trade, 
but only creates a mechanism by which domestic supply and the international set of 
exports are allocated. Transactions for specific goods are determined from the 
following algorithm: producers put the output into a world pool, consumers then choose 
their preferred level o f consumption of each good from this pool and then, "by the Law 
o f Large Numbers," he states that we will observe the expected value o f their choices.38 
Given identical and homothetic tastes, all countries w ill spend the same share, |3k, of
37 Thursby and Thursby (1987, p. 494).
38 Deardorff (1998, p. 10).
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Tij is the value o f country j's imports from country i,
Yj and Yj are the incomes from countries i and j, respectively, and 
Y w is world income.
This is the "simple frictionless gravity equation."
If you relax the assumption o f identical and homothetic tastes, then the share,
pik, that each country spends on good k is different for each country. N ow  the import
equation is:
(Xik is the share o f country i's income from purchasing good k and 
XkW is the world output o f good k.
In this intermediate model, if a country does not demand any o f good k and country i
only produces good k, then imports w ill be zero regardless o f income. So this equation
is not a gravity model. Now if we add the restriction that the portion o f export
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and with a few  more substitutions we get the general result for the frictionless trade 
gravity equation given by:
The sign o f the summation on the right is equal to the covariance o f (Xik* and Pjk*. So  
on average if  the exporter production shares are uncorrelated with importer 
consumption shares then you get the simple frictionless trade gravity model.
This frictionless trade gravity model is not only not realistic but it is probably 
not useful for analyzing deeper trade patterns and trade liberalization, where you expect 
exporter production and importer consumption to be correlated.
Deardorff derives a second version o f the gravity equation for "impeded trade." 
In this derivation, every export is assumed to have some positive transport cost and/or 
trade barrier imposed on it. The "impeded trade" case does require that every country 
produces and exports different goods (the case o f perfect product differentiation). If 
you introduce transportation costs into the Heckscher-Ohlin model, then countries with 
identical factor prices cannot trade with each other. In the factor price equalization 
theorem, the prices for traded goods equalize, then the factor prices equalize. Once this 
happens, all production costs are equal. Therefore domestic consumers will never buy 
the imported good which is more expensive due to the transportation costs. So in order 
to give the Heckscher-Ohlin model a chance, we need to relax the equal factor prices 
restriction. Pattern o f trade is determined by tastes, which are assumed to be identical
W
(3.21)
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and Cobb-Douglas.39 Each country again spends a fixed share, pi, o f their income on 
the good from country i. On an f.o.b. (exclusive o f transportation costs) basis, with 
Cobb-Douglas tastes, imports are defined as:
YY.
7'0 = - L ± ,  (3.22)
i j  w
where tjj is the tariff and or transportation costs between country i and j.
This is nearly identical to the general gravity equation derived by Tinbergen. This 
restraint on tastes is not desirable, however. If w e assume that tastes have the constant 
elasticity o f substitution (CES) property, then the import equation becomes:
YY  1
T  —
ij ~ Y t..W *IJ
p } ~ artj
Y j >a





p equals the relative distance from consumer to supplier,
0h is the income o f country i's share o f world income, and 
o  is the elasticity o f substitution between countries' goods.40
This equation is very close to the general gravity equation and has some interesting
implications. If the distance between country i and j is equal to the average distance of
all exporters to country i, then the formula reduces to the simple frictionless trade
gravity equation. If the distance from country i to j is greater than the average, then
imports w ill be less than average. This is appealing. A lso a trivial result is that
39 The inference is that if everyone has identical tastes and everyone produces different goods, then 
everyone necessarily exports to every country in equal proportions.
40 Deardorff (1998, p. 20).
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countries w ill always purchase more domestically than from exporters because the 
transportation costs for i to i are one in this model, the lowest that they can be. This too 
is appealing. A lso in this context, if trade barriers or transportation costs decrease, then 
imports from more distant countries w ill rise, while imports with closer countries will 
decline. This is appealing because it parallels the intuition o f terms o f trade changing in 
favor o f  distant sellers.
This theoretical foundation is the best that has been presented to date. For 
bilateral traded evaluations, distance is a less relevant factor in the analysis and 
technically the distance from country i and j is equal to the average. So the average is 
always equal to the current i and j distance. Deardorff makes two important 
observations about gravity models. First, he observes that many different trade theories 
can be reduced or restricted such that they generate a gravity-type equation. This has 
been proven clearly in the previously presented literature. And second, because 
different theories can reduce to the gravity equation, it is not appropriate to use the 
gravity equation as evidence that one theory is correct.
Gould (1998) was the first to use the gravity equation to measure the pure 
bilateral trade flow s between two countries. The coefficients in this equation represent 
the pure relationship between two countries and the effects o f the regressors on export 
flows between those two countries. There is no haze created by having numerous 
countries' exports included in the same equation. A  separate equation is specified for 
each direction of trade flow. This version o f the augmented gravity model uses lagged 
dependent variables to pick up both trend and capture any autocorrelation processes in 
the model. This specification was used in many previous studies when statistical
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software was less equipped to deal with non-spherical errors like autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity.
Gould uses very general versions o f the gravity equation:
My is country i's import to country j,
M t.j is a q-period lag o f the dependent variable,
Xjj are country i's exports to country j,
X t.q is a q-period lag o f the dependent variable,
Yj and Yj are the optimal lags o f the real G D P for the exporting and importing 
countries, respectively,
Pi and Pj are the G D P price deflators for the importing and exporting countries, 
respectively,
Ey is the real exchange rate between countries i and j, and
Eiw is the real exchange rate between the exporting country and the rest o f the
world.
The variable, D , is a dummy for trade liberalization in M exico where D  equals one after 
1988, the period when M exico started to remove controls on investment flows into 
M exico and remove some non-tariff barriers (see U S-M exico History section for further 
details). The NAFTA variable is a dummy equal to one after 1993. This is very similar 
to the specification used in the empirical model o f this dissertation. There is no distance 
variable, obviously, because it would only act as a constant in a one-way two-country
+ a .D  + a aNAFTA + £
(3.24)
and
Xu = P0 + PxX t_q + P2Yit_q + fiiY jt_q + frE'j + & E iw + & F  
+P1P j,_q + PSD + p 9NAFTA + e
(3.25)
where
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trade model. Gould uses a long history o f quarterly data from 1980 to 1996 and 
specifies six equations, one each for each permutation o f trade flow s between Canada, 
M exico, and the US.
Gould does not directly incorporate any foreign direct investment into his 
model, but he does make an interesting observation about the inter-relationship o f FDI, 
trade and the reduction o f trade barriers due to NAFTA. He states, "[i]f NAFTA did not 
create a credible commitment to free trade, new investment would not flow  into export 
industries to take advantage o f reduced trade barriers."41 Therefore, it is expected that a 
NAFTA variable will pick up some feedback from the FDI spillover effects. It is 
appropriate to allow the NAFTA variable to take credit for this effect because the 
increased exports are a result o f the lowered barriers to trade (caused by NAFTA), but 
in an indirect way.
The NAFTA variable is statistically significant in the US exports to M exico  
model. Gould then uses the coefficients to predict the level o f imports and exports that 
would have occurred without NAFTA. He found that NAFTA was responsible for 16.3 
percent higher U S exports to M exico and 16.2 percent higher US imports from M exico  
than would have occurred otherwise. The NAFTA coefficient in the US imports from 
M exico model was nearly identical to the NAFTA coefficient in the US exports to 
M exico model. However, the coefficient in the latter equation was not statistically 
significant. This is some weak evidence that M exico benefited to a greater extent 
because o f NAFTA than did the US.
41 Gould (1998, p. 14).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
Krueger (1999) focused extensively on shares o f US exports to M exico as a 
percent o f  total US exports and shares o f total M exican exports to US as a percent o f  
total M exican exports. Krueger's analysis takes place in three different sections. First 
she does a cross-section analysis o f aggregate exports. Then she breaks down the 
exports sectors into their one-, two- and three-digit SITC categories. And finally she 
constructs a gravity model. US exports to M exico represented 6.9 percent o f total US 
exports in 1980. Trade liberalizations in the maquiladora42 industries and others in the 
1980s contributed to the slight increase to 7.2 percent o f total exports by 1990. By 
1998, the U S ’s exports to M exico made up 11.6 percent of total US exports 43 
M eanwhile, M exico's share o f US imports doubled from 1980 to 1998. Krueger then 
identifies 18 two-digit SITC categories which had an increase o f at least three percent in 
the US import share from 1992 and 1998.
It is not at all surprising that the top five US exports to M exico three-digit SITC 
industries which are examined in the econometric analysis in this paper are also 
contained in the group of 18 industries identified by Krueger. She observes that at the 
three-digit level there are few  categories in which member imports rose, but fell for the 
rest o f the world. Therefore she concludes that there is insufficient evidence for trade 
diversion for these goods.
Krueger used a pooled dataset over six non-consecutive years for 61 countries to 
estimate an augmented gravity equation. There were a number o f unusual features in 
her model specification. First, she used a common intercept term as opposed to running
42 Maquiladora are those special sectors o f goods which are exported from the US to M exico, 
manufactured, assembled or processed there, then are reexported back to the US. These sectors o f goods 
traditionally have received preferential tariff rates going back to the early 1980s.
43 Krueger (1999, p. 8).
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it with the more widely used fixed-effects model. Instead she used dummies to 
capture the year (or temporal) effect. Second, the model estimates an enormous 41 
coefficients where all but four are dichotomous dummies. This is a potentially 
problematic specification but she has rigorously controlled for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation using the appropriate tests and transformations. The possibility o f  
multicollinearity and model m isspecification still cannot be ruled out.
Krueger finds two interesting results. First, her NAFTA variable and the 
NAFTA trended variables both had small positive coefficients, 0.11 and 0.03  
respectively, but were statistically insignificant. The coefficients for the NAFTA  
variables can be interpreted to mean that NAFTA led to a net three percent increase in 
exports among member countries.44 Second, the coefficient for exports where the 
importer was a NAFTA member but the exporter was not, was statistically significant 
and negative. This is evidence that NAFTA may have had some trade diversion 
effects.45
Krueger's most important contribution to the study o f NAFTA are her 
observations about trade liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, her insights about the 
importance o f the peso crisis and its subsequent effects on real exchange rates, and how  
political unrest accompanied by assassinations affected NAFTA. She states that the real 
depreciation in the peso in 1994 was greater than the influence o f NAFTA given the 
trade liberalization which had already occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s. She states
44 Krueger (1999, p. 20) states that the NAFTA trend variable indicates "three percent per year" growth in 
exports. It is unclear if  this export growth is computed as an average or as a net growth figure.
45 She observes that for those categories where Mexican exports to the US grew rapidly, they also grew  
rapidly with the rest o f  the world. She concludes that this is evidence that trade diversion did not occur. 
The literature seems to support the belief the trade diversion did not occur as a result o f  NAFTA. 
However, the regression results for the variables Importer in NAFTA and Both in NAFTA contradict her 
explicit observations in the text about trade diversion.
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that the peso depreciated by 50% in real terms. So relatively speaking, the currency 
effects on real income, import behavior, and export behavior far outweigh any marginal 
gains that might be due to NAFTA's implementation. This conclusion is borne out in 
her gravity model results. The NAFTA dummies are all statistically nonsignificant, 
indicating no statistical difference from zero.
The Congressional Budget O ffice (2003)46 provides the most current, official 
US estimates o f the effects o f NAFTA on US trade with M exico in their 2003 report. 
Their study uses a long-term error-correction model with quarterly data from 1989 to 
2001. The two long-term models are estimated by maximum likelihood with first order 
autocorrelation correction in the error term. The CBO model uses gravity-type 
equations to estimate exports between Canada, M exico, and the United States. They 
estimate four equations specifications given by the following:
In X = c c n + a ,  TREND + or, CONSTRS1 + a .  In YMex
0 1  2 3 (3.26)
+ a 4 In TEX + a 5NAFTA + e
A In X = J 3 0 + f t  CONSTRS \ + J ]j3 2 \n X t_t + J ]  f i 3 A In Y‘Mext_ t
^  ' ' (3.27)
+ X  J34A ln(T£*,_,) +J3SNAFTA + /?6 (In -  In X M) + ju
i
In M  = a ,  + a,TREND + a ?CONSTRS0 + a , In Yus
0 1  2 3 (3.28)
+ a 4 In(TEm ) + a 5NAFTA + e
46 Gary Hufbauer and David Gould are credited in the paper as having provided valuable comments. The 
authors note that their empirical design was based in part on the methodology o f  David Gould (1998).
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where
A is the first-difference operator,
ln() is the natural logarithm of the variable,
X  is real US exports to M exico,
M is real US imports from M exico excluding crude oil,
superscripts X  and M are the values o f X and M predicted by the long-term
equilibrium equations,
Y  ex is the M exican industrial production index,
Y us is real US GDP,
TEX, TEm are the tariff adjusted real exchange rates for exports and imports, 
respectively,
NAFTA is a dummy variable, equal to 0 before first quarter 1994 and equal to 1 
after 1993, and
CONST81 and TREND80 are constructed variables to rectify certain 
deficiencies in the data for 1981 and earlier.
Both the long-term equilibrium equations and the dynamic error-correcting equations
were run for the time horizon 1969 to 1993 and also for 1989 to 2001 for a total o f four
export models and four import models. Crude oil was removed from US imports o f oil
because the trade in oil is inconsistent with trade in all other goods imported.47 Four
leads and four lags o f the Y and TE variables were used to adjust for the bias caused in
AQ
finite sampling o f maximum likelihood estimation.
Alm ost every coefficient is statistically significant in the long-term equilibrium  
equations (equations (1) and (3)). Four equations were examined from 1989 to 2001 for 
which there is a NAFTA variable. The NAFTA coefficient for US exports to M exico is 
0.07 and statistically significant at the five percent alpha level. This model has an R-
47 CBO (2003, p. 28).
48 CBO (2003, p. 32).
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squared o f .96. The NAFTA coefficient for US imports from M exico is 0.07 and also 
statistically significant at the five percent alpha level. Exactly half o f the coefficients in 
the dynamic error-correction models are statistically significant at least the 10 percent 
alpha level. The NAFTA coefficient is 0.05 and was not statistically significant. The 
R-squared for this model is .68. N o NAFTA variable appears in the dynamic error- 
correcting equation for US imports from M exico. It is not clear from the write-up why 
it was omitted.
The CBO results are consistent with most studies' results. They find that 
NAFTA's effect on both US exports to and imports from M exico are small. They 
conclude that the largest portion of growth that occurred between M exico and the US in 
the 1990s would have occurred without NAFTA. From their empirical results, they find 
that NAFTA was responsible for an immediate increase o f 2.2 percent o f US exports to 
M exico. They also find that the NAFTA effect persists for years after NAFTA and 
continues to grow. They find that in 2001, NAFTA is responsible for an 11.3 percent 
increase in US exports to M exico. These results are just slightly lower than the results 
from Krueger (1999), who finds a three percent increase in US exports to M exico, while 
Gould (1998) finds a higher increase in US exports to M exico.
The CBO finds that the effects on M exican exports to the US were slightly 
smaller. The immediate effect o f NAFTA on M exican exports to the US were 
estimated at 1.9 percent. The CBO finds that the NAFTA effects on M exican exports 
are expanding also. By 2001, the impact on M exican exports to the US climb to 7.7 
percent. These are both small in relation to total incomes in each country. The export 
effects for the US never exceed 0.12 percent o f US GDP and the imports never exceed
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0.11 percent o f US GDP. The effects for M exico relative to their GDP were much 
larger. The export effect (Mexican exports to the US) for M exico was 1.7 percent o f  
M exican GDP, while the import (M exican imports from the US) effect measured 1.9 
percent o f M exican GDP. This is the common interpretation o f how the effects o f  
NAFTA were small for the US and moderate-to-large for M exico.
The history o f the gravity model sets the framework for export analysis. But the 
real addition from this paper is the foreign direct investment angle and how it affects 
exports. Capturing the true effects between foreign direct investment and exports is 
crucial to correctly identifying the relationship between NAFTA and exports. In the 
next section, a theoretical model o f foreign direct investment and exports is developed. 
The stylized facts generated in the theoretical model provide a backdrop for testing the 
selected industries in the empirical model. Each o f these will be discussed in detail 
below.
Summary
Numerous variations o f the gravity model have been developed in the last 40  
years. Tinbergen (1962) first used the gravity model to measure international trade 
flows with the core variables: income, population, and distance. Linnemann (1966) 
develops a compelling qualitative explanation o f the gravity model defining the 
potential supply and demand in each country. A  central assumption is posed that a 
population always demands more than it can produce. Also, higher incomes mean that 
there is more demand for goods.
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Aitken (1973) further refines Linnemann's analysis. Income and population 
together determine export supply. Income represents economic capacity and population 
reflects the ratio between domestic production and foreign markets, such that the larger 
the population, the more production is consumed domestically relative to that exported 
to domestic markets.
Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Thursby and Thursby (1987), Deardorff 
(1998), and Gould (1998) make additional contributions to the gravity model. The 
former five authors add theoretical underpinnings to the model and further calibrate 
important terms o f the core equation. Thursby and Thursby test nominal and real 
exchange rates and find no difference between them. Gould is the first to use the 
gravity model in a bilateral trade flow  analysis. This design has the added benefit that 
concrete statements and inferences may be made about the equation coefficients. Gould 
finds that NAFTA was responsible for a 16.3 percent increase in US exports to M exico.
Krueger (1999) finds that the impact o f the peso crisis is far greater than the 
effects generated by NAFTA. This evidence provides further support for the argument 
that monetary variables, like the exchange rate, are crucial for models examining 
exports to M exico. Krueger finds that NAFTA was responsible for three percent o f the 
increased exports among NAFTA members.
The Congressional Budget O ffice (2003) uses an error correction model to 
estimate the effects o f NAFTA. They find that NAFTA was responsible for a 2.2 
percent increase in US exports to M exico.
The gravity models have been used extensively to test the impacts o f free trade 
areas on trade flows. These models seem to do a good job in capturing the majority o f
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variation of trade flow s, as measured by the R-squared goodness o f fit statistic. 
However, as in any econometric work, alterations in sample horizon and equation 
specification can lead to some variation in conclusions. The differences between the 
Gould results and the results in this dissertation are some evidence that variations, 
although not necessarily large variations, in conclusions can occur. Som e important 
parameters in the Gould model, like the time horizon in export growth calculation and 
method of correcting for autocorrelation, were not revealed in the articles and therefore 
appropriate comparisons are not possible. The export growth calculation from the 
regression coefficients can be calculated in several ways. If the time horizon in the 
export growth model calculation is allowed to extend far past the free trade agreement 
implementation date, then the growth can be shown to explode. The export growth 
calculation in this dissertation is computed only using the four quarters following the 
appropriate lagged NAFTA coefficient.
Gould's gravity specification is the most useful specification for two reasons. 
First, his specification uses only bilateral trade flow  data to estimate the coefficients. 
This is useful because analysts can draw country-specific conclusions for each 
coefficient estimate. Second, the addition o f the exchange rate variable to the gravity 
model allows analysts to account for many monetary shocks without losing several 
degrees o f freedom from a monetary model.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL MODEL
Does an increase in foreign direct investment lead to more exports? Or 
alternatively, does an increase in foreign direct investment lead to less exports? In 
order to fully understand this relationship, it is convenient to break down the individual 
components and mechanisms involved in the movement of resources from production in 
Home to production in Foreign. When a firm decides to invest in a new production 
facility (either an existing facility which comes under control o f the Parent firm by 
gaining controlling-interest shares or the building o f a new production facility), several 
areas o f the econom y are affected and have independent effects on net exports (both 
within the Parent industry and in other industries). Specifically, there are two mutually 
exclusive export changes that occur when a firm begins production in another country. 
The nature o f  these two sources o f change will be discussed separately below.
It all begins with a firm which has som e stock o f liquid assets which they can 
invest in various investment instruments. Generally these take the form of stocks, 
bonds and futures investments. Firms constantly seek out new investment opportunities 
which yield an expected profit as well as opportunities which may expand the future 
market share o f their product. Foreign direct investment, in contrast to the other 
investment instruments, can satisfy both o f these goals.
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There is still no consensus in the literature for why firms choose to create 
subsidiaries in other countries, as opposed to other leasing strategies. Perhaps the 
answer is related to the increasing complexity o f intellectual property rights law and the 
risk involved in sharing with third parties. The more important question, however, is 
given that firms do invest in Foreign-located firms, whether investing in such a 
Subsidiary results in more or less exports for the Home country. There is considerable 
evidence for each hypothesis. The majority o f empirical studies favor a complementary 
relationship, but not an overwhelming majority. In the following section, some 
representative articles are reviewed. It w ill be shown from these past studies that the 
general empirical design or in some cases the data themselves are not conducive to 
testing the FDI-exports relationship. To investigate the relationship between FDI and 
exports, it is necessary to understand why firms create subsidiaries to begin with, or at 
least understand some incentives for creating them. W hile FDI is not a typical 
investment, it is useful to think o f it as just one investment alternative among many, for 
purposes o f determining what the firm expects to gain by the investment. A  firm will 
only choose to invest in a foreign firm if it is going to produce some immediate or 
future value to the firm. Much o f the choice among investment alternatives is pretty 
standard from the classical assessment o f investment theory. However, foreign direct 
investment is distinguished from other ordinary investment opportunities by some 
additional factors which are not typically found in a standard asset like the purchase o f  
stocks from a domestic firm. Investing in a venture in a foreign country leads to such 
factors as the additional risk generated by any political turmoil in the target investment 
country, exchange rate risk, foreign taxes and tax laws, potential language barriers, and
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also such positive factors as comparative advantages reaped from new labor pools (or 
capital pools) and a physical presence in one good can lead to an expansion o f branding 
which can spill over into other product lines.
The relationship between foreign direct investment and exports is complex. And 
so it is not surprising that there is no simple solution or explanation for the wide array 
of results in the existing literature. There is a wide body of literature supporting both 
conclusions, that foreign direct investment has a complementary (or substitution) effect 
on exports from the investor country to the investment recipient country. Before 
presenting the theoretical model, a brief review o f these theories and conclusions will be 
presented. The research design, countries chosen, industries investigated, and period o f  
examination all have an important effect on why these authors arrived at their 
conclusions.
Lipsey and W eiss (1981) find a complementary relationship between FDI and 
exports. Lipsey and W eiss recognize that the biggest problem in identifying the true 
relationship between foreign direct investment and exports is one o f unit o f analysis and 
the proper data with which to analyze it. Specifically, they observe that the proper unit 
o f analysis for solving this puzzle is the firm and that exports should be analyzed by 
country and by industry. Unfortunately, such data are not available for any country as 
time series. Lipsey and W eiss use 1970 cross-sectional data from Bureau o f Economic 
Analysis' Special Survey o f US Multinational Companies for the US affiliate's sales 
data.
The 1970 data is classified by country and by industry. There are two facets o f  
the Lipsey and W eiss design which are not the most suitable choices for analyzing the
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FDI-exports relationship. First, the unit o f analysis for each equation is US exports to 
14 different countries. Each o f the 14 countries (the US plus 13 others) are highly  
developed capital-abundant countries. This leaves very little variance along the vital 
parameter o f difference in input-abundance. That is not to say that these countries do 
not have a "sufficient" variance in FDI or exports to make the regression model viable, 
but countries selected are all very similar. This means that the ability o f the model to 
pick up differences across countries with widely different input ratios is lacking 
completely. Countries should be selected which have different input abundances. It is 
useful to select countries with different input abundance to fully capture how  countries 
vary with respect to input abundance.
Second, the Bureau o f Econom ic Analysis' Special Survey was restricted to 
industry groups within the manufacturing classification category. That means that the 
industries selected were most likely highly capital intensive industries. Care should be 
taken to select industries which have a mix o f labor and capital intensities. It will 
further be shown in the theoretical model below that firms whose products are capital 
intensive (labor intensive) will seek out countries where there are comparative 
advantages in capital (labor). So it is important to select both industries in which there 
are both capital intensive goods and labor intensive goods so the model contains 
sufficient variety along that dimension to capture any effects which are held therein.
One equation was run for each 3-digit SIC industry. Tw elve o f the 14 
coefficients for net sales were positive. Ten o f the twelve positive coefficients for net 
sales were statistically significant. Neither o f the two negative coefficients were 
statistically significant. Standard errors were not provided. One o f the two negative
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coefficient's t-statistics was between 1 and 1.96. These models show some solid  
evidence that net sales (the proxy for FDI) has a complementary relationship with 
exports. That is, they find only positive coefficients among those which were 
significant, which indicates complementarity. But while there is strong evidence for a 
complementary relationship, there is also some passive evidence that a complementary 
relationship is not the only outcome under all circumstances, for all countries, for all 
industries, and even for all model specifications.
Blomstrom, Lipsey and Kulchycky (1988) generate seven equations, one for 
each industry o f analysis. Their source data com es from the now-classic 1970 Swedish  
data set popularized by Birgitta Swedenborg.49 Blomstrom, Lipsey and Kulchycky use 
net sales o f foreign affiliates as a proxy for FDI. The problem here is the incongruity 
between current econom ic events which affect sales and past events which caused the 
FDI transfer. Current econom ic events (e.g., successive oil shocks which increase the 
price o f gas and decrease the demand for large trucks) can influence net sales (e.g., o f  
trucks) regardless o f the actual FDI investment. W hile this criticism is true, it does not 
detract from the findings o f the models. B y using the Swedenborg data set and through 
other design techniques, the authors have eliminated many of the common design errors 
in testing the foreign direct investment and trade flows relationship.
The authors made an effort to eliminate imports from the home country from the 
net sales data. To estimate this, the authors reduced the sales figure by "the ratio o f  
imports to sales." The goal is to account for those sales which were imports from the 
home country. The problem is that there is no link between the ratio o f imports to sales
49 The Swedish data set contains firm level data for multinational firms in Sweden and their subsidiaries. 
The data set contains variables on inter-firm exports as well as international exports.
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and the actual proportion of imports that went to the subsidiaries in question. Given 
these two spurious conditions, net sales may not be a good proxy for FDI. One last 
comment on the empirical design: the authors include both GDP and GDP per capita in 
their equations, which inserts notable multicollinearity into the regressions. The 
Swedish regression for paper products contained a statistically significant negative GDP 
variable. This is highly unusual and was not addressed by the authors.
In one model, six o f the seven manufacturing industries' independent variables 
have a positive relationship with the net sales dependent variable. Four o f the six were 
statistically significant. The theoretical question investigated by using this model is 
slightly different than the standard question about FDI's effect on exports, but the 
correlation still supports the complementarity theory. A  negative relationship was 
found in the metal manufacturing industry and was statistically significant.
For the US equations, there are 30 industries which utilize 1982 data for 15 
countries, but the authors do not state which specific countries are used. The results for 
some industries indicate a complementary relationship and other industries indicate a 
substitution effect in the US equations. Seven industries had a positive statistically 
significant net sales independent variable and 4 industries had a negative statistically 
significant net sales independent variable. This article is considered to be one o f the 
strongest pieces o f evidence for a complementary relationship in the FDI-exports 
debate. The results are clearly mixed for the United States export equations. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence, although not explicit, that country o f origin 
matters in the relationship. The Swedish equations are dominated by the 
complementarity effect, while the results are mixed for the US.
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Marchant, Cornell and Koo (2002) choose geographically close trading 
partners for this study. The study does not make any explicit assumptions about 
country, industry, or firm selection based on input intensity. But this article does 
demonstrate that it is important to consider these issues when examining the FDI-export 
relationship. The five countries selected contain a mix o f a capital-abundant country 
(Japan) with four countries (China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) which are 
relatively labor-abundant. It is always good to investigate countries representing both 
ends o f a particular dimension. However, if  capital-abundant country selections have a 
predisposition towards one FDI-export relationship and the labor-abundant countries 
have a predisposition towards another relationship, then they will have offsetting effects 
in the coefficients, which will obscure the real relationship. A  case will be made shortly 
that these factors do matter. In the case o f a mixed group of input-abundant countries, a 
single country which has strong tendencies may overwhelm the effects from other 
smaller economies. This may be the case with Japan and the other four countries. The 
truth can only be seen in a two-country export flow  model, which is not provided.
Foreign affiliate sales were positive and statistically significant. The positive 
coefficient indicates that there is a complementary relationship between net sales (FDI) 
and exports in the processed food industry for these five Asian countries. The foreign 
affiliate sales coefficient was 0.96, indicating that a one dollar increase in sales leads to 
an increase o f 96 cents in exports in that industry. So for a capital-abundant country 
investing in a labor-abundant country in a labor-intensive good, they find a positive  
(complementary) relationship between FDI and exports.
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Mundell (1957) provides a theoretical analysis o f the relationship between 
capital movement (FDI) and trade. Mundell's analysis is considered by many texts to be 
the seminal theoretical work regarding FDI and trade flows. Using a neoclassical 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework, he shows how trade is driven by differences in 
factor endowments. Given perfect factor mobility, the marginal products o f  both labor 
and capital will be equalized in both countries. Moreover, if  factor endowments are 
allowed to be mobile, then commodity prices will equalize. The "need" for trade w ill be 
removed by the mobility o f the factors, as factor mobility is a substitute for commodity 
movement in this framework. There w ill no longer be a desire by the Home country to 
export the good since there will be no econom ic incentive to do so. The econom ic  
incentive (reward) was already reaped via the movement o f the capital. Therefore, 
factor mobility is the perfect substitute for exports.
Mundell argues that this substitute relationship persists in the long run as w ell as 
the short run. That is, he is not just talking about what will later be called the 
Production Replacement effect. Mundell's model addresses the issue o f adjusting prices 
and the incentives for exporting and selling in a highly competitive industry. Mundell 
argues that, when the cost o f trade is increased, whether by tariffs or transportation 
costs, the return o f the scarce input increases, which attracts the scarce input and 
encourages the export o f the abundant factor.
Pearce (1982) uses 1977 cross-sectional survey data on 329 o f the world's 
largest firms. Each firm has been classified into one o f 19 industries. The number o f  
countries included in the sample was not declared, but included the US, Germany,
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France, the UK, Sweden, Japan, Canada, and others. He specifies the model as a 
quadratic in terms of the FDI measure.
Pearce uses somewhat unusual measures for both FDI and exports. He uses the 
"overseas production ratio" as a measure o f foreign sales (FDI). The overseas 
production ratio is computed as the sales o f overseas Subsidiaries divided by the Home 
firm plus Subsidiary's total worldwide sales. This ratio does not include those goods 
imported from the Parent for resale. He also computes three different measures of 
exports for use as dependent variables. First, he defines a variable called "commitment 
to internal exports" as the exports by the Parent firm to its Subsidiaries divided by the 
Parent firm's total production. Second, he computes "commitment to external exports" 
as exports o f the Parent firm to non-Subsidiary customers divided by total production o f  
the Parent firm. And third, he computes the "parent's export ratio" as the Parent's total 
exports divided by the Parent's total production.
Pearce finds in the Commitment to External Exports equation that there is an 
inverted-U shape to the relationship o f overseas production and exports. That is, there 
is a complementary relationship up until the overseas production ratio is 50%, then it 
becomes a substitution relationship above that. To explain this phenomenon, Pearce 
calls this the competitiveness effect. When international competitiveness increases, 
then both overseas production and exports increase. When they increase in equal 
shares, then a complementary effect is observed. And when the international 
competitiveness leads to more overseas production than exports, a substitution effect is 
observed. Pearce's argument can be taken one step further. If a firm's presence leads to
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an increase in demand in the good in question or related goods, then a general 
increase in exports may be observed owing to the increase in demand.
There are two problems with the competitiveness theory. First, firms with very 
large shares o f Home sales relative to its Subsidiary sales will have little movement in 
the overseas production ratio relative to exports for all levels o f international 
competitiveness. So for firms which service large domestic markets relative to their 
total production, there will be a tendency to understate the overseas production change 
relative to the export change. That will show up as a pronounced complementary effect 
between FDI and exports. The important lesson to learn here is to select industries or 
firms which have both small and large Home market shares, so the complementary 
effect does not get dominated in the results.
The second problem is that the competitiveness theory may violate one o f  the 
assumptions about foreign direct investment. More competitiveness indicates that 
another seller can compete with the price o f the Subsidiary firm. One o f the 
assumptions o f investment is that you would only make the investment to begin with, if 
you had some cost advantage to produce the good. So it is not a strong hypothesis to 
assume that greater international competition is affecting the FDI decision and the 
export level.
Pearce's most important finding is that the ratio o f overseas production to home 
production may be a relevant factor in the debate o f complementarity versus 
substitution. Does hom e market size matter to overseas production? Does foreign 
market size matter to the FDI decision? The empirical model later in this paper takes
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this into consideration by using Tinbergen's gravity analysis o f Home and Foreign 
market size.
D oes the size o f the firm matter in the FDI decision? Buckley and Pearce (1979) 
conclude that the size o f the investing firm matters and that the larger the firm, the more 
likely it w ill be to invest in a new production plant than to continue to export. D o larger 
firms have more available liquid assets or do larger firms have more predisposition to 
seek market share expansion than smaller firms? This topic is investigated in more 
detail below.
Svensson (1993b) suggests that the existence o f other Subsidiaries in a target 
country matters in whether there is a complementary effect or substitution effect. 
Moreover, the exports to other countries than just the Home country should be 
considered. That is, if the new Subsidiary has been created to overcome transportation 
costs and/or to exploit lower input costs, then it is reasonable that that new Subsidiary 
will service the adjacent markets (countries) as well as the Foreign market. If the 
Subsidiary is replacing Home country exports, then the decline in exports should be 
observed in other countries, thereby generating a clear substitution effect between 
Subsidiary production and Home exports (to Foreign and countries adjacent to Foreign).
Svensson also argues that Subsidiary production will not generate enough 
demand for imports o f intermediate goods from Home to dilute the substitution effect o f  
finished goods. Svensson's empirical model strongly supports these substitution 
hypotheses, and finds that as much as 31 percent o f Swedish Subsidiaries within 
European Community countries is exported to adjacent countries. The data used come 
from Swedish majority-owned subsidiaries located in several different countries for six
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nonadjacent years covering 1965 to 1990. Finally, Svensson's data show an 
interesting trend in total production by Swedish firms. Over time, the proportion of  
total Swedish production which occurs at Home has decreased. In 1970 exports from 
Sweden accounted for 47 percent o f total foreign sales, while in 1990, only 27 percent 
was produced and exported from Sweden.
Svensson's important contribution to the debate is that exports from Foreign to 
adjacent countries should be considered when investigating the FDI-export relationship. 
Exports from the US to Central American countries, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Nicaragua, are extremely small to begin with, but may have large effects 
as ratios o f earlier exports from the US.
The FDI-exports relationship is complex at best. To formally investigate this 
relationship, a theoretical model and accompanying comparative statics are supplied 
here to demonstrate the nature o f the important variables surrounding the relationship. 
Finally, the last three comparative statics illustrate the complex nature o f the FDI- 
exports relationship.
Consider a multinational corporation that produces the same good in both the 
Home and Foreign market.50 The foreign production is created by a Subsidiary which 
has either full ownership o f the Subsidiary or owns controlling stock o f the Subsidiary. 
The Subsidiary’s output is all sold in the Foreign market, but some of the production 
from the Home facility may be exported and sold in Foreign. The Home production 
function is given by:
50 The following profit maximization and comparative statics were generated in partnership with Dr. 
Ardeshir Dalai, professor o f  economics at Northern Illinois University.
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Q = H { K , L ) (3.1)
and the Foreign production function is given by:
q = F ( k , l ) (3.2)
Both production functions are considered to be concave in each input and have positive 
and diminishing marginal products.
Home capital, K, and Foreign capital, k, are exogenously determined and are 
fixed in the short run. Foreign capital, k, may also be used to identify foreign direct 
investment, as each is an expenditure o f assets to buy the means o f production. Let 
Exports = X, Home sales = S = Q - X  and Foreign sales = s = q + X. The firm is 
assumed to have some monopoly power in both markets and therefore, faces 
downward-sloping demand curves. For simplicity o f computations, constant elasticities 
o f demand are given for each market. The assumption o f constant elasticities is not 
necessary for the analysis; it is made only so that the comparative statics are easier to 
see. Demand in Home is given by:
where -1/a is the elasticity o f demand in Home, 0 < a < l, P  is the price in Home, and 0 is 
a scalar. Demand in Foreign is given by:
-1
S = 0 P a , (3.3)
-1
(3.4)
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where -1/p is the elasticity o f demand in Foreign, 0<P<1, p  is the price in Foreign, and x 
is a scalar. The assumptions, a < l and P<1, guarantee that demand is elastic. The firm 
is assumed to be a price taker in both labor markets and therefore, the dom estic and 
foreign wage rates are exogenously given by W  and w. Tariffs and/or transportation 
costs for exports are ST  per unit o f exports, so the total associated cost is given by $TX.
The goal o f the firm is to m axim ize profits. The maximization problem is given  
by the profit function:
max x  = PS + p s - W L - w l - T X  (3.5)
X ,L J
To get the first-order conditions, take the partial derivatives o f the profit function with 
respect to each o f the three variables, exports, Home labor, and Foreign labor. The 
first-order conditions are:
d x  dP dS dS dp ds ds
■S + P  + —  s + p  T =  0 ,  (3.6)
dX dS dX dX ds dX dX
t e  =  a p a s 8e 5 + p 3£ a £ _ w, = 0 _ ( 3 7 )
dL dS dQ dL dQ dL
and
d7t dp ds dq ds dq
—  = — -------- s  +  p ------- - w  = 0 .  (3.8)
dl ds dq dl dq dl
For notational purposes, a simple substitution is made for the marginal products o f  labor 
in Home and Foreign:
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- ^  = Fn  (3.10)
respectively. The first-order conditions can be obtained from the following  
relationships: algebraic manipulations o f (3.3) and (3.4), the substitutions from (3.9) 
and (3.10), and the following partial derivative results:
# •  =  1 (3.13)
dQ
and
| ^  = 1. (3.14)
dq
Then substitute those into (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8), and the first-order conditions can be 
rewritten as:
7)tt
—  = - P { \ - a )  + p { l - p ) - T  = 0  (3.15)
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The second-order conditions require sign restrictions on the second partial derivatives 
o f 7i with respect to the decision variables. To sim plify the notation, let
( l - a r ) s A > 0  (3.18)
and
(1-J3) = B > 0 .  (3.19)
The second partial derivatives o f 7t with respect to the decisions variables are:
. dP dS dp ds - A a P  B B p
7ix x = - A ----------+ B — —  = ---------------^ < 0  (3.20)
”  dS dX ds dX S s
dP dS dQ _  A a P H L 
dS dQ dL S
Xxl= X uc= - A — — —  =  ^—^ > 0  (3.21)
_  B dp ds dq _  BfipFl 
ds dq dl s
71 xi -  71 ix ~ B -^-~— = ----   1 < 0  (3.22)
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77LL = A - — ^ - H L + P H LL dS d Q d L  L
A a P H
L + A P H l l < 0 (3.23)
77U  ~  77IL (3.24)
7Tu = B ^ h Fi+pFii
ds dq dl '
BflpF,2
+ BpFn < 0 (3.25)
Let the Hessian o f K  be denoted [ D ] . Then equations (3.20) to (3.25) imply
71XX 77XL 77XI
[D] = 77LX 77U. 0
1 X
0 77 11
A a P  B p p  
~ S  
AocP H l 
S
BfipF,
A a P H ,
A a P H l
+ A PH LL
BPpF,
0
B p p F ;
+ BpFu
(3.26)
The second-order conditions also require that the naturally ordered principal minors o f  
[D] alternate in sign where the odd-ordered minors are signed negative and the even-
ordered minors are signed positive. The principal minors o f order one are the terms on 
the main diagonal o f (3.26), and it is clear that (3.20), (3.23), and (3.25) establish that 
these are all negative as required. The naturally ordered principal minor o f order two is 
given by:





A a P  B p p  
~ S  ~  
A a P H  L
A a P H ,
A a P H l
+ APH LL
A 2a 2P 2H 2L A 2a P 2H LL Bjdp A a P H 2L + APH LL
K a 'P 'H l
S 2
A 2a P 2H LL B f ip A a P H [
+ APH LL >0 (3.27)
The principal minor o f order three is given by:
f tX X f t  XL ftXI - A a P S  -  B fi  p s A a P H LS - B f ip F ls
d \ = f tL X ft[± 0 - A a P H LS - A a P H  IS + A P H ^  0
f t i x 0 f t  11 -B f ip F ls 0 - B p p F 2s + BpFn
B 2p 2p 2F 2 A a P H l
+ A PH LL
B f ip F 2
+ BpFu A
B 2P 2p 2F 2 A a P H 2 B 2P 2p 2F 2 ^   ^ B /3pF 2 A 2a P 2H LL
2 c  2 “ LLs S s
+
b 2p 2p 2f 2 A a P H l
+ APH , + BpFn \D2
B P p F 2 A 2a P 2H LL + BpFu \D2\ < 0 (3.28)
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where the inequality in (3.28) follows from (3.27) and the fact that H u  < 0 and 
F„ < 0. Hence, the second-order conditions are satisfied.
Comparative Statics
The goal o f these comparative statics is to find the effects o f increases in T, w  and k 
(FDI) on Q, q and X. To find comparative statics, totally differentiate equations (3.15), 





B P pF k
dk + dT
-BpF. . dk + dw
(3.29)




0 f t  LL 0 ~  f t u f t n  >  ^ (3 .30)
0 0 ft,I
where the inequality follows from (3.23) and (3 .25). Since [D| < 0, this implies that:
® < 0 .
dT
(3.31)
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K xx 1 77 XI
= ^VX 0 0
71 IX 0 77 11
: - X  1**11 > 0 (3.32)




implies that labor in Home decreases and thus, output in Home decreases. For the 
comparative static, partial o f / with respect to T :
4 - ='dT
77X X 77XL 1
77 I X 77LL 0
77IX 0 0
: ^IX^LL < ^ (3.34)
where the inequality follows from (3.22) and (3.23). Hence,
- * > < >
dT
(3.35)
implies that labor in Foreign increases and thus, Foreign output increases. Thus, an 
increase in tariffs or transportation costs causes exports and domestic production to 
decrease while foreign production increases. N ow  consider the effects o f an increase in 
w. For the comparative static, the partial o f X  with respect to w  is:
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dX
>0 (3.37)





f t  a. 1 f t  11
—  TTix^ xi < 0 (3.38)




implies that labor at Home increases and thus output in Home increases. For the 
comparative static, partial o f I with respect to w:
I dl 
dw
ftxx f t  XL 0
- ft IX ftu 0
ftIX 0 1
= D J > 0 (3.40)
where the inequality follows directly from (3.27). Hence,





implies that labor in Foreign decreases, and thus output in Foreign decreases. 
Therefore, an increase in the foreign wage reduces output in Foreign and increases 
output and exports in Home. Now consider the effects o f an increase in k (an increase 












f t  i . i  f t u  j
F,FkB p p











IX -  Bp Flk
0
77, ,




~ BP Fik \ftxi (3.43)
and





It is clear from (3.42) to (3.44) that in general, the effect o f an increase in k is 
ambiguous. The ambiguity arises because the sign o f the term,
is indeterminate. It is possible to sign each component o f this term. Suppose that the 
production function, q, is well-behaved. For example, if  q displays constant returns to 
scale, then
But even when all o f  the components o f the term in (3.45) have been signed, the result 
is still a positive number minus a positive number. The sign o f (3.45) and thus, the 
signs o f (3.42), (3.43) and (3.44) are still indeterminate. Therefore, an increase in FDI 
has an indeterminate effect on exports, labor at Home, and labor in Foreign. This 
concludes the formal comparative statics section.
It has been formally shown that the relationship between foreign direct 
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can the structure o f the FDI-export model be improved to get to the heart o f  the 
relationship? Are there some facts about this relationship and market structures that 
may help in understanding the various facets o f the relationship in whole? There are 
two dominant effects that occur as a result o f foreign direct investment. These two 
effects have mutually exclusive effects on exports and will be examined separately 
below.
The Production Replacement effect is the income effect that is observed once a 
firm in Home has determined to invest in a foreign Subsidiary. Once the firm has 
created the foreign Subsidiary, all o f  the production to supply the foreign market is 
produced by the Subsidiary. Therefore the output which was previously produced in 
Home is now produced in the Subsidiary. Therefore the production in Home which was 
being exported to Foreign is no longer exported to Foreign. This is a clear substitution 
effect.
A  Subsidiary firm imports some firm-specific inputs from the Parent firm in the 
Home country. This is called the Vertical Integration effect. A  Subsidiary firm requires 
many types o f capital inputs. Som e o f these inputs can only be provided by the Parent 
firm. These intermediate goods can show up in the export data if  they are "near" in 
classification to the original exported good. So again, the finer the international trade 
classification, the less likely you will be to encounter this effect. A  firm which 
produces a capital-intensive good is more (less) likely to supply these intermediate 
goods if  the good requires many capital-intensive (labor-intensive) intermediate goods.
The exact nature o f  assembly matters. If good A, which is classified in the same 
industry classification as some good C, is exported to Foreign, assembled with some
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good B to produce good C which is sold in Foreign, then exports in industry C (and 
A) will be positive to Foreign. This is true o f  many automobile parts. A  bumper 
bracket is an input into making a bumper and both are in industry SITC 784.31, which 
is the most specific (smallest) industry classification for this grouping. On the other 
hand, goods which have inputs which com e from wholly different industries than 
themselves w ill have no vertical integration effect. For example, wire wound resistors 
(SITC 772.33) are used in the creation o f radio-broadcast receivers (SITC 762.1), but 
are different classifications at the three- and two-digit levels. This illustrates the 
importance to selecting classification groups as small as possible. Often the 
constraining factor is data availability; model designers should then select the smallest 
industry groupings which are available.
Over a period o f time, the firm will discover some or all o f  the intermediate 
goods which are available in Foreign cheaper than importing them from Home. Once 
this happens, the Vertical Integration effect should diminish. This diminishing effect is 
most likely to occur with the inputs not used intensively in the production o f the 
exported good. Home will continue to supply those inputs in which it has a 
comparative advantage. Therefore, the relationship between FDI and exports is 
dynamic and can change over time. However, the more patent-related or firm-specific 
goods there are in the production process, the more likely the Home firm will be to 
continue to export those inputs to the Subsidiary.
W hen the two effects are summed together, a fuller view  o f the foreign direct 
investment-export relationship can be seen. The Production Replacement effect will 
have a negative effect on exports. The Vertical Integration effect will have a positive
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effect on exports. The net o f the two effects is ambiguous. But by investigating the 
capital-labor ratio o f each individual industry, a pattern emerges that makes some sense 
o f  the indeterminacy. It is expected that the Vertical Integration effect w ill dominate 
for those cases where the US, a capital-abundant country, exports a capital-intensive 
good to M exico. Likewise, it is expected that the Vertical Integration effect will 
dominate for those cases where M exico, a labor-abundant country, exports (moves 
production of) a labor-intensive good to the US. For those goods where Home is 
exporting a good, in which it does not have input abundance, the Vertical Integration 
effect should approach zero and therefore the remaining effect, Production 
Replacement, will be responsible for the net export effect. Interestingly, M exico is as 
much a paradox as is the United States. The Top 5 largest M exican exports to the 
United States are capital-intensive goods. M exico, as a relatively labor-abundant 
country (certainly in relation to the US), exports capital-abundant goods to the US, 
while the US, a capital-abundant country, imports capital-intensive goods. This is 
called the Leontief Paradox.
The difficulty posed by this summed net effect is that, at various levels o f  
aggregation, some individual effects are lost. When multiple firms or industries or 
countries are grouped together, counteracting effects may be negated or masked. The 
goal o f the model designer should be to select the unit o f  analysis which is as close to 
firm-level as the data w ill allow. That is, homogeneity o f goods with respect to capital 
and labor content within one industry classification is desirable. It is therefore prudent 
to select industries with particular capital-labor ratios in mind. That is, it is not 
desirable to select industry classifications for which one sub-classification is capital
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intensive and another is labor intensive. Their effects will likely cancel each other 
out in aggregate and generate an indeterminate effect.
Summary
There is still no consensus in the literature as to how foreign direct investment 
affects exports. Lipsey and W eiss (1981) use net sales data (as measures o f FDI) to 
analyze 14 developed capital-abundant countries and find that 10 o f  the 14 net sales 
were positive and statistically significant. The two negative coefficients were not 
statistically significant. Blomstrom, Lipsey and Kulchycky (1988) found mixed results 
while regressing net sales on exports. For the models which included the United States, 
the coefficients for seven industries had a positive and statistically significant sign, 
while the coefficients for four industries were negative and statistically significant. In 
the non-US equations, a large majority o f the coefficients were found to exhibit a 
complementary relationship between FDI and exports. This article is considered to be 
the strongest evidence supporting a complementarity relationship between FDI and 
exports, but even here, the results are not overwhelming.
Mundell (1957) provides a basic framework for analyzing input movements in 
the presence o f increased trade barriers. Specifically, he derives a theoretical model 
which shows that as the cost o f trade increases, the return to the scarce input increases, 
which attracts the scarce input and encourages the export o f the abundant input. This is 
appealing, as it demonstrates that input abundance and input-intensity should play a role 
in factor movements, in this case, the movement o f production via foreign direct 
investment in Subsidiaries.
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Pearce (1982) suggests that international competitiveness drives both foreign 
direct investment and exports. He further states that when foreign direct investment and 
exports rise at the same time, then a complementarity relationship will be observed. 
Conversely, when Subsidiary production increases by more than exports increase, then 
a substitution relationship is observed. Pearce's models are specified as quadratics in 
the net sales variable. His empirical models indicate that there is an inverted U-shape 
relationship between overseas production and exports. He finds that there is a 
complementarity relationship up until overseas production is 50 percent; thereafter it is 
a substitution relationship. This is essentially a restatement o f  Linnemann's proposition 
that relative market sizes between Home and Foreign matter when determining the 
correct FDI-export relationship.
A  theoretical model is developed which shows that the foreign direct 
investment-export relationship is indeterminate. By investigating the capital-intensive 
nature o f each individual firm, it is possible to see a pattern emerge. The Production 
Replacement effect represents the loss in exports to Foreign caused by the new  
production o f good X in the Subsidiary. The Vertical Integration effect is the increase 
in exports generated because o f increased demand for intermediate goods from the 
Subsidiary firm. If a capital-abundant firm produces a good which is capital intensive, 
then there is a propensity to export intermediate goods which are also capital intensive 
to the Subsidiary firm. That is, the capital-intensive firm is more likely to continue to 
supply intermediate goods, which are also in the same industry classification to the 
Subsidiary firm. The labor-intensive firm who is exporting a capital-intensive good will 
not engage in this type o f  Vertical Integration and therefore the Production Replacement
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effect becom es dominant and a substitution effect becomes clear in the empirical 
results.
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CHAPTER 4
US-M EXICAN TRADE A N D  INVESTMENT HISTORY
"Mexico and the United States are m ore than neighbors. We are partners in building a 
safer, m ore dem ocratic and m ore prosperous hem isphere." - M arch 6, 2004, President 
George W. Bush
The US has a long and intricate trade history with M exico. The path o f  trade 
liberalization has been a long one. The period from 1877 to 1910 was a period o f  
transformation for M exico. General Porfirio Diaz ruled the government. US 
investment into M exico was substantial. B y 1910, US investment in M exico was 38 
percent o f  the total foreign capital invested in M exico.51 Infrastructure including 
railroads were built during this time. Mineral production was expanded. Real gross 
domestic product (GDP) tripled. The Diaz government, for good or bad, made M exico  
open to investment and increased trade. The lack o f a modem banking system and 
developed financial system  may have inhibited some investment, but for the most part it 
was a period o f growth.52
After the M exican Revolution o f 1910, the government took a more aggressive 
or protectionist position than in the past. By the 1930s, oil, the country's primary 
product, became nationalized and regulated. During this period, foreign investments 
slowed. This was probably not the fault o f the M exican government, but rather due to
51 Blank and Haar (1998).
52 Blank and Haar (1998).
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other market forces. Foreign investment was regulated to some extent. In 1973,
M exico passed the Law for the Promotion o f M exican Investment. This law strictly 
limited the areas for foreign investment and capped ownership if  certain conditions 
were not met, like supporting local suppliers in the industry. In the 1970s, total world 
foreign direct investment (FDI) into M exico averaged only $447 m illion per year.
This is very small by global standards at the time. Alm ost overnight, M exico's attitudes 
towards FDI changed. In 1980, FDI grew substantially. It quadrupled to 2.1 billion  
dollars. Import permits, the most pervasive non-tariff barrier in M exico, continued to 
expand through the 1970s and 1980s. Import permits covered 68 percent o f imports in 
1970. And they covered virtually every import category by 1982. So there was some 
shift in how the United States engaged with M exico. There was a type o f substitution 
o f imports to FDI during the period before 1980, when import barriers increased. This 
reinforces the theory about how  firms engage in foreign direct investment. When 
export barriers rise, we see a shift towards investment. It follows that when barriers are 
lowered w e will see a shift towards more exports and less investment. There seems to 
be a negative relationship between foreign direct investment and exports.
The oil boom of the 1970s was over by 1981. M exico was having a serious debt 
crisis. Just as M exico had opened the doors to investment, foreign investors started to 
flee the market. FDI fell by 38 percent in 1982 as investors looked for higher returns 
and more stable investment locations.
M iguel de la Madrid became President o f M exico in 1982 and implemented 
many new policies. He negotiated with foreign creditors to reduce interest rates and
53 UNCTAD data measured in US dollars at current prices. Author summed and averaged.
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principal payments on current debt, m oved to privatize many industries which were 
then run by the government, and targeted raising interest rates to attract new and old 
investors. In 1984, regulations on investors began to ease. In 1985 authorization for 
foreign firms became easier. Authorization and other rules were used to control 
investment in protected industries. Most importantly, M exico abandoned its policy o f  
import substitution (a popular isolationist strategy o f high exports and low  imports to 
support domestic industries). M exico began to lower its tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
In 1986, M exico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
M exico eliminated most export permit requirements and reduced direct export 
subsidies.54 By joining GATT, M exico agreed to reduce its maximum tariffs to 20 
percent. Furthermore, M exico agreed to remove 80 percent o f all import licenses. 
Import licenses were the primary export impediment to the US. Therefore this action 
had considerable impact on US exports. But many other non-tariff barriers remained.
A lso in 1986, FDI into M exico again began to flourish. In 1989, under 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, M exico implemented two more landmark 
liberalization policies. First the government further opened investment markets to 
foreigners with the passage o f  the Foreign Investment Law. The 1989 Foreign 
Investment Law removed many o f the long-standing barriers to investors, including 
restrictions to markets reserved for the M exico government and M exican citizens. This 
law also removed the 49 percent ownership cap. The 49 percent ownership cap 
prevented any foreign investors from purchasing more than 49 percent in a particular
54 Blank and Haar (1998, p. 12).
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firm. Second, over 25 areas o f the econom y were deregulated and decentralized.
These sectors included chemicals, telecommunications, and financial services.
In the six years before the peso crisis, growth in US foreign direct investment 
into M exico was high. It averaged over 15 percent growth per year (see Figure 2).
After the peso crisis, US investors fled, and foreign direct investment fell by one third 
in 1995. Partly due to financial backing by the US, which enforced financial 
accountability, and partly due to the recognized stability that was achieved by enacting 
NAFTA, M exico quickly put the peso crisis and the 1995 recession behind them. By  
1996, US foreign direct investment in M exico had increased by 71.5 percent to $2.7 
billion and the US accounted for 63 percent o f FDI inflow into M exico.55
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Figure 2 . US Foreign Direct Investment into M exico  
Source: BEA
55 Blank and Haar (1998, p. 10).
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But the 1980s were really only the beginning o f Mexico's trade liberalizations. 
Even greater changes were yet to come. On February 5, 1991, Canada, M exico, and the 
United States announced that they would begin formal negotiations o f  a free trade 
agreement.
Summary
In the last hundred years the M exican government has relaxed and tightened its 
control on the flow  o f investments into M exico several times. From 1877 to 1910 was a 
period o f openness to inward investment. From 1910 to 1930, several factors slowed  
investment into M exico, including specific government intervention, but primarily the 
economic landscape made it an undesirable destination. In 1973, M exico passed a law  
which placed several tight restrictions on investments into M exico. Som e industries 
were com pletely blocked to investment and others had contingency ownership caps, 
which required that firms use local suppliers for intermediate goods. Despite this, by 
1980, FDI grew substantially. This was m ostly due to the fact that import permits 
expanded to include nearly every industry. Foreign direct investment fell rapidly in the 
early 1980s, due to the debt crisis.
B y 1980, US FDI into M exico had grown to a substantial sum. B y 1982, the 
investment landscape changed again. FDI fell as M exico experienced a serious debt 
crisis. M exico initiated a series o f reforms to spur investment. Over the next twenty 
years, M exico liberalized its investment restrictions. By the year 2000, US FDI into 
M exico grew to over $4 billion. Then just five years later, it doubled to $8.5 billion. 
Trade and investment liberalization policies led to considerable growth during this time.
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CHAPTER 5
NAFTA NEGOTIATION A N D  FEATURES
The US tried to implement a free trade agreement or trade liberalization 
agreement with Canada on several occasions in the 1980s. One o f the first public 
callings for an agreement was made by Ronald Reagan in 1979 shortly after he 
announced his candidacy for President o f the United States:
"/ would be w illing to invite each o f  our neighbors to send a special representative to 
our governm ent to s it in on high level planning sessions with us, as partners, mutually 
concerned about the fu ture o f  our continent."
Both President Jose Lopez Portillo's government and Prime Minster Pierre Trudeau 
made it clear they were not interested in a common market. The courting o f Canada 
was arduous. A  turning point occurred in 1983 when the auspices for trade changed 
from the Canadian Department o f Industry Trade and Commerce to the Department o f  
External Affairs. The Department o f External Affairs had recently completed a report 
which recommended "sectoral free trade" with the U S.56 The report changed the 
general feeling within the Canadian government. Canada signed three minor 
agreements covering agricultural machinery, defense products, and automotive products 
the same year. These agreements were considered trivial and did not at all satisfy the 
real goal o f  the United States. But things were about to improve.
56 Robert (2000, p. 24).
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In September 1984, Brian Mulroney was elected as Prime Minister o f Canada. 
This was particularly fortunate for President Reagan because Mulroney was in support 
o f a free trade agreement. In March 1985, both Prime Minister Mulroney and President 
Reagan had requested formal studies from their trade departments on how to eliminate 
trade barriers between the two countries. In September, Mulroney received the report 
of the Royal Commission on the Econom ic Union and Development Proposals for 
Canada.57 Mulroney informed the House o f Commons that he planned to pursue
CO
bilateral negotiations with the US to "reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers." In
December 1985, Reagan notified Congress o f his intent to seek a trade agreement with 
Canada. Reagan requested "fast track" status for the agreement whereby Congress has 
sixty business days to wholly reject or accept the President's proposal. The US 
Congress did not reject the proposal and the US and Canada began formal negotiations 
on May 21, 1986. Negotiations continued for over 16 months. At one point in 
September o f 1987, Canada suspended talks due to some disagreements over subsidies 
and trade remedies. Terms were worked out and Mulroney and Reagan signed the 
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) on June 2, 1988. The monumental 
agreement included provisions for removing trade barriers on goods, services, and 
investments.
M eanwhile the pressure on M exico to accept more foreign investment was 
growing. M exico needed econom ic growth to help finance its debt problem and it 
needed job growth to employ its fast-growing labor force.59 In January and February of
57 Robert (2000, p. 25).
58 Doem and Tomlin (1991, p. 30).
59 Robert (2000, p. 27).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
86
1990, President Salinas visited several western European countries and tried to 
persuade them that M exico was a wonderful investment opportunity. After talking with 
European businessmen, it became apparent to Salinas that they thought M exico was too 
small for investment purposes. One businessman reportedly suggested to Salinas that 
"Mexico would look much brighter should his firm be able to serve the US market."60 
At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Salinas had his trade minister, 
Jaime Serra Puche, speak to the US Trade Representative, Carla Hills, about negotiating 
a free trade agreement. The Bush administration had conceived o f a "hemispherical 
trade area" and saw this as a stepping stone toward that end.
In January 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney sent an aide to M exico at the bequest 
o f President Salinas. The M exicans wanted to learn about Canada's experience with the 
United States in forming the CUSFTA and the process involved. It is not clear if  the 
Bush administration intentionally did not consider inviting Canada to the US-M exico  
talks or if  it was just some kind o f strategy to pit the two against each other in a race 
towards further trade liberalization. Nonetheless, it succeeded in making Canada more 
interested in joining some kind o f trilateral agreement.
In early March 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney visited President Salinas at his 
official residence. Mulroney made it clear he did not want to let M exico engage in a 
free trade area with the US alone. On March 17, 1990, news agency UPI reported that 
"Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said ...[] we have no intention o f being left 
out [of a M exican - US bilateral agreement.]" During this visit Mulroney and Salinas
60 Robert (2000, p. 27).
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agreed to 10 agreements which outlined a dispute settlement procedure, plans for 
future talks and created work groups for discussions on specific goods.
On March 27, the Wall Street Journal broke the news that the US and M exico  
were working on a free trade agreement. Canada may have wanted to slow  play its 
interest in a free trade area with the US and M exico, but now needed to publicly take a 
position both with its own citizens and with the US. Canada began its internal process 
for entering such a negotiation. First, Canada prepared a review o f  the implications o f a 
US-M exican free trade agreement. Salinas called on the M exican Senate to hold a 
"national forum" on global trade relations.61 Then on May 21, the Senate recommended 
that M exico pursue agreements with several continents and specific countries, 
specifically encouraging the M exican President to make an agreement with the US.
On June 11, the Federal New s Service issued a joint statement that the US and 
M exico will begin "preparatory work for a free trade agreement and create a report due 
by the end o f the year." The Canadians were officially informed o f  their intentions. At 
this point it was completely clear to Canada that the US and M exico would complete a 
free trade agreement and that it would occur very soon.
Canada had been considering its own bilateral free trade agreement with 
M exico. But now the U S-M exico free trade agreement seemed to be inevitable. The 
cost to Canada was not just the lost increase in exports to M exico. M exico actually 
represented a very small portion o f Canadian trade. The main concern among 
academics was that if  Canada allowed the US to form a bilateral agreement with 
M exico, then the US would reap the benefits with both countries. The fear was that the
61 Robert (2000, p. 31).
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US might substitute Mexican imports for Canadian imports in the few  sectors where 
they overlapped. In this scenario, trade would be diverted from Canada. Another fear 
was that the U S-M exico arrangement might include agreements for lower or elimination 
o f non-tariff barriers (like import quotas or import licensing). If this should happen, 
then Canada could face non-tariff barriers in the US market and M exico would not.
This was an unbearable situation for Canada. Therefore Canada's best option was to 
engage in direct negotiations for a trilateral agreement. On September 24, Canada 
officially announced its intentions. Canadian firms and the legislature still needed to be 
persuaded that this was good for Canada. Trade Minister John Crosby was in a difficult 
position. He needed to quickly convince the government and businessmen that this was 
good for Canada. Yet he realized that M exico, while originally receptive to the idea o f  
a Canada-Mexico agreement, was becoming concerned that Canada was going to slow  
down the process. M exico had econom ically pressing issues that could not wait for 
Canada. They could not wait while Canada convinced all the relevant participants. 
M exico needed progress now. M exico saw the upcoming 1992 US elections as a risk 
factor. They wanted to complete the negotiations before this time. The next 
administration might not be willing to proceed with the agreement or negotiations at all. 
So M exico had to mobilize. Canada's trade minister recognized this. To allay M exico's 
concerns about Canada backing out o f the negotiations and potentially stalling the rest 
o f the negotiations, the three signed an agreement whereby trilateral negotiations would 
continue as planned, but allowed for any party to back out o f the negotiations at any 
time and it would not affect the progress made between the two remaining parties o f a 
bilateral nature.
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There was some resistance within the US in allowing Canada to participate in 
the negotiations, but there was no way to tell its closest ally and largest trading partner
(V)
that they were not wanted at the negotiating table. Years after the NAFTA was 
signed, US Deputy Trade Representative Julius Katz said that including Canada in the 
NAFTA negotiation was an issue o f efficiency and cost-minimization. Two different 
sets o f phase-out dates, different tariff rates, different classifications o f goods for those 
tariff schedules, and different rules for investment would have greatly increased the 
complexity o f trade in the region for many years.63
On September 25, President Bush notified Congress under the Trade Acts o f  
1974 and 1988 to give the negotiations "fast track" status. Any trade agreements made 
by the Executive Branch can be accepted or rejected by the legislature within 60 days o f  
the notification.
Official negotiations began June 12, 1991 in Toronto, Canada. This time, the 
US made no secret o f its intentions. They wanted a comprehensive free trade 
agreement including tariffs, non-tariff barriers, investment, services, intellectual 
property rights, rules o f origin, and dispute settlement procedures. Nineteen working 
groups in six major categories were formed. The six categories were market access, 
trade rules, services, investment, intellectual property rights, and dispute resolution.
The US was primarily represented by the US Trade Representative's office (USTR). 
M exico was represented by the Ministry o f Commerce and Industrial Development. 
Canada was represented by External Affairs and International Trade. Each group was
62 Robert (2000, p. 34).
63 Robert (2000, p. 34).
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led by one negotiator from each country.64 The head trade representatives from each 
country (Carla Hills for the US, Jaime Serra Puche for M exico, and M ichael W ilson for 
Canada) met seven times during the negotiations, which served to resolve tough issues 
and additionally to provide a sense o f sanctioning by the national governments. The 
private sectors were involved in the process directly or indirectly. In Canada businesses 
were consulted directly. In the US numerous advisory committees represented the 
interests o f US business. In M exico the Coordination of Foreign Trade Business 
Organizations represented business's interests.
On September 19, the first tariff rules proposals were revealed and exchanged 
between all three countries. B y the end o f October, specifics on tariffs were drafted. 
Each country proposed a paper outlining their position on all issues and agreed to 
exchange them with the other countries by November. These papers were not actually 
delivered until November 21st, December 2nd, and December 4th, respectively. Work 
groups met next on January 6, 1992 in which they would prepare a composite document 
from the three position papers. The fourth ministerial meeting was held on February 9- 
10 in Chantilly, Virginia. The three parties examined the composite document.
February 17-21 a large number o f negotiators met in Dallas, Texas. Negotiators were 
instructed to focus on areas where an agreement was possible and near resolution. The 
US felt that M exico was not moving on many significant issues. Jules Katz, the chief 
negotiator for the US, pointed out that since M exico was the most closed economy, it 
would be required to make the most concessions.65 Many working groups arrived at
64 Robert (2000, p. 37).
65 Grayson (1995).
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working formulas during this meeting. However, there were still issues in 
agriculture, automobiles, energy, and textiles to resolve.66
In March President Salinas contacted President Bush and Prime Minister 
Mulroney. Salinas made it clear that M exico was willing to compromise to reach an 
agreement soon. In April and early May, the three met in M exico City, M exico. 
Negotiations progressed, including one where M exico backed o ff o f a long-time ban on 
foreign ownership o f petrochemicals.67 This was a major accomplishment because 
M exico had stated before the pre-negotiations that that was one o f the things on which it 
would not compromise. In M ay there were two key issues negotiated. First, they 
agreed to seek three bilateral agreements on agricultural products.68 And second, 
Canada was considering excluding apparel from the NAFTA. By mid July, Bush made 
a statement, "We're in the ninth inning," indicating that negotiations were almost over. 
M exico had agreed to several major concessions, including allowing US banks to open 
branches in M exico, allowing investment and ownership o f some petrochemical 
products, and to allow PEMEX (the nationalized M exican oil industry) to seek 
procurements from US and Canadian firms.69
In July the last round o f talks occurred in Washington, DC at the Watergate 
Hotel. Under dispute for Canada were the rules o f origin in textiles and apparel, 
regional content value for automobiles, policies for screening foreign investment, and
66 Robert (2000, p. 39).
67 Robert (2000, p. 39).
68 Canada refused to convert its import quotas into equivalent tariffs as part o f  the agreement.
69 Robert (2000, p. 40).
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dispute settlement procedures for anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases.70 
Another point o f contention was the rights o f US buyers o f oil and gas from M exico  
during a shortage. M exico did not want to treat US buyers the same as M exican buyers.
After nearly a month in Washington, DC, the NAFTA negotiation concluded. 
Some o f the finer issues resolved by NAFTA were:
71•  Canada kept its exception for cultural products. Canada had maintained the 
same exemptions as those worked out under CUSFTA.
•  Ownership o f copyright and other rights receive remuneration even if 
transferred.
•  Imports o f unauthorized works are prohibited. .
•  Sound recording producers have the right to prohibit rental o f originals or 
copies.
•  M exico has a provision that the broadcast o f a TV show must be authorized by 
the Secretaria de Gobermacion.
There was considerable debate on the cultural products issue. In February 1991, USTR
Carla Hills told the US House o f Representatives that the cultural exceptions were
protectionist. She said Canada and the US were still negotiating the issue.72 Later, five
US congressmen contacted Hills to reiterate their disfavor with exempting cultural
industries in Canada. During the Uruguay Round o f GATT, some European countries
had already cited Canada's cultural industries exception under CUSFTA as precedent
70 Canada and the US have a long history under GATT in dispute settlement cases involving anti­
dumping practices. For more see US Trade Representative Annual Reports 1980-1993.
71 For example, content rules on TV broadcasting to keep and preserve French and English as national 
values.
72 Robert (2000, p. 87).
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-yo
for broadcast quotas in the European Union. This issue was either going to 
snowball and possibly halt negotiations now or head later in the Uruguay Round talks.
The key features o f  NAFTA are:74 
TARIFFS
•  Many tariffs were lowered or eliminated as o f  January 1, 1994.
• The elimination o f all tariffs on all industrial products by January 1, 2004. Most 
M exican automobile parts are exported to the US duty-free already. B y January 
1, 1994, 90 percent o f M exican exports entered the US duty-free.
•  The elimination o f some tariffs on US exports o f agricultural products to M exico  
by January 1, 2009.
• The elimination o f M exican tariffs on nearly 50 percent o f  US exports o f  
machine tools, medical devices, semiconductors and computer equipment, 
telecommunications equipment and electronic equipment as o f January 1, 1994.
•  B y January 1, 1999, 65 percent o f  US industrial product exports to M exico will 
be tariff-free, including those on light trucks, most automobile parts and paper 
products.
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
• The elimination o f most non-tariff barriers in M exico on US exports including 
quotas, import licenses, local content requirements, local production 
requirements, and export performance requirements.75
RULES OF ORIGIN
• W ell-specified and fair rules o f origin. Rules o f  origin prevent non-member 
countries from using other member countries as landing zones for avoidance o f  
other trade rules. For example, it prevents non-member countries from 
importing goods into M exico and then re-exporting them to another NAFTA  
country for the purpose o f  avoiding another member's rules. NAFTA rules of 
origin reward companies which use North-American-produced parts and labor.
73 Robert (2000, p. 186).
74 The North American Free Trade Agreement (1994).
75 M exico required import-to-export ratios in order for US firms to export certain goods into M exico. This 
was common in several automobile parts sectors. These were considered a leading non-tariff barrier to 
US exports to Mexico.
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• Provides harmonized rules, language, tariff codes, accounting, and unified 
customs procedures for streamlining all trade done in North America.
•  Rules o f origin also govern the "tariff-shift rule" and the "value content rule." 
The tariff-shift rule determines the tariff classification on inputs used in the 
making o f other final goods or intermediate goods. Value content rules set the 
proportion o f North American content required to avoid (or earn) a particular 
tariff classification.
SAFEGUARDS
• If increases o f M exican imports into the US cause or threaten to cause serious 
injury to American workers or firms, then tariffs may be reinstituted for a period 
o f up to three years (or four years for sensitive products).
•  If a member country takes the above safeguard action, then they must 
compensate the country whose imports are affected by the tariff increases.
INVESTMENTS
• Eliminates almost all special conditions for US investment in M exico. N o  
longer will US investors be required to export a given level or percentage o f  
goods or services in order to be given permission to invest in that industry.
•  N o longer w ill US investors be required to use domestic goods or services as a 
condition for investment.
•  N o longer w ill US investors need to provide technology to competitor firms as a 
condition for investment.
•  N o longer can investments be conditional upon import-to-export ratios.
• US investors must be treated the same as domestic firms. This has several 
implications. Investors may freely repatriate profits, they have the right to 
compensation for expropriations and the right to seek arbitration in monetary 
damage disputes with other member governments.
• M exico reserves the right to review and prohibit investments over $25 million  
initially, phased up to $150 m illion by the end o f  2002.
• M exico maintains its foreign investment prohibition on some constitutionally 
protected industries including energy and railroads.76
76 Private petrochemical sectors will still allow foreign investments.
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•  Permits member governments to require environmental import statements for 
new investments. NAFTA discourages the lowering o f environmental standards 
to create investment. This was one o f the biggest concerns o f the US Congress 
during its discussions and hearings on the NAFTA.
SERVICES
• Extends the protections negotiated under CUSFTA to M exico. Accounting, 
architecture, land transport, publishing, consulting, commercial education, 
environmental services, enhanced telecommunications, advertising, 
broadcasting, construction, tourism, engineering, heath care management, and 
legal services are explicitly covered and protected sectors o f services. Aviation  
transport, maritime and basic telecommunications services are explicitly not 
covered.
• Licensing and certification o f service professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc) are 
licensed and certified according to the same standards as residents. Citizenship 
requirements, wherever they exist, w ill be phased out completely by January 1, 
1996.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
• Each country must enforce the rights o f authors, artists, and inventors.
• A llow s US firms to patent a large range o f inventions in M exico.
• Limits compulsory licensing requirements for patents, including those in 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical industries.
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
• Firms may not be denied government contracts for goods, services and 
construction just because they are foreign. The agreement creates a "bid 
challenge mechanism" whereby firms may request a review o f the bidding 
process.
STANDARDS MEASURES
• Prohibits the use o f standards (mandatory technical specifications, labeling and 
quality requirements) which interfere with trade. Standards must be non- 
discriminatory.
•  Firms may participate in the development process o f new standards in the same 
way as domestic firms. Moreover, US firms must be given "ample" time to 
make comment on new standards proposals.
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•  The three countries vow  to make concerted efforts to make product standards 
compatible. Under these rules, products which fail to meet US health and safety 
standards may still be denied entry into the US, as long as they are treated the 
same as domestic goods.
TEMPORARY ENTRY OF BUSINESS PERSONS
• Service providers (repair, management and training personnel, etc.) are eligible 
for special temporary entry permits.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
•  Scientific review boards may be called to assist in matters involving 
environmental, health, or safety disputes.
•  Investors may take host governments directly to international arbitration for 
disputes involving monetary damages.
•  Anti-dumping and countervailing duty disputes may call upon panels to 
determine if  decisions are consistent with domestic laws.
•  Encourages arbitration between private parties. Each country is responsible for 
mechanisms to enforce such arbitration.
It is clear that NAFTA w ill affect different industries in different ways. Not 
only are the impacts in each industry different, but also the timetable for which the 
phase-outs o f tariffs and non-tariff barriers occur are also different. Therefore it is 
expected that NAFTA will have a different effect based on industry and at different 
times. This is accounted for in the empirical model by allowing the NAFTA lag to vary 
by industry. This also takes into consideration that there may be some delay for 
exporters to realize the newfound lower costs in exporting to M exico based on the lower 
or eliminated tariffs. So the lag for exporters to recognize the new cost structure is also 
implicitly imbedded in this lag structure.
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The next section discusses the individual industries used in this study. There 
are four categories o f industries. The first five industries represent those industries in 
which the United States has a comparative advantage. Specifically, they are the top five 
US exports to M exico in 1993. The second group of industries are those industries in 
which M exico has a comparative advantage. Specifically, they are the top five M exican 
exports to the US in 1993. The third group of industries represents those industries 
which have a high capital-to-labor ratio. Data limitations prevented analysis o f capital- 
labor ratios at the three-digit SITC level for most industries. Capital stock data was 
available at the two-digit SITC level for most classifications. The top three industries 
with high capital-labor ratios were selected. The fourth group represents the three 
lowest capital-labor ratio industries. These industries will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
Summary
The US sought a free trade agreement with Canada throughout most o f the 
1980s. With very little difficulty, the US and Canada agreed to free trade terms by 
1988. In 1990, the US and M exico began discussing a free trade agreement. Canada 
did not wish to be left out o f any potential US-M exican arrangement, so it joined the 
official talks in mid-1991. After considerable negotiations and several near failures, the 
three countries reached an agreement. NAFTA was signed on D ec 17, 1992. Som e o f  
the key resolutions o f the agreement were: M exico eliminated all tariffs on 50 percent 
o f US exports in machine tools, semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, and 
electronic equipment as o f January 1, 1994; US duties were removed on 90 percent o f
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all M exican exports by January 1, 1994; M exican tariffs were phased out on US  
exports o f industrial products (specifically light trucks and automobile parts) such that 
by January 1, 1999, 65 percent o f those goods were tariff-free; M exico eliminated all 
import licenses; all three nations agreed upon fair rules o f origin such that non-NAFTA  
members could not use M exico as a platform for exporting goods to the US; and all 
special conditions were removed for US investment into M exico.
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CHAPTER 6
KEY US-M EXICO EXPORT SECTORS
The first group o f industries are those in which the US has a comparative 
advantage. In 1993, the top five largest US export sectors to M exico were parts for
77
tractors and motor vehicles (SITC 784), telecommunications equipment (SITC 764), 
equipment for distributing electricity (SITC 773), electrical machinery and apparatus 
(SITC 778), and electrical apparatus for switching and protecting (SITC 772).78 
Together these five export sectors make up a significant portion o f US exports to 
M exico. In 1993, the US exported over $41.5 billion in total goods to M exico (see 
Table 1). For comparison, that is roughly half o f  one percent o f US real gross domestic 
product for that year. These top five export sectors sum to just over $9.7 billion in 
1993. That is 23.3 percent o f total US exports to M exico.
One can look at the progress and growth of these five sectors in many different 
ways. In the 10 years following NAFTA, these five sectors combined increased by a 
net average o f 82 percent (see Table 2). This is an increase o f almost $8 billion just
77 SITC stands for Standard International Trade Classification.
78 Estimated low  value shipments (SITC 994) is actually the third largest US export sector. Estimated 
low value shipments is a catch-all category. The variety o f  goods in this category is very diverse and are 
subject to hundreds o f different demand market forces. For that reason, this category was not included in 
the regression analysis o f  top five US exports to M exico. Instead the sixth largest US export to M exico, 
SITC 772, was included to replace it.
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Table 1














1989 363,765 NA 24,982 NA 6.9
1990 392,976 8.0 28,279 13 .2 7.2
1991 421,854 7.3 33,277 17.7 7.9
1992 447,471 6.1 40,592 22 .0 9.1
1993 464,858 3.9 41,581 2.4 8.9
1994 512,416 10.2 50,843 22 .3 9.9
1995 583,031 13 . 8 46,292 -9.0 7.9
1996 622,827 6.8 56,790 22 .7 9.1
1997 687,598 10.4 71,389 25.7 10.4
1998 680,474 -1.0 78,792 10.4 11.6
1999 692,821 1.8 86,968 10.4 12.6
2000 780,419 12 . 6 111,350 28.0 14.3
2001 731,026 -6.3 101,294 -9.0 13 .9
2002 693,257 -5.2 97,470 -3.8 14.1
2003 723,743 4.4 97,412 -0.1 13.5
2004 816,548 12.8 110,835 13 . 8 13.6
2005 904,380 10.8 120,365 8.6 13.3
All data reported on F. A.S. Basis in $US millions
Source: US International Trade Commission DataWeb
Table 2
Top 5 US Exports to M exico Ten Years After NAFTA
Top 5 US Exports to Mexico ($US millions) 
Ten years after NAFTA
764 772 773 778 784 Top 5 USrGDP
1993 1,592 1,120 1,376 1,342 4,269 9,699 7,637
2003 3,107 4,253 1,747 2,480 6,063 17,650 10,467
difference 1,515 3,133 371 1,138 1,794 7,951 2,830
% growth 95.2 279.7 27.0 84.8 42.0 82.0 37.0
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with M exico. Top exports number two through five contain infrastructure-related 
goods. As M exico continues to modernize and build its infrastructure, these four 
sectors will probably continue to expand at this rate (Figure 3). Interestingly, these 
same industries have increased greatly in the post-NAFTA period for M exican exports 












US Exports to Mexico (Top 5 1993 Exports)





7 6 4  = T e le c o m m u n ic a tio n s  E q u ip m en t
7 7 2  = E lectrical A p p ara tu s  for Sw itching  o r P ro tecting
7 7 3  = E q u ip m en t for D istributing Electricity 
7 7 8  = E lectrical M achinery  a n d  A ppara tu s
7 8 4  = P a rts  a n d  Acc. for T racto rs a n d  Motor V ehicles
Figure 3 . US Exports to M exico by SITC 
Source: US International Trade Com m ission
These five sectors were chosen to capture industries in which the US has a 
comparative advantage. It is not a surprise that all five o f these industries fall into the 
heavy manufacturing category. They are also highly capital-intensive industries.
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SITC764 SITC772 SITC773 SITC778 SITC784
76 4  = T e le co m m u n ic a tio n s  E q u ip m en t
7 7 2  = E lectrical A p p ara tu s  for Sw itching o r P rotecting
7 7 3  = E q u ip m en t for D istributing Electricity 
77 8  = Electrical M achinery an d  A ppara tus 
7 8 4  = P a rts  a n d  ficc. for T racto rs  a n d  Motor V ehicles
Figure 4 . M exican Exports to the US by SITC 
Source: US International Trade Com m ission
US Comparative Advantage Industries
It is important to look at individual industries as opposed to aggregate categories 
for two reasons. First, the effects o f NAFTA are different in each industry. And 
second, the two separate effects o f production replacement and vertical integration can 
only be seen by looking at each industry separately. In aggregate, the complementary 
and substitution effects may get cancelled. So it is important to look at a variety o f  
industries for each country pairing.
Long before NAFTA came into effect, the automotive sector was a thriving 
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Canada-United States Automotive Agreement (also known as the Auto Pact). The 
Auto Pact eliminated tariffs on automobiles and automotive parts. This agreement 
allowed firms in the US and Canada to selectively specialize in components in which 
they had some technical or cost advantage. Under the Auto Pact, Canadian vehicles and 
parts entered the US tariff-free based on two conditions. First, only those goods whose 
country o f origin (Canada) were allowed the tariff-free rate qualify. Second, the goods 
needed to meet the 50 percent Canadian or US content minimum. The US struck an 
interesting deal with Canada for US imports. Place o f origin did not matter so long as 
the content requirement was met. Therefore, the US could send a steel door brace to 
China, where it is further assembled into a car door (with other US parts) then export it 
to a Canadian firm for final assembly and still receive the tariff-free rate.
So by the time Canada and the US signed the CUSFTA, firms were already 
specialized and had optimized their respective assembly strategies. CUSFTA expanded 
Canada's export rules, so that they could import vehicles or parts from Europe or Japan 
and then re-export them to the US tariff-free. Under NAFTA rules o f origin these 
would be technically European or Japanese exports, not Canadian re-exports. Under the 
Auto Pact, Europe or Japan would need to meet production-sales ratios and the 
Canadian value-added limit to qualify for zero tariff status. Japan did not attempt to 
meet these thresholds. V olvo and European subsidiaries of the US Big Three did utilize
70
it. CUSFTA eliminated these re-export loopholes.
NAFTA formalized and unified the institutions o f trade between Canada, 
M exico, and the US in the automotive sector. But the process o f specializing
79 The Big Three are Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors. These three possessed the majority o f  the US 
car market for over three decades.
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optimizing and even integration had occurred over a longer period o f time before 
NAFTA. Therefore the strength o f the results for any NAFTA variable in the model are 
expected to be weaker than in the other sectors.
The US automotive sector experience with M exico was quite different. In 1962, 
as part o f their import-substitution strategy, M exico prohibited imports o f finished 
vehicles and defined high local content requirements on foreign firms (The Big Three,
on
Nissan, and Volkswagen) producing vehicles inside M exico. The Automotive Decree 
o f 1977 expanded the restrictions on foreign firms producing in M exico. M exico set 
rules which limited foreign firm exports relative to M exican content export. These rules 
required firms to use domestic suppliers for parts instead of importing them. In 
hindsight, there is a sense that these firms, the sheltered local M exican parts firms who 
enjoyed higher sales because o f these rules, were inefficient relative to the foreign 
producers. As trade liberalization occurred in this industry in the 1980s, these firms 
could not compete and disappeared.
Besides lowering tariffs, NAFTA has had two key effects on the automotive 
sector, changes in the rules o f origin and phase outs o f the trade balancing requirements. 
The rules o f origin were tightened to prevent non-NAFTA member countries from  
exporting to the US via Canada or M exico (especially via M exico). In 1998 the North 
American content percent was increased to 56 percent.81 In 2002 it was raised again up 
to 62.5 percent for most automotive goods. Canada was in a tight position on this 
matter because they regularly import partially assembled vehicles from non-member
80 Hufbauer and Schott (2005, p. 368).
81 Hufbauer and Schott (2005, p. 369).
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countries, manufacture them and then export the finished vehicles to the US. So 
they were reluctant to agree to setting this threshold too high.
Specifically NAFTA made the following changes explicitly affecting the 
automotive and automotive parts industries:
• M exican tariffs on cars and light trucks were reduced from 20 percent to 10 
percent as o f January 1, 1994.
•  M exican tariffs on light trucks were phased out completely by 1998.
•  M exican tariffs on cars were phased out completely by 2003.
• By 1998 the M exican tariffs were eliminated on 75 percent o f US auto parts.
•  M exican tariffs on all US auto parts were completely phased out by 2003.
• M exico reduced its export-conditional rate from $1.75 to $0.80 on January 1, 
1994.
•  M exico reduced its export-conditional rate down to $0.55 in 2003.
• By 2004, M exico phased out the export-conditional rate completely.
• M exico value-added requirement was lowered to 36 percent on January 1, 1994.
• M exico value-added requirement was lowered to 29 percent in 2003.
• By 2004, M exico phased out the value-added requirement completely.
• M exican content requirements were lowered from 30 percent to 20 percent on 
all auto parts.
• M exican import quotas on heavy trucks and buses were eliminated in 1998.82 
By any measure, parts for tractors and motor vehicles grew at a fast pace in the 10 years 
after NAFTA (see Table 3). B y comparison, US real GDP grew a net 37 percent during 
this time period (which includes a recession). It is unclear from Table 3 what the
82 Tariff and non-tariff statistics taken from Hufbauer and Schott (2005).
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baseline growth is for this industry. Table 3 shows net growth from 1989 to 1993 
compared to the net growth from 1994 to 2005. This breakout provides a slightly better 
basis for comparison. Telecommunications equipment and electrical apparatus for 
switching and protecting experienced significant improvements in growth in the post- 
NAFTA period. Equipment for distributing electricity and electrical machinery and 
apparatus experienced a slight decline. Growth in parts for tractors and motor vehicles 
declined substantially. There is some basis for comparison now but the separate effects 
o f the NAFTA, the peso crisis the 1995 M exican recession, and, to a lesser extent, the 
2001 US recession are all intermingled. Regression analysis takes care o f this trouble 
by accounting for other separate macroeconomic events.
Table 3
Top 5 US Exports to M exico Pre and Post NAFTA
Top 5 US Exports to Mexico ($US millions) 
Pre and Post NAFTA
764 % chg 772 % chg 773 % chg 778 % chg 784 % chg Top 5 % chg
1989
1993
976 924 899 623 2,005 5,426 
1,593 63.3 1,120 21.3 1,377 53.1 1,343 115.5 4,269 112.9 9,955 83.5
1994
2005
1,732 1,610 1,401 1,363 4,642 10,747 
3,371 94.7 5,326 230.9 2,001 42.8 2,737 100.8 6,301 35.8 20,206 88.0
Source: US International Trade Com m ission DataWeb
Telecommunications equipment was the second largest US export sector to 
M exico in 1993. Exports o f telecommunications equipment nearly doubled in the 10 
years following NAFTA. This is over 2.5 times greater growth than US real GDP 
growth. Telecommunications equipment includes goods like: microphones, 
loudspeakers and parts o f TV receivers. Telecommunications equipment makes up the 
basic level o f electronics technology. As m odem  technology spreads across M exico,
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the demand for these types o f goods will continue to increase. US exports fell 
substantially in 1993, across all sectors, not just telecommunications equipment. The 
peso crisis and slowing econom ic growth lowered import demand. Average annual 
export growth in the period before NAFTA is 13.2 percent (see Table 4). In 1995, the 
year o f M exico's recession, exports declined by 17 percent. Average annual export 
growth o f telecommunications equipment shortly following NAFTA increased by 9.6 
percent, still a substantial growth rate, but lower than before NAFTA. After the peso 
crisis and the recession passed, we see telecommunications equipment exports nearly 
quadruple. Once again it is difficult to distinguish between the various effects o f  
NAFTA, import demand changes due to the recession and the peso crisis.
Table 4
Average Annual Growth Rates by Period




764 772 773 778 784 Top 5 Mexico USrGDP
4-yr average growth pre-NAFTA 
4-yr average growth post-NAFTA 
12-yr average growth post-NAFTA
13.2 5.5 12.3 21.3 21.7 15.8 13.8 1.9 
9.6 31.2 9.2 17.3 9.2 13.2 15.4 3.7 
7.8 15.2 3.8 7.5 7.0 7.3 10.0 3.2
Key for Standard International Trade Classifications
SITC 764 = Telecommunications Equipment
SITC 772 = Electrical Apparatus for Switching and Protecting
SITC 773 = Equipment for Distributing Electricity
SITC 778 = Electrical Machinery and Apparatus
SITC 784 = Parts and Accessories for Tractors and Motor Vehicles
Equipment for distributing electricity was the third largest US export sector to 
M exico in 1993. This category includes products like insulated wire and fiber optic 
cables. Growth in equipment for distributing electricity was the lowest o f the five
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examined sectors. This sector grew by 27 percent in the 10 years follow ing NAFTA  
(see Table 2). This is lower than US real GDP growth during that period. Average 
annual growth in the post-NAFTA period was 3.8 percent. This is slightly higher than 
average annual US real GDP growth during that period. The capital stock measure used 
in Table 5 is actually capital stock for industrial machinery and equipment, two 
classifications up from equipment for distributing electricity. Therefore the capital 
stock measure overstates the capital content for equipment for distributing electricity by 
a large amount. Nonetheless, this is a mid to high capital-labor ratio industry.
Table 5
Capital-Labor Ratios for Key Industries
Industry K/L ratio
Apparel 13,371
Furniture and related products 20,334
Leather and allied products 21,169
Motor cars and other motor vehicles 65,875
Parts for tractors and motor vehicles 150,596
Chemicals 172,114
Electrical equipment and appliances 173,498
Primary metals 193,726
Electrical machinery and apparatus 256,812
Electrical apparatus for switching and protecting 473,791
Equipment for distributing electricity 1,766,667
Petroleum oils and other oils, crude 1,967,232
Telecommunications equipment 6,081,529
TV receivers X
Note: Capital-Labor ratio is based on US labor employed and US net stock o f fixed  
private capital in that industry. A  reasonable capital stock measure for TV receivers 
was not available.
Source: BEA current-cost net stock o f fixed private capital and BLS Current 
Employment Statistics database.
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Electrical machinery and apparatus was the fourth largest US export sector 
to M exico in 1993. This category contains good like batteries, electric filament lamps, 
electrical capacitors, and electromechanical tools. US exports o f electrical machinery 
and apparatus to M exico grew by a solid $1.1 billion, 84.8 percent, in the 10 years 
following NAFTA. Growth in US exports to M exico o f electrical machinery and 
apparatus shortly before NAFTA grew a net annual rate o f 21.3 percent, while US real 
GDP grew at 1.9 percent during that period. The 1990 recession in the US depressed 
some GDP growth during this period. In the four years before NAFTA, US exports to 
M exico o f electrical machinery and apparatus doubled. In 1993, it was the fastest 
growing US exports sector. In the four years after NAFTA, the rate o f growth o f  
exports fell slightly to an average o f 17.3 percent. This is extraordinary considering the 
demand decreases during the 1995 recession. The US recession in 2001 was 
particularly harsh on this export sector. Four o f the five years after the recession, 
exports declined in this sector.
Electrical apparatus for switching and protecting was the fifth largest US export 
sector to M exico in 1993. This sector contains good like printed circuit boards, 
electrical resistors, and electrical circuits not exceeding 1000 volts. US exports to 
M exico in electrical apparatus for switching and protecting was the fastest growing 
export sector from 1989 to 2003. Exports in this sector nearly quadrupled by 2003, a 
net increase o f $3.1 billion. By 2005 this sector had become the second largest export 
sector for the US into M exico. By 2005, parts o f  tractors and motor vehicles and 
electrical apparatus for switching and protecting alone made up over 28 percent o f US 
exports to M exico. This is $5.3 billion in exports in this one sector alone. This
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represents a considerable increase in total exports o f these goods and a considerable 
shift in the make-up o f exports.
M exican Comparative Advantage Industries
The second group o f industries represents those industries in which M exico has 
a comparative advantage. M exico's top five exports to the US in 1993 were petroleum  
oils and oils from bituminous minerals (crude oils) (SITC 333), motor cars and other 
motor vehicles (SITC 781), parts for tractors and motor vehicles (SITC 784), equipment 
for distributing electricity (SITC 773), and TV receivers (SITC 761) (see Figure 5).
The US and M exico both export large quantities o f parts for tractors and motor vehicles 
and also equipment for distributing electricity. These are both maquiladora industries, 
whereby the US exports a component to M exico, it is further processed and 
manufactured, then it is exported back to the US. In these cases, the processed good is 
still classified in the same 3-digit SITC and therefore both the US and M exico are 
shown to have high export volumes in these industries. NAFTA had little or no effect 
on the maquiladora goods because they were already imported tariff-free.
In 1993, M exico exported over $4.2 billion in crude oil (SITC 333) United 
States. Today, M exico is the fifth largest oil producer in the world, behind Saudi 
Arabia, Russia, the United States, and Iran. M exico is also the 10th largest exporter o f  
oil in the world. And M exico is the second largest exporter o f oil to the US, just behind 
Canada. Table 5 shows that this industry is one o f the highest capital-labor ratio
83 Energy Information Administration website.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.
html
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industries in the sample. Oil and gas extraction capital stock was used for the 
capital stock measure to compute this capital-labor ratio. So the capital stock term may 
be somewhat overstated. But it is still a high capital-labor ratio industry. By 2005, the 
last full year for which there is export data, M exico's oil exports to the United States 
were $23.2 billion. It remains M exico's largest export to the United States.
Mexican Exports to the US





333 = Petroleum oils (crude)
781 = Motor c a rs  and other motor vehicles 
784 = Parts for trac to rs and motor vehicles 
773 = Equipment for distributing electricity 
761 = TV receivers
Fi
gure 5
Top 5 M exican Exports to the US
Mexico's second largest export to the United States in 1993 was motor cars and 
other motor vehicles (SITC 781). In 1993, M exico exported just over $3 billion in 
motor cars and other motor vehicles to the United States. Employment and capital 
stock information was only available on the larger category motor vehicles and parts 
(SITCs 3361, 3362, 3363). Therefore the capital-labor ratio in Table 5 appears
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somewhat diluted for motor cars and other vehicles. The employment figures for 
just motor cars and other vehicles should be significantly smaller and therefore the true 
capital-labor ratio for this industry will be higher than that illustrated in Table 5. It is 
nevertheless a mid or high capital-labor industry. B y the year 2000, this industry had 
grown by more than quintuple; it surged to $16.4 billion in exports to the US. But by 
2005, exports fell back to a still-healthy $10.8 billion.
The fifth largest M exican export to the US is TV receivers (SITC 761). In 1993, 
M exico exported just over $1.5 billion in TV receivers to the US. B y 2005, M exican 
exports o f  TV receivers rose to $9.6 billion. This is one o f the largest export growths 
recorded over this period.
High Capital-Labor Ratio Industries
The capital-labor ratios in Table 5 are computed using employment data from  
the Bureau o f Labor Statistics' Current Employment Statistics data and current-cost net 
stock o f fixed private capital data from the Bureau o f Econom ic Analysis' national 
accounts website. These measures o f capital-labor ratios have two shortfalls. First, the 
capital-labor content is based on that in US firms, not in M exican firms. So the 
measures with respect to M exican exports are tenuous at best. Second, capital-labor 
ratios are estimates based on the closest industry where data is available. The 
components used to compute this measure are as accurate as possible; any 
inconsistencies in industry classification are noted in each industry section. For this 
reason, these measures o f capital-intensity are meant to be rough measures only.
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The three most capital-intensive industries using 1993 measures for 
employment and capital are chemicals (SITC 5), electrical equipment and appliances 
(SITC 775), and primary metals (SITC 68). The US exported just over 3.4 billion in 
chemicals to M exico in 1993. This amount increased to $14.2 billion by 2005. This is 
a less important industry to M exico. In 1993, M exico exported $772 m illion in 
chemicals to the US. This export industry grew by 326% by 2005 to $3.2 billion, a 
substantial increase (see Table 6).
The second highest capital-labor ratio industry is electrical equipment and 
appliances. This is one o f the smaller export sectors for the US. The US exported $426  
m illion in electrical equipment and appliances to M exico in 1993. The industry grew  
by a modest 23 percent over 12 years to $527 m illion in exports. This is one o f the few  
export industries for the US where export growth fell behind US GDP growth. In 
M exico, this industry has shown considerable growth over the last 12 years, ultimately 
becoming one o f M exico's larger exports to the US. In 1993, M exico exported $559 
m illion in electrical equipment and appliances to the US. This amount quadrupled to 
over $2.2 billion in exports by 2005.
The third highest capital-labor ratio industry is primary metals. Primary metals 
has becom e a moderately important export for both the US and M exico. In 1993, the 
US exported $603 m illion in primary metals to M exico. In contrast, M exico exported 
$458 m illion in primary metals to the United States. Growth in this export sector tripled 
for both countries by the end o f 2005. In 2005 the US exported $2.3 billion in primary 
metals to M exico, while M exico exported just over $1.5 billion to the US.
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Export Growth Rate Comparison for Select Industries
114
1993 2005 growth
UM Total Exports 41,581 120,365 189.5
M U Total Exports 39,919 170,109 326.1
USGDP 30,130,600 44,194,500 46.7
MGDP 5,024,790 7,024,830 39.8
UM5 3,470 14,233 310.2
MU5 772 3,291 326.3
UM775 426 527 23.7
MU775 559 2,255 303.4
UM68 603 2,349 289.6
MU68 458 1,576 244.1
UM84 879 1,124 27.9
MU84 1,413 6,322 347.4
UM82 680 758 11.5
MU82 882 4,297 387.2
UM61 94 618 557.4
MU61 63 89 41.3
(millions o f  US dollars unless otherwise noted)
UM =US Exports to M exico, M U=M exican Exports to the US. US GDP is measured in 
millions o f chained 2000 dollars. M exico GDP from IMF International Financial 
Statistics. M exico GDP is measured in m illions o f constant 1993 pesos.
SITC 5 = Chemicals, SITC 775 = Electrical equipment and appliances, SITC 68 =  
Primary metals, SITC 84 = Apparel, SITC 82 = Furniture and related products, SITC 61 
= Leather and allied products
Sources: Export data from FRED and International Trade Commission DataWeb 
US GDP from Bureau o f Econom ic Analysis.
Low Capital-Labor Ratio Industries
The three lowest capital-labor ratio industries are apparel (SITC 84), furniture 
and related products (SITC 82), and leather and allied products (SITC 61). Not 
surprisingly, these are not important export sectors for the United States. Apparel, 
however, is a significant export industry for M exico. M exico exported over $1.4 billion  
in apparel to the US in 1993. Apparel was M exico's seventh largest export (by 2-digit 
SITCs) to the US in 1993, behind only electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances 
(SITC 77), road vehicles (SITC 78), petroleum and petroleum products (SITC 33),
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telecommunications and sound recording and reproducing apparatus (SITC 76), 
power generating machinery and equipment (SITC 71), and vegetables and fruits (SITC 
05). By 2005, apparel had more than quadrupled to $6.3 billion in exports to the US. 
This is one o f the largest export growths over this period.
The second lowest capital-labor ratio industry is furniture and related products. 
This is currently one o f the United States' smallest export sectors to M exico, and had the 
lowest export growth o f the 14 industries in this study in the 12 years that followed  
NAFTA. The US exported $680 m illion in furniture and related products to M exico in 
1993. This grew by 11.5 percent to $758 m illion by 2005. M exico's exports o f  
furniture and related products to the US nearly quintupled by 2005. Exports grew from  
$882 m illion in 1993 to over $4.2 billion in 2005. That makes furniture and related 
products one o f M exico's top ten export industries to the US.
The third lowest capital-labor ratio industry is leather and allied products.
W hile this was and still is a small export industry for the US, it has shown substantial 
growth since NAFTA. In 1993, the US was exporting only $94 m illion in leather and 
allied products to M exico. B y 2005, this grew by a factor o f six to $618 million. This 
is a somewhat unusual result, since this is a highly labor-intensive set o f goods and the 
US has increased its exports o f these goods by a large degree. It is likely that many o f  
these goods are by-products from other products, mainly beef products, and the growth 
in those industries has spurred growth in these industries as well.
The nature o f the selected industries has been identified. Does foreign direct 
investment occur equally often in each o f these industries? D o the capital-intensity 
factors or comparative advantage factors discussed above matter in the foreign direct
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investment-exports relationship? Its important to understand the nature o f foreign 
direct investment and its prevalence among US firms' general investment decisions 
before answering these important questions. A  full discussion o f foreign direct 
investment appears in the next chapter.
Summary
Four categories o f industries are identified. The first category is those goods in 
which the US has a comparative advantage with M exico and they are: parts for tractors 
and motor vehicles, telecommunications equipment, equipment for distributing 
electricity, electrical machinery and apparatus, and electrical apparatus for switching 
and protecting. The second category is those goods in which M exico has a comparative 
advantage with the US and those goods are: petroleum oils and oils from bituminous 
minerals (crude oil), motor cars and other motor vehicles, parts for tractors and motor 
vehicles, equipment for distributing electricity, and TV receivers. The third category is 
those goods which have a high capital-to-labor content and they are: chemicals, 
electrical equipment and appliances, and primary metals. The fourth category is those 
goods which have a low  capital-to-labor content and they are: apparel, furniture and 
related products, and leather and allied products. These industries were selected to 
determine whether the input abundance o f  a country and the input intensiveness o f  a 
good matters to the foreign direct investment-export relationship.
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CHAPTER 7
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
"I am com m itted to working with President Fox to expand free  and fa ir  trade between  
our nations. We've seen trade lift both our nations and both our economies. O ver the 
past decade, trade between the United States and M exico has nearly trip led  to about 
$230 billion. Today, M exico is Am erica's second-largest trading partner, and we are  
Mexico's la rgest." - President G eorge W. Bush, M arch 6, 2004.
Foreign direct investment is a long-term purchase o f assets, stocks, or ownership 
in a foreign firm. FDI is distinguished from a normal portfolio investment, because FDI 
involves control o f  the new asset. Each sovereign nation defines the level o f investment 
that qualifies as FDI for their own accounting purposes, but the most comm only used 
threshold is 10 percent ownership o f voting shares. Foreign direct investment can take 
two forms: the creation of a new production facility, which usually results in job  
creation, or mergers and acquisitions, whereby ownership o f an existing firm is 
transferred to the investor or parent company. Mergers and acquisitions can have a 
variety o f  effects on employment.
FDI can be used as an alternative means to gain access to a market, as in the 
cases o f Toyota, Nissan, and Mitsubishi, who all built factories in the US in the 1980s. 
Foreign direct investment can also be a source o f additional capital. There is an 
argument that a firm is investing in a market in order to penetrate a market which may 
have been inaccessible in the past due to high tariff barriers or transportation costs.
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This was certainly true o f M exico prior to NAFTA. Foreign direct investment can 
be tested in a regression model to determine whether firms are using it as an alternative 
to exporting directly into M exico. This phenomenon is called tariff-jumping in some 
literature, because it allows the firm to avoid aggressive tariffs in some countries and 
still provide goods to that foreign market. In this simple analysis, the expected sign on 
FDI in the empirical model will be negative. A  positive sign would indicate some 
degree o f  complementarity in exports and FDI. It is certainly plausible that if  
investment conditions in the target country offered a competitive return relative to other 
investment opportunities (among both domestic and other investment opportunities 
from other countries) and import demand was also high, such that FDI and exports 
increased in tandem, this phenomenon might occur. Other factors discussed in the 
Theoretical M odel chapter will elaborate on this basic premise. Empirical results from  
numerous studies offer considerable evidence that firms are investing in foreign markets 
to supply that market with goods, as opposed to investing in foreign firms in hope that 
that stock appreciates in the future.
During the sample period 1989 to 2005, US foreign direct investment into
QA
M exico (measured by income without current cost adjustment) increased eight fold.
And its share o f  total US foreign direct investment outflows has continued to grow over 
that period as well. During the early 1980s, US foreign direct investment into M exico  
hovered near zero or was negative. Foreign direct investment can be negative when a 
capital asset is sold, and it shows up in the national accounts as negative. In 1986, net 
US foreign direct investment to M exico was -$75 million. Just two years later, it
84 Bureau o f Economic Analysis International Economic Accounts for the US data.
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increased to $1.2 billion. US foreign direct investment outflows to M exico in the 
last two decades have risen pretty consistently. Looking at annual data since 1987, 
foreign direct investment has declined only five times. In 1989, foreign direct 
investment fell by 10 percent; as the 1990 recession loomed, US aggregate demand fell 
even before the official contraction period. In 1995, FDI fell by one-third as investors
oc
became worried about inflation and the fate o f the peso and pulled their investments. 
Then more recently, FDI fell in consecutive years, 2000 and 2001, as the 2001 US 
recession again cut US incomes and US demand fell. By 2005, US FDI into M exico  
was $8.2 billion and represented almost four percent o f total US FDI outflows.
The implementation o f NAFTA provides an excellent experimental field for 
testing empirical relationships because it creates incentives for increased trade flow s. In 
terms o f the gravity equation, the time period which includes NAFTA's implementation 
is also ideal because a trade "resistance" factor reduced. The gravity equation thrives 
upon the relationship between incomes, populations, resistance factors, and export 
flows. Therefore any agent which causes a change in one o f these four variables makes 
the gravity model all the more appealing. However, for the specification o f this paper, 
the ideal (pure) four-term relationship w ill be altered by adding a fifth term, FDI.
In social sciences, there is rarely the luxury o f  designing perfect experiments. 
Usually one must select events which closely match the experiment which is desired 
instead o f constructing the event itself, as is true in many natural sciences. But there are 
some rules which govern experiments in the natural sciences as well as the social 
sciences. There are two important rules when designing any experiment. First, one
85 Anderson (2003, p. 172).
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wants to localize a single change and keep everything else constant, to better 
examine that one cause and its impact on your test variable. NAFTA accomplishes this 
first requirement pretty w e ll.. .sort of. NAFTA lowers tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
exports o f goods and services from all three member countries. M exico, however, had 
much higher tariffs for most imports before NAFTA. Therefore, M exico was required 
to lower its tariffs and non-tariff barriers more in absolute terms than either Canada or 
the US. This created some asymmetry in the reduction o f trade resistances. However, 
because each trade flow  is measured independently, the NAFTA dummy variable can 
"pick up" the effects o f the different trade resistance reductions in the respective 
NAFTA variable. This is more serendipity than design, but it works. There is no really 
good way to "measure" the trade resistances o f all the various tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers in a model. Tariffs vary across different goods, for which there are no good 
data sources. Likewise, the phase-out period for these tariffs occurs at different times 
and by different schedules. So it would be necessary to include a separate dummy 
variable for each tariff reduction schedule. The loss in degrees o f freedom by including 
so many extra variables w ill quickly result in a powerless and unmanageable regression 
model. One final concern is that there is no easy way to quantify the various non-tariff 
barriers facing each good. But it is known that the majority o f these changes occurred 
on enactment day or shortly thereafter. The simplest way to capture this time-relevant 
event is to just use a simple binary dummy like the NAFTA variable.
The second rule o f experimental design is a corollary to rule number one. If you 
cannot localize a single "cause," then ideally you want the multiple changes to occur in 
a fashion which allows you to observe the multiple effects clearly. Unfortunately, this
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is not the case with foreign direct investment, exports, and NAFTA. An asymmetry 
existed in the barriers to FDI in M exico and the US prior to NAFTA. In fact, there were 
essentially no barriers to foreign direct investment flow s into the US before NAFTA. 
M eanwhile, there were substantial barriers to foreign direct investment into M exico. 
NAFTA caused these barriers to disappear for the majority o f investment sectors in 
M exico, with some notable exceptions (see Chapter 5 for more on this topic). So we  
observe that inflows o f FDI into M exico increase after the passage o f  NAFTA. This 
result was expected, since the barriers to entry have been removed and the return to 
potential investments has essentially increased.
So now two factors have changed facing the US firm. First, it is now cheaper to 
export to M exico. And second, it is now more lucrative to invest in M exico. It is 
difficult to make a guess as to the proportional relationship between trade barrier 
reductions and investment barrier reductions. Both are not quantifiable to some extent. 
But we can say that both barriers were reduced at the same time. All other things equal, 
if  the reduction in barriers were proportional, then we would expect US firms to export 
more, invest more, or both in M exico. The exact net effect o f which increases by more, 
exports or investment, is ambiguous. Moreover, this dual reduction o f barriers is not 
conducive to the experiment or hypothesis within this paper. The stylized facts 
developed in Chapter 5 were developed to help overcome this shortfall o f  the 
experimental design. The empirical model can help test these facts to determine how  
FDI affects exports in each industry.
N ow  let us look at the environment facing the M exican firms. The investment 
landscape facing M exican firms has not changed. There were no barriers to investment
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in the US before NAFTA and there are none after NAFTA. But NAFTA did cause 
a real reduction in the tariff and non-tariff barriers for the export o f goods to the US.
The tariff levels in the US before NAFTA were smaller than those in M exico before 
NAFTA, but the tariff levels were reduced nonetheless. So now the M exican firm 
observes a real decrease in the barriers facing its exports and no change in the foreign 
direct investment landscape. In one sense, this is useful for testing the hypothesis in 
this paper. It is contended that if  tariff barriers fall, then the options facing the M exican 
firm for profit-maximizing behavior have been shifted towards exporting more. That is, 
at the margin, the firm is more likely to export more, given that their goods can be more 
profitable as exports, than to spend that money on foreign direct investment. Given that 
the firm has finite resources, they are more likely to export more and invest less in the 
US. And therefore we should not expect the same results for the M exico export model 
as we would for the US export model. In fact, it is logical to expect the substitute 
relationship to be more prevalent in the M exican export models than in the US export 
models.
Foreign direct investment at its essence is just another way that firms can 
optimally assign their assets to m aximize profits. Foreign direct investment allows 
firms to buy partial or full ownership in foreign firms. Many times this is used to 
acquire vertical integration in their product inputs and sometimes it is simply used as 
one component o f a larger investment portfolio. Ultimately, firms decide whether to 
buy more capital to produce more goods, hire more labor to produce more goods, or 
purchase an investment instrument, like shares in a foreign firm. If firms decide to 
spend their assets by buying foreign shares, then it is reasonable to assume that foreign
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exports decrease. This is a testable empirical hypothesis. To test the hypothesis that 
foreign direct investment affects trade flow s, foreign direct investment from the 
exporting country into the importing country has been added to the model.
So there are clearly some asymmetries between the US and M exico.
Specifically, there are asymmetries in how each nation has lowered its respective 
resistances to FDI and imports. W hen this is coupled with the stylized facts presented 
in Chapter 5, one should expect that at the very least the exporting country does matter 
when trying to assign the appropriate sign to FDI in the empirical model. The next 
section discusses the specifics o f the data used in the empirical model.
Summary
Foreign direct investment is the purchase o f controlling assets in a foreign firm. 
Until NAFTA, there were considerable barriers to FDI inflows into M exico. Tariff 
barriers in both the US and in M exico were reduced as a result o f NAFTA. But 
NAFTA had an asymmetric effect on FDI. There were few barriers to M exican 
investment into the US before NAFTA, while NAFTA created a substantial reduction to 
M exican investment barriers facing US investors. Thus, NAFTA stimulated US 
investment into M exico. Because o f this asymmetry, it is logical to expect more 
substitution effects in the M exican export m odels, as firms decrease investments into 
the US and m ove assets towards the now more lucrative exports. The duality o f  
lowering barriers for US investment and for US exports (despite controlling for incomes 
in the empirical models) may generate more complementarity relationships in the US 
export models.
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CHAPTER 8
DATA
The sample consists o f quarterly data on the US and M exico from 1989 to 2005. 
Exports are recorded in Free A longside Ship (FAS) value, which does not include 
loading fees, insurance, and other transportation costs. Monthly exports were summed 
to get quarterly observations. Export data was gathered directly from the US  
International Trade Commission's DataWeb website. Total exports and five three-digit 
SITC exports were collected for US exports to M exico and M exico exports to the US. 
The five three-digit SITC exports were selected by sorting all three-digit exports from  
the US to M exico for 1993. The top five classifications were selected for analysis 
because o f  their importance in US-M exican trade. The large absolute size o f  these 
classifications has an inherent appeal in the econometric analysis by providing
a/-
sufficient variance across time. The top six classifications in order are parts and 
accessories for tractors, motor cars and other motor vehicles (SITC 784), 
telecommunications equipment (SITC 764), estimated low value shipments (SITC 994), 
electricity distribution equipment (SITC 773), electrical machinery and apparatus (SITC 
778), and electrical apparatus for switching and protecting (SITC 772). The third 
category is a catch-all category for those goods which do not fit in any other category.
86 These classifications were not only large but also exhibited high growth before NAFTA entered into 
effect.
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There are hundreds o f completely different goods in this category and therefore they 
do not represent any one commodity market. For this reason it was not used in the 
sample. The remaining five classifications make up 23 percent o f  US exports to 
M exico for 1993.
The same 3-digit SITC sorting process was used to select the top 5 M exican  
exports to the US. All o f the M exican export data was taken from the US International 
Trade Com m ission DataWeb website. The top five M exican exports to the US for 1993 
are: petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals (crude oil), motor cars and other 
motor vehicles, parts for tractors and motor vehicles, equipment for distributing 
electricity, and TV receivers. The US and M exico share two o f  their top 5 largest 
exports to one another. The US does not export any crude oil to M exico and therefore, 
there is no empirical model possible.
The six industries, apparel, furniture and related products, leather and allied 
product, chemicals, electrical equipment and appliances, and primary metals were 
selected by sorting capital-labor ratios for available industries. The capital measure is 
the 1993 current-cost net stock o f fixed private capital taken from the Bureau o f  
Econom ic Analysis for each available industry. The labor measure is the Survey o f  
Current Business employment taken from the Bureau o f Labor Statistics for each 
available industry. Then the capital-labor ratios were sorted and the three highest and 
lowest ratios were selected to represent the high and low  capital-labor ratio industries.
Quarterly data for real gross domestic product (rGDP) for the US was taken 
from the Bureau o f Econom ic Analysis National Accounts website. This is measured in 
billions o f chained 2000 US dollars. Real GDP for M exico was taken from the Bank o f
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M exico website. The US recessions o f 1990 and 2001 are bounded within the 
sample period. Real GDP in the gravity model specification w ill capture the income 
effects o f the recessions. This is particularly important for specification o f  the NAFTA  
dummy variables. The M exico recession o f 1995 caused depressed incomes in 1995. 
The over-valuation o f the peso, prior to the peak o f the peso crisis, also depressed 
incomes in 1994. The inclusion o f the M exican real GDP variable will prevent the 
income effects from the M exican recession and the effects o f the peso crisis on incomes 
from being assigned to the NAFTA dummy variable.
US civilian population estimates were taken from the US Census website. 
M exican mid-year population estimates were taken from the Statistical Abstract o f  the 
United States. The exchange rate variable is taken from the Bank o f M exico and is
87expressed as number o f pesos to the US dollar. The NAFTA dummy variable is zero 
from first quarter 1989 to fourth quarter 1993 and one thereafter. Expressed lag values 
o f the NAFTA dummy variable are lags o f  one quarter each.
Quarterly foreign direct investment data from the US into M exico for 1994 to 
2005 was taken from the US Bureau o f Econom ic Analysis International Econom ic 
Accounts Balance o f Payments website. Foreign direct investment is calculated on the 
basis o f income without current-cost adjustment and net o f withholding taxes. Annual 
FDI (income-basis) data for the years 1989 to 1993 was taken from the same source and 
converted into quarterly data using the average o f  quarterly shares for the 1994 to 2005 
periods. The computed shares were nearly 25 percent per quarter and were assigned to
87 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also publishes a measure o f the M exico-US exchange rate.
This measure is identical to the Bank o f M exico measure but is expressed as an index. The Bank o f  
M exico measure has been used for this empirical model.
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the annual data for 1989 to 1993. The Bureau of Economic Analysis was consulted
to confirm that quarterly FDI data are not available for US FDI to M exico for this time
period. Annual FDI from M exico into the US was also taken from the Bureau o f
Econom ic Analysis International Econom ic Accounts Balance o f Payments website.
The FDI data from M exico into the US is recorded on a historical cost basis. H istorical
cost basis is a measure o f  the value o f  d irect investors' equity in, and net outstanding
loans to, their affiliates in which the direct investors' investment is valued a t book value.
It largely reflects p rices a t the time o f  the investment rather than prices o f  the current
period  and is not ordinarily adjusted to reflect the changes in the current costs o r the
88replacement costs o f  tangible assets o r in stock market valuations o f  firm s. Foreign
direct investment data on an income basis was used for the US and on a historical cost 
basis for M exico because o f data availability issues. Annual data for M exico FDI into 
the US can be seen in Figure 6. There was no other basis for selecting different 
measures o f FDI for each country. Both measures do a good job o f capturing the full 
effects o f  capital inflows. And more importantly, both measures capture the variation in 
foreign direct investment.
Aggregate FDI was used instead o f industry-level FDI because o f data 
limitations. However, the use o f aggregate FDI does have one redeeming feature, in 
that it captures the FDI from a variety o f firms who are potentially investing into the 
same industry o f interest. If there existed FDI data which was from some industry into 
the same industry, then this effect would be missed. However, the industry-specific 
demand effects are m issed by using aggregate FDI and therefore this is a deficiency o f
88 Bureau o f  Economic Analysis website glossary definition.
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Figure 6 . M exican Foreign Direct Investment into the US 
Source: BEA
Summary
The sample consists o f quarterly data from 1989 to 2005 for M exico and the US. 
The dependent variable in each model is bilateral export data between the US and 
M exico. Bilateral export data between the US and M exico for several levels o f  
aggregation (total exports, sum o f comparative advantage goods, sum o f  high and low  
capital-labor ratio goods, and individual industries) are used in the empirical analysis. 
The data for the dependent variable and regressors are taken from a variety o f  sources, 
specifically from the US International Trade Commission, Bureau o f Labor Statistics, 
the Bureau o f Econom ic Analysis, the US Census Bureau, the World Bank, the Bank o f
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M exico, and the International Monetary Fund. Where possible, data were 
confirmed with multiple respected sources.
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CHAPTER 9
MODEL A N D  METHODOLOGY
The data were specified using an augmented gravity equation. Two slightly 
different specifications o f the gravity model are used to illustrate the effects o f FDI on 
trade flows. For specification number one, the widely used specification o f  the gravity
OQ
equation has been altered to include a binary NAFTA dummy variable. This equation 
is given by:
Xy = a G D P /G D P /2 P O P f3 P O P /4 X R A T E /5 NAFTAp6£ , (10.1)
where GDPi is the real G D P of the exporting country, GDPj is the real G D P o f the 
importing country, POP; is the population o f the exporting country, POPj is the 
population o f the importing country, and XRATE is the exchange rate between the two 
countries. In the second specification o f the gravity model, the same binary dummy is 
included for NAFTA and also a continuous variable for foreign direct investment from  
the exporting country into the importing country. Epsilon is a log-normal residual term. 
The second specification is given by:
89 Gould (1998) used a nearly identical specification, except he also included the additional variables 
GDP price deflators for both countries, a variable for the exchange rate with the rest o f  the world and 
lagged dependent variables. The addition o f a trading-block dummy is very common in cross-sectional 
gravity model specifications. See also Tinbergen (1962), Linnemann (1966), Aitken (1973), et. al.
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Xy = a G D P p G D P f2 PO P?3 P O P /4 X R A T E /5 NAFTA*6 F D I ^ e  . (10.2)
Real GDP is used instead o f nominal GDP to help eliminate any effects dealing with 
inflation or the purchasing power o f the currency. Gould (1998) uses real GDP in his 
specification o f the gravity equation. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2001) use nominal GDP 
and the real exchange rate, computed using the nominal exchange rate and the CPI, to 
capture any price-level effects. The goal o f capturing price levels and purchasing power 
should be attained by both approaches. GDP per capital has been used both in addition 
to GDP90 and also instead o f GDP91. A ll three specifications have been successful in 
estimating export flows. Real GDP was chosen for parsimony and for the reasons
92stated above. The expected sign for both real GDP variables is positive based on the 
economic mass/capacity theory outlined in Linnemann (1966), Aitkin (1973), and 
Anderson (1979).
Populations for the exporting country and the importing country are used in each 
model. The expected sign for the population o f the exporting country is negative 
because the larger the domestic market, the more o f domestic production is consumed 
domestically, and hence the smaller the available supply o f exports will be. Together 
income and population o f  the exporting country represent the potential supply o f  
exports as laid out in Linnemann (1966). The expected sign for the population o f the 
importing country is negative because the higher the population the less need there is
90 Bergstrand (1989).
91 Breuss and Egger (1999).
92 In the analyses using the both GDP and GDP per capita together in one specification, the authors were 
using the GDP per capita variable as a proxy for the capital-labor ratio within a country or were 
specifically testing the Linder Hypothesis.
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for imports, because the domestic production is supplying a larger amount o f its 
domestic market with its own domestic goods. Together income and population o f the 
importing country represent the potential import demand. There seems to be an 
unwritten assumption about economies o f scale in Linnemann's argument for the
Q -5
negative sign on importer's population. The gravity equation literature supports this 
finding.
The exchange rate was included in the model to capture the terms o f trade 
effects with the other country. Thursby and Thursby (1987) tested the effectiveness o f  
real exchange rates versus nominal exchange rates in their model o f 17 countries and 
found them to be equivalent. For this reason and for parsimony, the nominal exchange 
rate was used in the empirical model. The exchange rate variable will also capture 
many o f the appreciation and depreciation effects that occurred due to the M exican peso 
crisis.
I will use a standard log-linear specification o f ordinary least squares to estimate 
two versions o f the augmented gravity equation. The dependent variables found in 
models (1) through (74) are the exports from the Host country to the Subsidiary country 
(see Tables 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14 ). In each case, only one country-to-country 
export trade flow  is measured per regression equation. Each odd-numbered model uses 
the equation (10.1) specification. Each even-numbered model uses the equation (10.2) 
specification, which includes an FDI variable. The optimal NAFTA lag length was 
specified using the respective odd-numbered models. N o effort was made to re-specify 
for the NAFTA lag length in the even-numbered models.
93 Learner and Stern (1970, p. 153).
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Each model was individually tested for the presence o f autocorrelation using 
the Ljung-Box Q-Statistic test. Significant autocorrelation was present in all model 
specifications. Autocorrelation violates the ordinary least squares assumption that the 
error terms are not correlated with each other. To correct for this in the standard linear 
model generate:
where
y is the dependent variable,
x is the vector o f regressors, and
u is the normal-distributed residual term.
The autocorrelation equation is written as:
where
p is the coefficient o f autocorrelation, 
u t . q  is the q-period lag o f the residual term,
e is the error term o f the autocorrelation equation (sometimes called the 
innovation term), and 
q is the order o f autocorrelation.
This linear model is transformed into the non-linear model:
y , = f 3 x t + u t , (10.3)
ut =  P u,-q + £ t> (10.4)
(10.5)
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The coefficients (3 and p are estimated simultaneously using a Marquardt non-linear 
least squares algorithm.94 These terms appear in the model as AR(q) terms, where q is 
the order o f autocorrelation. After the algorithm was run, the model residuals were 
visually inspected and tested again with the Ljung-Box Q-statistic test to confirm that 
no autocorrelation exists. These final models do not exhibit any autocorrelation 
processes and the residuals appear to be white noise.
There was no reason to presume that heteroskedasticity is present in these time 
series m odels, but it was tested for anyway. The White Heteroskedasticity test with 
cross terms was used. As expected, each specification failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no heteroskedasticity present.
The gravity model's functional form is particularly appealing when national 
incomes are different and national income growth rates are different. This is true for 
bilateral and multi-lateral frameworks, since both income variables appear in both 
equations. The US and M exico have very different incomes, income growth rates, and 
populations, which makes the gravity specification all the more appealing.95 The next 
chapter evaluates the empirical results and compares them to the expected outcomes 
based on the theoretical model.
Summary
An augmented gravity model specification is used for empirical testing. The 
gravity model uses income and population for both the importer and the exporter
94 eViews version 4.1 Help Manual by Quantitative Micro Software, Inc.
95 The United States' real GDP is six times that o f  Mexico's and the United States' population is four times 
that o f Mexico's.
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countries to explain variance in the dependent variable, one-way bilateral exports.
The functional form is a standard log-linear specification of ordinary least squares. 
Exchange rate is included to capture any terms o f trade effects with the other country 
and to account for the monetary effects o f the peso crisis. A dichotomous dummy 
variable, NAFTA, is included in the model to account for the reduction in tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. The NAFTA variable is lagged in some models to account for 
phase-out tariff reductions and a natural learning delay for exporters to adjust to the new  
cost structure with reduced trade barriers. Two regressions are run for each level o f  
export aggregation and industry. The first is a standard augmented gravity equation. 
And the second is the standard augmented gravity equation with the addition o f the 
foreign direct investment variable.
Autocorrelation was tested, detected, and corrected for in each model. Other 
econometric tests were conducted to assert that the error terms contained only white 
noise and complied with the rules for ordinary least squares regressions.
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CHAPTER 10
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results are promising and indicate that the models do a good job o f  
explaining trade flow s between M exico and the US. The R-squared (goodness o f  fit) 
measure is above 0.9 in most models. This means that at least 90% o f the variation in 
the dependent variable can be explained with each set o f independent variables. Alm ost 
half o f the GDP coefficients are statistically significant, o f which all are positively  
signed. There were only a few  negatively signed GDP coefficients. Those that were 
signed negative were not statistically significantly different from zero. This seems to 
indicate that GDP does a good job o f explaining much o f exports flow s. For most 
models, the population coefficients have the correct (negative) sign. For those which 
have the theoretically incorrect sign, all but one are statistically insignificant. That one 
anomaly will be examined further later. So overall, the gravity model has a good 
structure for explaining M exican - US trade flow s. The details o f each model w ill be 
discussed separately in the next sections.
Aggregated Industries
The gravity equation is particularly well-fit for models (1) and (2). Here, not 
only are there several statistically significant coefficients but also each coefficient has
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the expected sign, as suggested by Linnemann's theory o f the gravity model. A ll 
eight o f the GDP coefficients have the theoretically correct (positive) sign. Moreover, 
four o f the eight are statistically significant. In each case, the larger country (the US) 
has the higher coefficient. More will be discussed about this issue later. The signs on 
the population variables were negative for six o f the eight population variables. A  
negative population coefficient is consistent with Linnemann's theory that a country's 
population places limits on the potential market demand and supply.96
The NAFTA dummy variables were statistically significant in all four Total 
Export models (see Table 7). It is then with some reason that the NAFTA coefficients 
are statistically significant in the first quarter o f 1994. Since these models measure total 
exports, it is picking up the tariff reductions from every sector o f trade. There were 
numerous tariff reductions and eliminations that occurred simultaneously and 
immediately. NAFTA immediately eliminated trade barriers on over 20 percent o f  
textiles and apparels and NAFTA immediately reduced tariffs on 50 percent o f
97agricultural products. Therefore in the aggregate it is understandable that the 
strongest impact occurs in the first period that NAFTA was enacted.
The foreign direct investment variable is not statistically significant in model (2) 
or (4). In both cases the coefficient is small in absolute value. There is no evidence that 
in aggregate, foreign direct investment has an effect on total export flow s. This was 
expected since numerous complementary and substitution effects are aggregated.
The next four models (models 5-8 in Table 8) use the sum o f exports from the 
five industries, parts for tractors and motor vehicles, telecommunications equipment,
96 Linnemann (1966, pp. 34-35).
97 Gould (1998, p. 19).
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Table 7
Regression Results for Total Exports o f all Goods
Total E x p o rts  of all G o o d s 
US e x p o r ts  to  MEX MEX e x p o rts  to  US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
c -0.835 -0.646 -1.796 -1.764
3.120 3.107 2.681 2.732
-0.27 -0.21 -0.67 -0.65
GDPi 3.371 3.350 0.469 0.472
0.697 0.689 0.291 0.297
"*4 .83 ***4.86 1.61 1.59
GDPj 0.218 0.148 2.448 2.450
0.263 0.271 0.646 0.653
0.83 0.54 ***3.78 ***3.75
POPi -0.477 -0.552 -0.311 -0.314
1.439 1.432 0.393 0.399
-0.33 -0.39 -0.79 -0.79
POPj -0.308 -0.288 0.118 0.107
0.369 0.368 1.262 1.280
-0.83 -0.78 0.09 0.08
XRATE -0.199 -0.179 0.303 0.303
0.073 0.076 0.073 0.074




NAFTA 0.098 0.092 0.088 0.089
0.041 0.041 0.042 0.043
" 2 .4 0 **2.26 " 2.11 **2.09
OBS 65 65 67 67
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
DW 2.05 2.04 2.30 2.30
AIC -3.55 -3.53 -3.59 -3.56
NAFTAdiff 3.4% 4.3% 11.8% 11.8%
Coefficients, Standard Errors and t-statistics are provided 
* = statistically significant at 10% alpha level 
** = statistically significant at 5% alpha level 
*** = statistically significant at 1% alpha level
NAFTAdiff = Growth in exports generated by calculating for NAFTA=0 in the model. 
Base year for computing the percent is the NAFTA=0 baseline level o f exports.
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Table 8
Regression Results for Aggregated 1993 Top 5 US Exports to M exico and 1993 Top 5
M exican Exports to the US
1993 US T op 5 -ln d u stries 1993 M exican T op 5 -ln d u stries
E x p o rts  to  M exico E x p o rts  to  th e  US
US e x p o r ts  to  MEX MEX e x p o r ts  to  US US e x p o rts  to  MEX MEX e x p o rts  to  US
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
c 3.384 2.876 0.292 0.810 3.992 5.368 2.500 4.714
5.822 5.839 3.435 3.393 3.740 3.653 8.375 8.004
0.58 0.49 0.08 0.24 1.07 1.47 0.30 0.59
GDPi 2.727 2.957 -0.080 -0.033 0.074 0.112 3.167 2.833
1.195 1.216 0.286 0.279 0.335 0.356 1.749 1.832
" 2 .2 8 **2.43 -0.28 -0.12 0.22 0.31 *1.81 1.55
GDPj 0.301 0.324 3.471 3.568 3.901 4.131 -0.431 -0.511
0.500 0.499 0.729 0.727 0.845 0.817 0.740 0.743
0.60 0.65 ***4.76 ***4.91 ***4.62 ***5.05 -0.58 -0.69
POPi -0.938 -0.784 0.381 0.359 0.536 0.448 -0.608 -1.338
2.623 2.614 0.399 0.392 0.433 0.457 3.818 3.702
-0.36 -0.30 0.95 0.92 1.24 0.98 -0.16 -0.36
POP] -0.563 -0.604 -0.963 -1.195 -2.731 -3.297 -0.483 -0.453
0.650 0.647 1.605 1.589 1.706 1.663 0.966 0.958
-0.87 -0.93 -0.60 -0.75 -1.60 *-1.98 -0.50 -0.47
XRATE -0.236 -0.295 0.086 0.066 -0.207 -0.197 -0.574 -0.592
0.138 0.145 0.081 0.081 0.177 0.173 0.201 0.196





































OBS 67 67 66 66 67 63 67 65
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.92
DW 1.85 1.85 1.98 1.95 1.89 1.89 1.85 1.85
AIC -2.45 -2.45 -3.52 -3.54 -3.28 -3.30 -1.68 -1.71
Coefficients, Standard Errors and t-statistics are provided 
* = statistically significant at 10% alpha level 
** = statistically significant at 5% alpha level 
*** = statistically significant at 1% alpha level
Top 5 US Exports to M exico are Telecommunications Equipment (SITC 764),
Electrical Apparatus for Switching and Protecting (SITC 772), Equipment for 
Distributing Electricity (SITC 773), Electrical Machinery and Apparatus (SITC 778) 
and Parts and Accessories for Tractors and Motor Vehicles (SITC 784).
Top 5 M exican Exports to the US are Petroleum oils (crude) and oils from bituminous 
minerals (SITC 333), Motor cars and other motor vehicles (SITC 781), Parts for tractors 
and motor vehicles (SITC 784), Equipment for distributing electricity (SITC 773) and 
TV receivers (SITC 761).
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equipment for distributing electricity, electrical machinery and apparatus, and 
electrical apparatus for switching and protecting, as the dependent variables. These five  
industries represent the large manufacturing sectors in the US and also represent
Q O
industries in which the US has a comparative advantage. These goods are highly 
capital-intensive. The gravity equation explains a large amount o f export variation in 
all four models, as illustrated by the high R-squared statistics. However, models (7) and 
(8) only have one statistically significant variable in each. The results are not quite as 
clean or flashy as in models (5) and (6). M odels (5) and (6) have the theoretically 
expected signs but only US GDP is significant. The NAFTA variables in the remaining 
models contain som e lagged effects. This is not surprising considering that for these 
five industries the tariff and non-tariff reductions were not instantaneous, but rather 
phased out over time. The NAFTA coefficient was positive but not statistically 
significant in models (7) and (8). The trade barriers facing M exican exports were low  
before NAFTA. NAFTA reduced US tariff levels which were already low, so the effect 
on exports is expected to be small, as noted by the low coefficients, although not 
statistically significant. The foreign direct investment variable in model (6) is small, 
negative, and not statistically significant. Again, this is not surprising since we are 
aggregating five different industries, which are all capital-intensive, but have different 
lag structures with respect to tariff reductions.
M exico's top five exports to the US for 1993 are petroleum (crude) oils and oils 
from bituminous minerals (SITC 333), motor cars and other motor vehicles (SITC 781),
98 These five categories show up in the US exports top 10 lists for most o f  the developed nations in the 
world. Ricardian theory would suggest that these industries represent comparative advantage industries 
for the US.
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parts for tractors and motor vehicles (SITC 784), equipment for distributing 
electricity (SITC 773), and TV receivers (SITC 761). These five industries represent 
M exico's comparative advantage. M odels (9) and (10) look very similar to models (7) 
and (8). A  high amount o f export variance is explained, but there are only a couple o f  
significant variables. M odels (11) and (12) also have few  significant coefficients. They 
have highly significant coefficients for NAFTA implementation, good signs on most 
key gravity terms, but not much else is significant. The lack o f good a FDI fit here was 
again expected since this is an aggregation o f five different industries. The appropriate 
lag effects are quite different for these individual industries for both FDI and NAFTA  
implementation. The results now becom e interesting when looking at the individual 
industry models.
US Comparative Advantage Industries
The gravity equation performed well in models (13), (14), (15) and (16) in Table 
9. For these two industries, the gravity equation does a good job explaining US exports. 
For these four models, not only are the R-squared statistics very high, but every 
coefficient has the expected sign and several are statistically significant. The 
coefficients on US GDP are statistically significant in seven o f  the ten models.
Fourteen o f the 20 GDP coefficients are signed positive. In the remaining six models, 
(17), (18), (19), (20), (21) and (22), there are negative coefficients on the M exico GDP 
terms. W hile these are statistically not different from zero, it is puzzling that the 
coefficients are negative. One explanation, similar to that given by Thursby and 
Thursby (1987), is that for these goods the elasticity o f supply is inelastic. That is, as
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Table 9
Regression Results for Top 5 1993 US Exports to M exico (part 1)
US E x p o rts  to  M exico
SITC 764 SITC 772 SITC 773 SITC 778 SITC 784
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
c 7.068 7.229 6.371 7.373 1.114 2.565 1.026 -0.208 4.936 6.636
7.189 6.996 5.016 4.857 7.068 6.527 5.628 5.637 10.029 9.751
0.98 1.03 1.27 1.52 0.16 0.39 0.18 -0.04 0.49 0.68
GDPi 2.617 3.055 3.771 3.557 1.412 1.106 2.589 2.638 4.113 3.545
1.572 1.553 1.120 1.131 1.558 1.464 1.196 1.164 2.121 2.261
1.66 *1.97 ***3.37 ***3.14 0.91 0.76 " 2 .1 6 **2.27 *1.94 1.57
GDPj 1.321 1.596 0.318 0.206 -0.397 -0.864 -0.351 -0.465 -0.563 -0.604
0.671 0.696 0.409 0.419 0.605 0.586 0.456 0.451 0.904 0.919
*1.97 " 2 .2 9 0.78 0.49 -0.66 -1.48 -0.77 -1.03 -0.62 -0.66
POPi -1.684 -1.975 -2.406 -2.688 -0.391 -0.805 -0.587 -0.497 -1.671 -2.108
3.346 3.248 2.326 2.268 3.302 3.023 2.370 2.376 4.600 4.530
-0.50 -0.61 -1.03 -1.18 -0.12 -0.27 -0.25 -0.21 -0.36 -0.47
POPj -1.691 -1.694 -0.990 -0.998 0.467 0.544 0.150 0.595 -0.738 -0.716
0.873 0.861 0.576 0.578 0.824 0.812 0.945 1.017 1.180 1.185
*-1.94 *-1.97 *-1.72 *-1.73 0.57 0.67 0.16 0.59 -0.63 -0.60
XRATE -0.018 -0.076 0.295 0.369 -0.019 0.068 -0.078 -0.094 -0.750 -0.771
0.171 0.173 0.128 0.128 0.169 0.161 0.141 0.140 0.242 0.239






















NAFTAL6 0.190 0.205 0.166 0.149 0.063 0.069 0.419 0.531
0.065 0.064 0.086 0.079 0.063 0.061 0.124 0.148
***2.91 ***3.19 *1.94 *1.89 1.01 1.13 ***3.37 ***3.58
OBS 67 67 65 65 66 63 63 57 67 65
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.91 0.90
DW 2.09 2.09 2.26 2.22 2.07 1.95 1.83 1.65 1.88 1.81
AIC -1.93 -1.94 -2.70 -2.70 -2.02 -2.17 -2.39 -2.37 -1.29 -1.29
Coefficients, Standard Errors and t-statistics are provided 
* = statistically significant at 10% alpha level 
** = statistically significant at 5% alpha level 
*** = statistically significant at 1% alpha level
SITC 764 = Telecommunications Equipment
SITC 772 = Electrical Apparatus for Switching and Protecting
SITC 773 = Equipment for Distributing Electricity
SITC 778 = Electrical Machinery and Apparatus
SITC 784 = Parts and Accessories for Tractors and Motor Vehicles
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price changes (by a large amount), quantity supplied responds (by a smaller 
amount). M exican consumers face an inelastic supply curve on imports. This could 
imply or be evidence that these goods have some monopoly-like qualities in these US 
markets or that these goods are origin-differentiated. A  simpler alternative theory, at 
least empirically speaking, is that for these three industries the US supply potential is 
overwhelming the much smaller econom y and it displaces the impact o f the M exican 
income effect. This is a convenient explanation, but it is clearly not true for the other 
models which have a positive sign on GDP.
A  more likely explanation has to do with the final sale destination for these 
goods. These three SITC sectors contain individual goods that belong to the 
maquiladora group of goods. And therefore many o f these goods enjoy a special status 
in the M exican economy. First, they receive preferential tariff treatments, which was 
true even before NAFTA was enacted. And second, many o f these goods are later re­
exported back into the US market for final sale or further manufacturing or assembly. 
Therefore, for some o f these goods, M exico acts just like another US state. It makes 
sense then that the import demand for som e o f  these goods is independent o f Mexico's 
GDP. Therefore, the M exico GDP variable cannot and should not be assigned any o f  
the variation in US exports, which is what a regression equation tries to do. M exican 
population is significant in models (13), (14), (15) and (16). Again, the coefficients in 
the models for telecommunications equipment and electrical apparatus for switching 
and protecting are perfectly consistent with the theoretically expected signs given in 
Linnemann. It can be inferred that the M exican import demand for these goods is 
particularly strong relative to other imports.
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The foreign direct investment coefficients were negative in two o f  the five  
US exports to M exico models, and while there was some correlation, they were not 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. One o f the three positive signed 
coefficients was statistically significant. Equipment for distributing electricity is one o f  
the most capital-intensive industries in the sample. Subcategories within this industry, 
including winding wire, co-axial cables, and optical fiber cables, are also capital 
intensive. O f the three-digit industries sampled, equipment for distributing electricity is 
the third largest US export commodity to M exico. This result is consistent with the 
expectations from the theoretical model. The US is exporting a capital-intensive good; 
therefore the Vertical Integration effect should be high.
The coefficients for the FDI variables are moderate to small. Two o f the three 
coefficients, including the significant one, were exactly 0.135. This coefficient can be 
interpreted: given a one-dollar increase in foreign direct investment, an additional 13 
cents in exports are generated.
The five categories were chosen because they are large industries which together 
represent a large share o f US exports to M exico. They are also industries in which the 
US has a comparative advantage. The top five US export categories are all 
manufacturing industries and represent a small cross-section o f the different types o f  
goods that the US exports to M exico, but represent a large share o f the total US exports 
to M exico. These five industries are also coincidentally all highly capital intensive.
Sixteen o f the twenty population coefficients are negatively signed and four o f  
them are statistically significant. Again, this is consistent with other research using 
population as part o f the gravity model. The coefficients on M exican population for
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models (17), (18), (19) and (20) were statistically not different from zero, but were 
positively signed. This is not consistent with Linnemann's hypothesis. An appeal to the 
explanation given above may answer this question; some o f these goods are not 
dependent upon M exican supply potential, but instead are more closely related to US  
potential demand for those goods. This is borne out in the coefficients o f the US 
variables, which are much higher than the M exican coefficients.
Six o f the ten coefficients for the NAFTA variables were found to be 
statistically significant. All ten were positively signed. The period o f the significant 
effect was found to be a lag o f one quarter or six quarters." The phase-in periods on 
many o f these goods occurred during this time period. There may have also been some 
delay between the time that new exporters learned that the tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
had been lowered (which changed the entire cost structure facing those firms) and the 
time in which exports were actually delivered.
The US GDP coefficients are two to eight times as large as the M exico GDP 
coefficients. This is consistent across all 28 models. This is also consistent with 
Linnemann's observation that the larger country w ill have the higher coefficient. In 
studies which included more than two countries (particularly those where the developed  
countries make up the majority o f the observations), this result is also observed to be 
true. In most cases, these coefficients hovered near unity. For the US, its importer 
elasticity o f income is greater than unity and its exporter elasticity o f income (in 
Linnemann's terminology this would be equivalent to the supply [potential] market
99 For these goods approximately 95 percent o f  tariff barriers will be removed by 1999. For this reason it 
is reasonable to test lags out farther than just six quarters. The interested parts are the immediate and 
short-term effects o f NAFTA and therefore a short window was chosen for export adjustments to be made 
by exporters.
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effect) is also greater than unity. In bilateral analyses, the larger country has the 
greater gravitational "pull" regardless o f whether it is an importer or exporter, as seen in 
Gould's results also.
In his analysis o f one-digit SITC classifications, Bergstrand (1989) uses 16 
OECD countries (primarily western European countries) and found two things similar 
to the results in this paper. First, the coefficients for importer and exporter income vary 
considerably across different product categories. This is some weak evidence that 
products are differentiated by country o f origin. And second, Bergstrand finds that the 
ratio o f  exporter to importer income coefficients is between one and three. This is 
consistent with the results o f this paper for three-digit SITC classifications. The 
difference between countries' incomes in his sample was much closer together than the 
difference in incomes between M exico and the US. This supports the general theory 
that the elasticity o f incom e is sensitive to product type, in addition to relative econom y  
sizes. That is, some goods and econom ies are more responsive to (potential) demand 
than others. This suggests that more work needs to be focused on gravity models with 
greater disaggregations o f goods and among exporters and importers who have 
disproportionate incomes.
Gould (1998) uses an econometric design and specification very similar to the 
empirical design o f this paper. The coefficients (in the Total Exports m odels) are 
likewise consistent with his results. Gould is also consistent with Bergstrand (1989), in 
that he also finds that the ratio o f exporter income elasticity to importer income 
elasticity is around four in his US exports to M exico model. This supports the finding 
that larger countries have a greater gravitational "pull" effect.
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For M exican exports to the US, he gets the unusual result that M exico's 
income elasticity is negative. This is consistent with the results from models (25) 
through (30) in this paper. Gould (1998) does not offer any explanation for this 
anomaly. In each o f these specifications where income has a negative coefficient, it is 
not statistically significant. Gould uses a somewhat unusual (unusual for 1998) 
specification including lagged dependent variables in his model. He finds, not 
surprisingly, that they are positively related to export flows and that they are statistically 
significant. Gould also finds statistically significant coefficients for exchange rate for 
both US exports to M exico and for M exican exports to the US. He has two exchange 
rate variables, real exchange rate between the two countries and real exchange rate with 
the rest o f the world. In the US exports to M exico model, both coefficients are between 
negative two and negative three. This is ten times larger than the coefficients in this 
paper (-0.19) for the corresponding equation. This indicates that exchange rates played 
a larger role in export flows in his sample specification than in the specifications laid 
out in this paper. To reiterate, the designs are very similar but there are a couple o f  
differences. Gould does not use population in his study. And he uses GDP price 
deflators for both countries in all o f  his models. These coefficients are not statistically 
significant for his M exico-US models. It is suspicious to add GDP price deflators in a 
gravity equation. The results from Gould's article confirm that that suspicion is correct. 
And therefore it is not used in the empirical specifications in this paper. It seems 
superfluous to add multiple price-relevant variables to a model. Not only are you eating 
up degrees o f  freedom, but the danger o f creating multicollinearity is just too great. His
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results are convincing that GDP price deflators do not add any value to the gravity 
equations.
Gould found NAFTA to be positive and statistically significant for US exports 
to M exico, but not statistically significant for M exican exports to the US. Perhaps the 
most important difference between the design used in this paper and Gould's design is 
that he is working with far fewer post-NAFTA observations. His sample includes 
quarterly data from 1980 to 1996. That is only 12 data points after NAFTA went into 
effect. It is unclear if  this fact limits or diminishes his results.
Gould then computes the trade flow  that would have occurred had NAFTA not 
been enacted and compares that with the actual export values. He finds that US exports 
to M exico are 16.3 percent higher with NAFTA than without NAFTA. He also finds 
that M exican exports to the US are 16.2 percent higher with NAFTA than without 
N A FTA .100 The results in this paper show a 4.3 percent impact on US exports to 
M exico due to NAFTA. This is clearly more consistent with Krueger's results, where 
she found a 3 percent impact due to NAFTA. It is not clear why Gould's results 
generate a higher NAFTA effect. The fact that he is dealing with fewer post-NAFTA  
observations may explain it.
The US GDP coefficients are positive and statistically significant in eight o f the 
ten M exican exports to the US models, (25) through (32) in Table 10. M exican GDP is 
positive and statistically significant in one o f  the models. The income coefficients for 
M exico and the US in models (23) and (24) are much closer than for the other
100 The NAFTA coefficient for US exports was statistically significant (p-value=.02), while the NAFTA  
coefficient for Mexican exports was not statistically significant (p-value=.12).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
149
Table 10
Regression Results for Top 5 1993 US Exports to M exico (part 2)
Mexican Exports to the US
SITC 764 SITC 772 SITC 773 SITC 778 SITC 784
(23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32)
c -0.018 -0.067 -2.895 -2.809 6.754 5.484 0.461 2.308 3.344 3.467
7.170 7.131 2.984 2.921 4.126 3.702 2.442 2.204 4.654 4.684
0.00 -0.01 -0.97 -0.96 1.64 1.48 0.19 1.05 0.72 0.74
GDPi 1.300 0.542 -0.141 -0.092 -0.198 -0.182 0.341 -0.032 0.151 0.189
0.586 0.532 0.268 0.273 0.303 0.331 0.302 0.299 0.394 0.401
" 2.22 1.02 -0.53 -0.34 -0.65 -0.55 1.13 -0.11 0.38 0.47
GDPj 1.947 2.283 3.055 3.087 2.730 3.260 3.163 4.098 4.439 4.500
1.617 1.492 0.662 0.622 0.942 0.872 0.594 0.577 1.042 1.057
1.20 1.53 ***4.62 ***4.96 ***2.90 ***3.74 ***5.33 ***7.10 ***4.26 ***4.26
POPi -0.787 0.016 0.658 0.668 0.467 0.672 0.120 0.174 0.528 0.510
0.822 0.721 0.372 0.354 0.659 0.479 0.419 0.388 0.550 0.555
-0.96 0.02 *1.77 *1.89 0.71 1.40 0.29 0.45 0.96 0.92
POP) 0.359 -0.275 0.128 0.069 -3.165 -3.156 -0.888 -1.944 -2.774 -2.837
3.437 3.288 1.398 1.351 1.472 1.728 1.132 1.023 2.188 2.205
0.10 -0.08 0.09 0.05 **-2.15 *-1.83 -0.78 *-1.90 -1.27 -1.29
XRATE 0.527 0.397 0.022 -0.026 -0.035 0.044 0.143 0.042 -0.264 -0.291
0.164 0.149 0.074 0.073 0.084 0.095 0.067 0.064 0.220 0.226
















NAFTA 0.189 0.190 0.047 0.051 0.124 0.082 0.119 0.130
0.084 0.074 0.041 0.042 0.046 0.048 0.038 0.035







OBS 66 60 65 66 63 64 67 63 66 66
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
DW 1.80 1.97 1.99 1.74 1.96 1.97 1.72 1.92 2.00 2.00
AIC -2.05 -2.24 -3.67 -3.72 -3.45 -3.30 -3.47 -3.69 -2.88 -2.86
Coefficients, Standard Errors and t-statistics are provided 
* = statistically significant at 10% alpha level 
** = statistically significant at 5% alpha level 
*** = statistically significant at 1% alpha level
SITC 764 = Telecommunications Equipment
SITC 772 = Electrical Apparatus for Switching and Protecting
SITC 773 = Equipment for Distributing Electricity
SITC 778 = Electrical Machinery and Apparatus
SITC 784 = Parts and Accessories for Tractors and Motor Vehicles
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industries. There is some indication that incomes, as measures o f  potential supply 
and potential demand, affect exports o f telecommunications equipment in similar ways.
The M exican population coefficients are positive in models (24) through (32). 
Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2003) state that the coefficient for population 
has an ambiguous theoretical sign. The coefficient for exporters is negative when it is a 
large country (an absorption effect). The coefficient is positive when it is a small 
country (an econom y o f scale). That would imply that for electrical apparatus for 
switching and protecting, equipment for distributing electricity, electrical machinery 
and apparatus, and parts and accessories for tractors and motor vehicles, M exico has 
economies o f scale in the production o f those goods. This result probably does not 
persist when measuring bilateral trade flow s where both countries are o f  equal size.
The coefficient for foreign direct investment has a negative sign in the models 
for two o f the five industries, telecommunications equipment and parts and accessories 
for tractors and motor vehicles. Telecommunications equipment, one o f the two 
negative coefficients, is statistically significant. Electrical apparatus for switching and 
protecting (SITC 772) and electrical machinery and apparatus (SITC 778) are 
statistically significant and positively signed. These results are consistent with the 
stylized facts outlined in Chapter 3. Telecommunications equipment is the most 
capital-intensive good in the sample.101 It is three times more capital-intensive than the 
second most capital-intensive industry. M exico, as a labor-abundant country, would  
supply very little or no inputs for these Subsidiaries. So the Vertical Integration effect 
would be near zero. The export share o f telecommunications equipment is moderate,
101 It is the most capital-intensive o f the industries for which there is a net stock o f fixed private capital 
measure available.
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making up 3.4 percent o f  M exican exports, which is neither high nor low for the 
M exican export makeup. This is consistent with the expected value for a normal 
Production Replacement effect on exports.
Both electrical machinery and apparatus and electrical apparatus for switching 
and protecting are both moderate to highly capital-intensive. This means they contain 
primarily capital-intensive inputs. These two industries make up a low  to moderate 
amount o f total M exican exports to the US, 2.4 and 3.4 percent, respectively. Here 
there is a normal Production Replacement effect and a low or zero Vertical Integration 
effect, so the expected outcome is ambiguous from the theoretical model. However, the 
positive effect on exports does not directly contradict the overall pattern found in Table 
11, which seems to be dominated by the input-intensiveness o f the industry.
The NAFTA coefficients are positively signed for all ten models and statistically 
significant in six o f them. For the statistically significant variables, the NAFTA  
coefficients range from 0.12 (for equipment for distributing electricity) to 0 .19 (for 
telecommunications equipment). Results on the magnitude o f free trade area variables 
vary based on the type o f countries included in the sample and on how the free trade 
area is coded. Gould (1998), as stated earlier, found a statistically significant NAFTA  
coefficient in his US exports to M exico model. His NAFTA coefficient was 0.073. 
Krueger (1999) used a fixed-effects model with 61 countries in the sample for the non- 
adjacent years, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1997. Her NAFTA coefficient was 
not statistically significant and was 0.11. She also used a special form o f the NAFTA
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Table 11
Summary o f Foreign Direct Investment Regression Results
Industry MU UM K/L ratio
Apparel + + 13,371
Furniture and related products 20,334
Leather and allied products + 21,169
Motor cars and other motor vehicles + 65,875
Parts for tractors and motor vehicles 150,596
Chemicals 172,114
Electrical equipment and appliances + + 173,498
Primary metals 193,726
Electrical machinery and apparatus + 256,812
Electrical apparatus for switching and protecting + 473,791
Equipment for distributing electricity + 1,766,667
Petroleum oils and other oils, crude - X 1,967,232
Telecommunications equipment - 6,081,529
TV receivers - + X
Notes: Signs are given for only those variables whose coefficients were statistically 
significant at the 10% p-value level or lower. Capital-Labor ratio is based on US labor 
employed and US net stock o f  fixed private capital in that industry. The US does not 
export any Petroleum oils (crude) to M exico. A  reasonable capital stock measure for 
TV receivers was not available. M U=M exico exports to US models, UM =US exports 
to M exico models.
Source: BEA current-cost net stock o f fixed private capital and BLS Current 
Employment Statistics database.
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dummy by multiplying it by a time trend variable in her model. Her NAFTA-time 
trend variable was also statistically insignificant and was 0.03. She translates the 0.03 
coefficient to mean that NAFTA was responsible for a three percent increase in trade
109flow among NAFTA members.
In Rose (2005) a general free trade area dummy is used when both countries are 
a member o f the same free trade area. He found that free trade area membership had an 
export elasticity o f 0.78 (in a fixed-effects model), and it was statistically significant at 
the one percent level. He sampled 178 countries between 1948 and 1999.103 Rose did 
not compute the export impact due to NAFTA. In this paper, the statistically significant 
NAFTA coefficients for US exports to M exico range from .16 (for equipment for 
distributing electricity) to 0.42 (for parts and accessories for tractors and motor 
vehicles).
M exican Comparative Advantage Industries
The top 5 M exican exports to the US are petroleum (crude) oils and oils from  
bituminous minerals (SITC 333), motor cars and other motor vehicles (SITC 781), parts 
for tractors and motor vehicles (SITC 784), equipment for distributing electricity (SITC 
773), and TV receivers (SITC 761), in that order. Parts for tractors and motor vehicles 
and equipment for distributing electricity have both been discussed in the top US  
exports to M exico section.
102 It was not clear from her article what method she used to make that determination.
103 Selecting a sample over such a large period o f  time has its disadvantages. There are numerous 
potential issues regarding the effects o f structural change within a sample, but that falls outside the scope 
o f this paper.
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For motor cars and other vehicles, model (34), M exico GDP is statistically 
significant and dominates the income components (see Table 12). This is not a large 
export sector for the US. The US exported $125 m illion to M exico in 1993, although 
shortly after NAFTA went into effect, exports in this sector quickly doubled and then 
tripled. M odel (36), TV receivers, is also a very small industry for the US. In 1993, the 
US exported only $139 m illion to M exico. The gravity model does a good job  
specifying these two industries. There are a large number o f statistically significant 
coefficients in both models. Foreign direct investment is positive and significant in 
both models. Motor cars and other motor vehicles is a relatively labor-intensive good  
compared to the other industries in the sample. There is no capital stock measure for 
TV receivers and therefore the capital-labor intensity could not be determined. This 
makes it difficult to place a sign on the Vertical Integration effect. So while motor cars 
and other motor vehicles has a relatively labor-intensive value compared to 
telecommunications equipment, it actually falls somewhere in the middle o f the capital- 
labor intensity spectrum. On net, there is an ambiguous sign for each o f these 
industries. If TV receivers is considered a capital-intensive good, then an increase in 
exports would be expected. For very small export industries, it is very difficult to make 
an a priori prediction about the FDI-export relationship. Their coefficients are 
somewhat large, meaning that a one-dollar increase in FDI would result in a 72 cent and 
37 cent increase in exports, respectively.
For the M exican exports models (37) through (42), there are fewer significant 
core gravity variables, but they still provide some useful results for the two key 
variables FDI and NAFTA (see Table 12). For (crude) Petroleum oils (SITC 333),
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Table 12
Regression Results for Top 5 1993 M exican Exports to the US
US E xports  to  Mexico M exican E xports  to  th e  US
SITC 781 SITC 761 SITC 333 SITC 781 s r r c  761
(33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42)
c 10.315 12.510 21.364 20.360 -17.964 -14.083 -7.230 -5.475 0.740 3.729
22.236 22.341 12.545 11.953 10.603 9.384 10.358 10.050 6.733 6.276
0.46 0.56 *1.70 *1.70 *-1.69 -1.50 -0.70 -0.54 0.11 0.59
GDPi -1.994 -3.015 9.418 7.820 0.282 0.422 -3.831 -1.293 5.545 6.316
5.715 5.917 2.714 2.544 1.263 1.083 2.740 2.441 1.420 1.396
-0.35 -0.51 ***3.47 ***3.07 0.22 0.39 -1.40 -0.53 ***3.90 ***4.53
GDPj 8.936 7.127 2.248 1.230 2.152 3.240 3.097 1.902 -0.383 -0.767
2.782 2.638 1.174 1.113 2.835 2.403 1.113 1.076 0.608 0.620
***3.22 ***2.70 *1.91 1.11 0.76 1.35 ***2.78 *1.77 -0.63 -1.24
POPi 0.040 0.536 -12.119 -10.967 -1.627 -0.735 5.234 3.278 -1.816 -3.416
10.341 10.558 5.782 5.478 1.962 1.444 4.964 4.702 3.128 2.916
0.00 0.05 **-2.10 **-2.00 -0.83 -0.51 1.05 0.70 -0.58 -1.17
POP] -6.061 -6.684 -0.550 -0.453 7.911 5.060 -1.574 -0.986 -0.658 -0.407
3.616 3.386 1.510 1.384 4.935 4.328 1.582 1.425 0.785 0.784
*-1.68 *-1.97 -0.36 -0.33 1.60 1.17 -0.99 -0.69 -0.84 -0.52
XRATE 0.933 1.041 -1.505 -1.295 -0.746 -0.862 0.934 0.573 0.047 -0.048
0.612 0.614 0.306 0.297 0.625 0.485 0.278 0.267 0.158 0.148














































OBS 67 66 67 67 64 58 66 61 67 61
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.99
DW 1.81 1.91 2.15 2.09 2.11 2.06 1.79 2.00 1.90 1.91
AIC 0.86 0.73 -0.81 -0.96 -0.60 -1.18 -0.79 -1.09 -2.13 -2.23
Coefficients, Standard Errors and t-statistics are provided
* = statistically significant at 10% alpha level 
** = statistically significant at 5% alpha level 
*** = statistically significant at 1% alpha level
Note: Only three o f M exico's Top 5 are displayed. Two o f M exico's Top 5 1993 
exports to the US are the same industries as those Top 5 US exports to M exico and 
therefore have already been displayed in equations 17, 18, 21, 22, 27, 28, 31 and 32. 
The US does not export any crude oil (SITC 333) to M exico.
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M exico's largest export to the US, FDI has a negative relationship with exports, 
indicating a substitution effect. This is consistent with the stylized facts. M exico is a 
labor-intensive country, exporting a capital-intensive good. Therefore the Vertical 
Integration effect is expected to be near zero. As M exico's largest export to the US, it 
makes up a large share o f total M exican exports, 10.6 percent. But since M exican 
exports to the US make up such a small share o f total US GDP, it would be 
inappropriate to give it the same weight as a similar US export with that share. So a full 
Production Replacement effect should lead to a negative effect on exports. Moreover, 
there are fewer if any "other" inputs to this end product, so it is unlikely that any 
additional intermediate good exports would com e from M exico even if  this were a 
labor-intensive good. This fact is probably reflected by the low coefficient. That is, a 
one-dollar increase in FDI leads to seven-tenths o f a cent less in exports. The small 
coefficient also makes a statement about the relative size o f exports in each economy. 
The share o f US exports to M exico relative to M exico's GDP is much larger than the 
share o f M exican exports to the US relative to the US's GDP. In all three models (38), 
(40) and (42), the NAFTA coefficient falls within expected parameters (see Table 12).
The next three sets o f results involve industries which are extremely capital- 
intensive or extremely labor-intensive. These industries were selected based on labor 
data taken from the Bureau o f Labor Statistic's Current Employment Statistics. 
Employment data is available for industry classifications as small as eight-digit NAICS, 
so employment data was available for all possible industries. Data on capital stock was 
taken from the Bureau o f Econom ic Analysis' net stock o f fixed private capital dataset. 
Data is available on approximately 60 industry classifications. These industries are
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classified at the one-digit and two-digit SITC level. Due to a lack o f  M exican data 
for capital stock, the same US-based capital-labor ratios will be used for discussing US  
industries versus M exican industries. However, there is clear reason to suggest that 
these ratios will be different for each country. It is still useful to use these measures for 
both countries relative to other industries. That is, apparel is a labor-intensive good in 
the US the same as it is in M exico. But it is not true that the capital-labor ratio for the 
production o f apparel in M exico is the same as that in the US. So the presented capital- 
labor ratio measure is only valuable in classifying goods relative to each other, not for 
comparison across countries.
A  representative classification was not available for all o f  the three-digit SITC 
classifications in the sample for this paper. Specifically, there was no capital stock data 
available for TV receivers (SITC 761) or any related category. Capital stock industry 
classifications are based on NAICS and not on SITC. O f the available industry 
classifications, the top 3 highest and lowest capital-labor ratios were selected to 
represent each grouping. Five industries (electrical machinery and apparatus, electrical 
apparatus for switching and protecting, equipment for distributing electricity, petroleum  
oils [crude], and telecommunications equipment) did not have perfect NAICS to SITC 
matching categories and so where necessary the next closest aggregate category was 
used for capital stock.
The coefficients from models (44) and (46) in Table 13 have all the expected  
signs except for one. The gravity models do a good job of explaining the variance in 
exports, as noted by the high R-squared values. Not much was expected from the 
aggregate m odels, because as noted before, each industry's effects tend to cancel each
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Table 13
Regression Results for Aggregate Low Capital Intensity and High Capital Intensity 
Industries
US E x p o rts  to  Mexico M exican E xports  to  th e  US
Low C apital High C apital Low C apital High Capital
In tensity In tensity In tensity In tensity
(43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50)
c 0.493 7.972 -3.546 -3.373 3.525 3.709 2.343 2.994
5.155 5.066 3.698 3.620 2.823 2.683 4.120 4.093
0.10 1.57 -0.96 -0.93 1.25 1.38 0.57 0.73
GDPi 1.387 0.366 3.456 3.334 -0.204 -0.269 0.428 0.396
1.267 1.253 0.798 0.777 0.186 0.178 0.417 0.412
1.09 0.29 *"4.33 ***4.29 -1.09 -1.51 1.03 0.96
GDPj 0.036 0.064 0.272 0.148 1.669 1.691 3.951 4.001
0.352 0.393 0.328 0.334 0.817 0.786 0.930 0.929
0.10 0.16 0.83 0.44 **2.04 "2 .1 5 ***4.25 ***4.31
POPi -0.487 -2.569 0.210 0.179 0.322 0.316 -0.588 -0.568
2.060 2.072 1.711 1.673 0.252 0.239 0.535 0.521
-0.24 -1.24 0.12 0.11 1.28 1.32 -1.10 -1.09
POPj 0.008 -0.372 -0.118 -0.088 -1.977 -2.034 -1.926 -2.211
0.507 0.515 0.427 0.423 1.137 1.087 1.904 1.895
0.02 -0.72 -0.28 -0.21 *-1.74 *-1.87 -1.01 -1.17
XRATE -0.133 -0.064 -0.185 -0.144 0.029 0.033 -0.205 -0.190
0.116 0.117 0.089 0.091 0.057 0.054 0.206 0.204





































OBS 64 64 67 67 66 65 67 65
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
DW 1.94 1.96 1.99 1.98 2.02 1.92 1.74 1.74
AIC -2.84 -2.93 -3.32 -3.33 -4.14 -4.19 -2.92 -2.95
Coefficients, Standard Errors and t-statistics are provided 
* = statistically significant at 10% alpha level 
** = statistically significant at 5% alpha level 
*** = statistically significant at 1% alpha level
Low Capital Intensity Industries are Apparel (SITC 84), Furniture and related products 
(SITC 82) and Leather and allied products (SITC 61)
High Capital Intensity Industries are Chemicals (SITC 5), Electrical equipment and 
appliances (SITC 775) and Primary Metals (SITC 68)
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other out. These particular aggregates are a little more homogeneous than the 1993 
top five groups were, so several o f the models do have significant FDI and NAFTA  
coefficients.
Low Capital-Labor Ratio Industries
The complementary effect is overwhelming in the two models (52) and (56) (see 
Table 14). These two results are confounding in light o f the other evidence supporting 
the theoretical model. For the US exporting labor-intensive goods, it is expected that 
the Vertical Integration effect would be nearly zero. Therefore, the dominate effect 
should unquestionably be the Production Replacement effect, and the FDI sign should 
be negative, indicating a net decrease in exports. These two results are simply not 
explained well by the current theoretical model.
It is possible that there is another less visible effect in play in these two 
industries. Fontagne (1999) suggests that small countries benefit from technology  
spillovers which result from foreign direct investments made by larger, more 
technologically advanced countries. In an extension o f Fontagne's idea, this type o f  
technology transfer from one industry can spill over into other industries and generate 
faster growth and higher incomes than without the FDI-technology transfer. It is 
possible that this spillover income effect is being produced via many o f  the US foreign 
direct investments made into M exican industries. This may help explain why there is a 
dominate positive effect on exports in the low capital-intensive industries (as well as all 
the other industries sampled). A  technology-spillover-induced-income effect could help 
to explain it. In any case, the complementarity effect has dominated for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
Table 14
Regression Results for Low Capital Intensity Industries
US E xports to  Mexico M exican E xports to  the  US
SITC 84 SITC 82 SITC 61 SITC 84 SITC 82 SITC 61
(51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62)
c 2.268 3.828 -1.494 12.937 3.849 4.838 2.230 1.167 6.367 6.660 -2.458 -3.584
6.330 5.688 9.187 6.799 13.750 13.315 4.120 3.810 5.853 5.549 7.912 8.661
0.36 0.67 -0.16 *1.90 0.28 0.36 0.54 0.31 1.09 1.20 -0.31 -0.41
GDPi 1.579 0.374 0.741 1.842 6.043 5.313 1.449 1.612 3.341 3.650 1.677 1.402
1.640 1.523 1.961 1.667 3.129 3.141 1.178 1.217 1.334 1.272 1.967 2.276
0.96 0.25 0.38 1.11 *1.93 *1.69 1.23 1.33 **2.50 ***2.87 0.85 0.62
GDPj 0.561 0.197 0.470 1.397 0.287 -0.121 -0.273 -0.255 -0.180 -0.223 -1.447 -1.570
0.406 0.401 0.815 0.809 1.390 1.375 0.265 0.276 0.380 0.364 0.647 0.729
1.38 0.49 0.58 *1.73 0.21 -0.09 -1.03 -0.92 -0.47 -0.61 **-2.24 **-2.15
POPi -1.226 -1.381 0.881 -4.671 -4.264 -4.045 -1.485 -1.304 -3.658 -3.935 -0.241 0.351
2.440 2.241 4.174 3.107 6.381 6.232 1.656 1.561 2.118 2.021 3.388 3.543
-0.50 -0.62 0.21 -1.50 -0.67 -0.65 -0.90 -0.84 *-1.73 *-1.95 -0.07 0.10
POPj -0.251 -0.033 -0.450 -1.343 0.035 -0.200 0.412 0.557 0.079 0.103 1.118 1.131
0.589 0.574 1.074 1.036 1.860 1.831 0.366 0.350 0.499 0.476 0.835 0.897
-0.43 -0.06 -0.42 -1.30 0.02 -0.11 1.13 1.59 0.16 0.22 1.34 1.26
XRATE -0.042 -0.022 -0.381 -0.224 0.102 0.110 0.098 0.093 -0.025 -0.031 -0.211 -0.228
0.124 0.121 0.222 0.187 0.354 0.348 0.087 0.085 0.107 0.102 0.199 0.213

















NAFTAL3 0.210 0.185 0.240 0.268
0.115 0.102 0.193 0.190
*1.82 *1.81 1.24 1.41
NAFTAL5 0.136 0.105 0.062 0.043
0.063 0.058 0.041 0.038




OBS 65 62 67 61 67 66 66 61 67 64 67 62
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.83 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.94
DW 2.21 2.14 1.99 1.94 1.83 1.78 2.21 2.17 2.05 2.01 1.88 1.67
AIC -2.47 -2.71 -1.48 -1.71 -0.44 -0.48 -3.44 -3.54 -3.01 -3.09 -1.94 -1.86
Coefficients, Standard Errors and t-statistics are provided
* = statistically significant at 10% alpha level 
** = statistically significant at 5% alpha level 
*** = statistically significant at 1% alpha level
SITC 84 = Apparel
SITC 82 = Furniture and related products 
SITC 61 = Leather and allied products
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every statistically significant coefficient for the US exports to M exico models (see  
column three in Table 11).
Only the FDI coefficient for apparel (SITC 84) in model (58) has a significant 
effect on exports o f the M exican exports models. This effect, while strongly significant, 
has only a modest effect on exports. The coefficient means that a one-thousand-dollar 
increase in FDI leads to a two-dollar increase in exports o f Apparel. This is probably 
not worth pursuing from a policy standpoint, as it has very little reward. Apparel is a 
sizable export sector for M exico, the sixth largest sector in the sample. The 
complementary result for this industry lends considerable support for the theoretical 
model outlined in Chapter 3. Apparel is a labor-intensive good. It can be expected that 
there will be a considerable Vertical Integration effect (positive effect) on export flows. 
A positive relationship between FDI and exports is indicated by the theoretical model.
M odels (61) and (62) have highly unusual negative NAFTA coefficients. There 
are probably two reasons for this. First, leather and allied products is the smallest 
M exican export sector to the US o f those sampled. This sector has changed very little 
in the 12 years follow ing NAFTA's enactment. In 1993 M exico exported $63 m illion in 
leather and allied products to the US. In 2005, exports only increased to $89 million. 
This sector's growth falls far short o f GDP growth and the growth in the other export 
sectors. This is simply not an important trade sector for M exico.104 Second, as was 
stated in the NAFTA section above, some goods could have their tariffs reinstated if 
certain conditions were not met. This could have occurred for leather. The long lag
104 Leather used in or as part o f  footwear is classified in SITC 851. This is where most o f  the leather 
trade occurs between M exico and the US.
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length is suggestive o f such an occurrence. N o empirical or anecdotal evidence 
could be found to substantiate or refute this claim, however.
High Capital-Labor Ratio Industries
The three industries classified as high capital intensity are chemicals (SITC 5), 
electrical equipment and appliances (SITC 775), and primary metals (SITC 68). The 
gravity specification has a good fit for most o f these models, (64), (68), (70), (72) and 
(74) (see Table 15). There is some loss in explanatory power regarding models (65) and 
(66), as the explained variation in exports falls to under 80 percent. Electrical 
equipment and appliances is the third smallest export sector for the US in the sample. 
This is the only model in which the R-squared measure falls below 0.90. This is not 
one o f the United States' high volume industries, nor does it appear to be one o f the 
industries in which the US has a clear comparative advantage. The theoretical model 
predicts that there should be a high Vertical Integration effect, due to the high capital 
content. And while this is a small export sector for the US, it is still a moderate source 
o f income for M exico. This indicates that FDI should have a strong predisposition for a 
positive (complementary) effect o f FDI on exports in this industry. The empirical 
results again support the theoretical model predications.
A ll o f the statistically significant coefficients in Table 15 have the anticipated 
theoretical sign. Two of the FDI coefficients are significant and two o f the NAFTA  
coefficients are significant. M odel (64) has an interesting non-result. This is one o f the 
United States' largest exports to M exico, making up just under $3.5 billion in 1993 
exports. Chemicals also contain a large share o f capital inputs. The theoretical model
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Table 15
Regression Results for High Capital Intensive Industries
US Exports to Mexico Mexican Exports to  the US
SITC 5 SITC 775 SITC 68 SITC 5 SITC 775 SITC 68
(63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74)
c -3.341 -3.201 2.327 11.494 -1.465 -1.067 2.126 2.637 -5.646 -5.158 11.444 11.716
3.733 3.701 7.931 6.218 7.952 7.749 5.700 6.096 4.842 4.984 7.073 7.070
-0.90 -0.86 0.29 1.85 -0.18 -0.14 0.37 0.43 -1.17 -1.03 1.62 1.66
GDPi 3.543 3.336 1.833 2.939 4.393 4.106 2.900 2.804 4.100 4.004 6.503 6.432
0.805 0.826 1.763 1.516 1.686 1.674 1.284 1.327 1.104 1.104 1.749 1.825
'**4.40 '" 4 .0 4 1.04 '1 .94 "2 .61 " 2 .4 5 ” 2.26 "2.11 '"3 .7 1 "*3.63 " '3 .7 2 " '3 .5 3
GDPj 0.362 0.344 0.712 -0.104 -0.493 -0.743 0.404 0.510 -0.075 -0.218 -0.007 0.009
0.348 0.352 0.823 0.791 0.722 0.738 0.564 0.603 0.417 0.409 0.889 0.904
1.04 0.98 0.86 -0.13 -0.68 -1.01 0.72 0.85 -0.18 -0.53 -0.01 0.01
POPi -0.011 0.009 -2.542 -6.386 0.412 0.364 -0.641 -0.642 -0.011 -0.211 -7.166 -7.226
1.736 1.729 3.689 2.851 3.677 3.587 2.649 2.788 2.274 2.330 3.257 3.304
-0.01 0.01 -0.69 "-2 .24 0.11 0.10 -0.24 -0.23 -0.01 -0.09 "-2 .20 '*-2.19
POPj -0.070 -0.057 1.040 0.990 -1.519 -1.467 -1.466 -1.667 0.658 0.732 0.290 0.264
0.457 0.455 0.969 0.976 0.943 0.938 0.747 0.771 0.574 0.558 1.129 1.149
-0.15 -0.13 1.07 1.02 -1.61 -1.56 *-1.96 "-2 .16 1.14 1.31 0.26 0.23
XRATE -0.129 -0.126 -0.605 -0.493 -0.176 -0.106 0.131 0.167 -0.256 -0.143 -1.047 -1.014
0.092 0.092 0.201 0.173 0.191 0.196 0.143 0.148 0.229 0.235 0.394 0.406
-1.41 -1.38 "*-3.01 "*-2.85 -0.92 -0.54 0.91 1.13 -1.12 -0.61 "-2 .6 6 " -2 .5 0
FDlij 0.223
0.076



















































" '3 .3 5
NAFTAL6
OBS 67 65 65 63 67 67 67 62 66 66 67 65
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.77 0.78 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.94
DW 1.99 2.01 1.93 1.77 2.02 1.99 2.05 2.05 1.91 1.92 2.02 1.95
AIC -3.22 -3.22 -1.60 -1.72 -1.76 -1.76 -2.26 -2.24 -2.76 -2.78 -1.48 -1.46
Coefficients, Standard Errors and t-statistics are provided 
* = statistically significant at 10% alpha level 
** = statistically significant at 5% alpha level 
*** = statistically significant at 1% alpha level
SITC 5 = Chemicals
SITC 775 = Electrical equipment and appliances 
SITC 68 = Primary Metals
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predicts that chemicals will have a high Vertical Integration effect. The sign is 
positive, but it is not statistically significant. The sign then is consistent with the 
theoretical model. Other timing factors may have contributed to the coefficient not 
being statistically significant.
M odels (70) and (74) contain FDI coefficients which have the theoretically 
expected negative sign. This is consistent with the theoretical model because M exico, a 
relatively labor-abundant country, is exporting capital-intensive goods. Therefore, the 
Vertical Integration effect should be small or zero, as few  intermediate goods would be 
expected to com e from M exico. A lso, while this is a small to moderate export for 
M exico, it is a trivial to small import for the US. The net effect predicted by the 
theoretical model is negative. This is consistent with models (70) and (74), but not with 
model (72). M odel (72) contains the third sign, which is contrary to the theoretically 
expected sign. Here we have three industries which are hom ogeneous, in that they are 
all highly capital intensive, but for M exico, they are clearly not similar at all. Chemicals 
and primary metals behave according to the rules o f the theoretical model, but electrical 
equipment and appliances do not. Fontagne's suggestion that technology spillovers 
generate ripples into the income growth dynamic is not really appropriate here. This is 
a highly capital-intensive good. And the US is the most capital-abundant country on 
earth. It is unlikely that M exico is providing technology spillovers via foreign direct 
investment in US-located firms. So the theoretical model speaks clearly and true about 
M exico's exports o f chemicals and primary metals. The full source o f  the 
complementarity for M exico's exports o f electrical equipment and appliances is not 
clear. There is clearly an unexplained effect in this industry for M exican exports.
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A  more deliberate exploration o f the effects o f NAFTA on exports is given  
in the next section. Export flows that would have occurred without NAFTA will be 
computed for specific years. Those results will be compared with the actual values o f  
exports.
W orld-W ithout-NAFTA Comparison
After running each o f the Total Exports models once, they are run again, but this 
time keeping all the coefficients except NAFTA, just as they appear in Table 6, and 
then re-computing the export flows. The NAFTA dummy is set equal to zero for all 
time periods. This simulates a "world without NAFTA" environment. Then the actual 
export flow s for each quarter were subtracted from the "world without NAFTA" export 
amounts. The growth in exports due to NAFTA are computed using the "world without 
NAFTA" computation as the base. This growth rate is reported at the bottom o f Table 
7, as the NAFTA effect (named NAFTAdiff in Table 7). Tinbergen (1962), Gould 
(1998), and Krueger (2005) use the same or similar method for computing export 
growth from regression coefficients. The growth rate is only computed for the four 
quarters after the appropriate NAFTA lag found in each model. Therefore, for a model 
which had a six-quarter lag on the NAFTA variable, the four-quarter period of interest 
would be third quarter 1995 to second quarter 1996. The growth rate for only that four- 
quarter period has been reported. As Gould (1998) demonstrates, the confidence 
intervals surrounding these "forecasts" grows quickly; therefore the time frames o f  
analysis are limited to just the first four quarters after the corresponding NAFTA lag. In
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all 28 models the growth rate "forecast" for future quarters increases, as one would 
expect with a positively signed NAFTA variable.
The NAFTA effect for US total exports to M exico was 3.4 percent (see Table 7). 
That means that the NAFTA treaty generated a net increase o f 3.4 percent greater US 
exports to M exico than it would have if  NAFTA had not been enacted. In nominal 
terms, 3.4 percent was equivalent to $1.6 billion in additional exports to M exico for 
1994. Based on the experimental design, it cannot be concluded whether any trade- 
diversion or trade-expansion occurred as a result o f NAFTA. But it can be seen from 
the data that the share o f US exports that goes to M exico has been increasing steadily 
from 1989 to 2005 (see Figure 7). In 1989, M exico received 6.9 percent o f total US 
exports. This share was increasing even before NAFTA. By 1993, M exico's share o f  
total US exports was 8.9 percent. Total US exports increased by relatively large 
amounts in 1994 and 1995, 10.2 percent and 13.8 percent, respectively. In 1994, US 
exports to M exico increased by 22.3 percent. In 1995, US exports to M exico decreased, 
mostly as a result o f the peso crisis. The follow ing devaluation resulted in the loss o f  
M exican buying power. For the next five years, M exico's share o f  US exports increased 
by about half o f a percent each year.105 Export share reached its peak in 2000 at 14.3 
percent. Over the next five years, M exico's export share declined slightly each year. 
M exico's share o f US exports in 2005 was still a robust 13.3 percent. It could be 
inferred that NAFTA was directly responsible for this increase in M exico's export share 
o f US total exports. The period o f share growth perfectly coincides with the phase-out 
period o f M exican tariffs for some 75 percent o f  US exports to M exico.
105 In 1997, M exico overtakes Japan as the United States’ second largest trading partner.
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Share of Total US Exports that go to Mexico
Figure 7 . Share o f Total US Exports that go to M exico  
Source: US International Trade Com m ission and BEA
In model (2),with the inclusion o f the FDI variable, the NAFTA effect is slightly 
higher, at 4.3 percent. This is slightly counter-intuitive, given that the coefficient for 
FDI has a positive sign. The reason for this is because the calculations for "world 
without NAFTA" often have one or two quarters o f negative difference (actual minus 
NAFTA=0 exports). When the four quarters are summed, the negative periods offset 
the positive periods. This is why the NAFTA effect in model (1) is less than the 
NAFTA effect in model (2).
The NAFTA effect for M exican exports to the US (model 3) is 11.8 percent. In 
nominal terms, 11.8 percent was equivalent to $5.2 billion in additional exports to the 
US in 1994. This is closer to Gould's finding o f  16.2 percent. The coefficient on 
Gould's NAFTA variable for his M exican exports to the US model was not statistically 
significant. M y results are more consistent with the pre-NAFTA applied general
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
168
equilibrium model conclusions that US exports to M exico would be positive but less 
than M exican export growth. This makes sense since US exports make up a much 
larger percent o f M exican total exports than M exico makes up for total US exports. In 
2005, the United States accounted for over 85 percent o f total M exican exports.106 The 
results from Gould (1998) and from this paper have much higher estimates for the effect 
o f NAFTA on M exican exports to the US compared to Krueger (1999). She finds that 
when both countries are members o f NAFTA that exports between them are three 
percent higher than without NAFTA. Krueger includes Canada in her model and 
therefore her results are likely to be diminished by the US-Canada, Canada-US, 
Mexico-Canada and Canada-Mexico trade flow  effects. Moreover, under CUSFTA, the 
majority o f gains from trade liberalization had already been made. M exico and Canada 
make up extremely small shares o f each other's exports, three and five percent, 
respectively. Both o f these factors dampen the combined NAFTA effect in her model.
Three o f  the five odd-numbered models had statistically significant coefficients 
for the NAFTA variable. Two o f  these three three-digit export M exican sectors 
exhibited very high growth in the first four quarters after the NAFTA variable was 
found to be significant. The biggest winner for M exico was in telecommunications 
equipment. It gained an estimated $422 m illion, an increase o f 26.7 percent, due to 
NAFTA. The second largest export increase was in electrical machinery and apparatus. 
This sector increased by an estimated 16.1 percent due to NAFTA. This is equivalent to 
$176 m illion in increased exports to the US.
106 CIA The World Fact Book website.
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Overall, the gravity model does a good job o f explaining export flow s between 
the US and M exico, explaining over 90 percent o f the variance in nearly every model. 
Approximately half o f the core gravity variables, real GDP, population, and exchange 
rate have statistically significant coefficients. Over half (43 o f 74) o f the NAFTA  
coefficients are statistically significant. The signs for these core variables are typically 
as expected relative to other research and gravity model theory.
There are a total o f 14 individual industries analyzed in the paper. N o model 
was run for US exports o f petroleum oils to M exico since this is an untraded good for 
the US. The foreign direct investment variable is statistically significant in 13 o f the 
remaining 27 models. Six o f the 13 US export models have statistically significant 
foreign direct investment coefficients. A ll six are positively signed, indicating a 
complementarity relationship between FDI and exports. The theoretical model is 
partially supported by these results. The foreign direct investment coefficient for the 
high capital-labor ratio industry, equipment for distributing electricity, was found to be 
positive and statistically significant. This is consistent with the hypothesis that capital- 
abundant firms will export intermediate goods to their Subsidiaries in industries which 
are capital intensive. The positive and statistically significant coefficients for the 
moderate to high capital-labor ratio industries, electrical equipment and appliances, and 
TV receivers, are also supportive o f the general hypothesis. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for apparel and leather and allied products are not
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supportive o f the general hypothesis. This result may be explained by technology 
spillover effects which occur when large countries trade with smaller countries.
The M exico export models provide clearer support o f the general hypothesis. 
Seven o f the 14 FDI coefficients were statistically significant in the individual industry 
M exican export models. The results for the high capital-labor ratio industries, 
petroleum oils, telecommunications equipment, and TV receivers (presumably a high 
capital content good) support the general hypothesis. M exico, a relatively labor- 
abundant country, does not supply any capital inputs to the capital-intensive goods, and 
therefore the indicated substitution effect is observed between FDI and exports. 
Likewise, apparel has a complementary effect as M exico continues to supply labor- 
intensive inputs to the labor-intensive Subsidiary producer.
The NAFTA coefficients in the total export models are used to generate 
estimates for NAFTA-induced export growth. The estimates indicate that NAFTA was 
responsible for a 3.4 percent increase in US exports to M exico immediately following  
NAFTA's implementation and was responsible for an 11.8 percent increase in M exican 
exports to the US.
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSIONS A N D  FINAL THOUGHTS
The gravity model does a good job in explaining exports between the US and 
M exico. The gravity model explains some 90 percent or more o f  the variance in exports 
between the US and M exico. The coefficient magnitudes for key gravity variables and 
NAFTA variables are consistent with the results o f similar studies. The coefficients for 
US GDP are positive and statistically significant for most models. For the variables
i r y j
which were statistically significant, almost all had the theoretically expected sign.
Nearly all o f  the NAFTA coefficients were statistically significant and were consistent 
with other studies. Exactly half o f  the 28 models which included an FDI variable were 
statistically significant. Despite all o f  this favorable evidence, there is no smoking gun 
here for the gravity model, as there are still some unclear relationships, but m ostly the 
gravity model performs well on a bilateral basis for the US and M exico. Many o f  the 
models in the existing gravity model literature use a multi-country approach for testing 
the effects o f NAFTA, where many o f the countries vary greatly in income, populations, 
and proximity. Further research should focus on comparing demographically similar 
countries in a bilateral design to further test the benefits o f analyzing single-industry
107 With the exception o f exchange rate, which may contain some ambiguous price information which is 
not absorbed into the gravity model framework. This is confirmed in other published gravity models 
studies. See Bergstrand (1989, p. 152).
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one-way export flow s. The income elasticity-large country effect (the gravitational 
pull effect) and the GDP magnitude ratio need to be further investigated with a variety 
o f demographics and different levels o f trade resistances. Certainly one would expect 
different results if either o f these factors were changed in a bilateral analysis.
You can derive the gravity equation from a variety o f theoretical models, even  
from the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The unifying theme among all these theories is that 
there exists some form of product differentiation either on a firm basis or country o f  
origin basis, that gives each industry some unique aspect. But whatever the theoretical 
underpinnings may be, the gravity model does a good job empirically o f  explaining 
trade flows. The gravity model provides a stable framework for analyzing trade flows.
It is not clear that one theory can be conclusively supported or rejected based on any 
one study. It just means that the general gravity equation contains good explanatory 
variables for explaining trade flows.
NAFTA had a statistically significant effect on both M exican and US exports for 
almost all trade flow s at each level o f aggregation in the analysis. Total US exports to 
M exico increased by an estimated 4.3 percent. M exican exports to the US increased by 
an estimated 11.8 percent. This is a combined increase o f over $6 billion in additional 
trade due to NAFTA.
NAFTA occurred in a troubled period for M exico. Political unrest and the peso 
crisis had a measurable effect on the finances and econom y o f M exico. In addition, 
these events created some level o f perceived risk, thereby causing som e investor anxiety 
and perhaps even reduced consumption and investment. The quantifiable variables 
included in the model cannot fully account for the additional risk that was generated.
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Therefore it is anticipated that the NAFTA dummy picks up some o f  the risk effects 
along with the trade agreement's tariff lower effects. The risk effect should depress 
imports from the US. The positive-signed significant coefficients o f NAFTA are 
probably understated (by a small amount) by the indirect import-reducing effects 
created by the additional perceived risk.
The most interesting results in this paper come from the FDI variables. A ll but 
three o f the significant FDI variables have the theoretically expected sign. There is a 
clear pattern in these results based on industry capital intensiveness. For M exico, a 
relatively labor-abundant country, there is some solid evidence that increases in FDI 
generate a negative relationship with exports for capital-intensive goods. This can be 
clearly seen in the M exico export models for petroleum (crude), telecommunications 
equipment and TV receivers. Similarly, for the United States, a capital abundant 
country, there is a clear positive relationship found between FDI and exports o f  capital- 
intensive goods. This can be seen most clearly in the empirical models for equipment 
for distributing electricity, electrical equipment and appliances, motor cars and other 
motor vehicles, and TV receivers.108
On the other end o f  the scale, FDI has a small but positive significant effect in 
M exico's export o f apparel. This is a pretty intuitive result. M exico is a labor-abundant 
country and apparel is a large industry there. The firms locate subsidiaries in the United 
States and continue to export labor-intensive intermediate goods to the US to supply 
those subsidiaries. This results in a small increase in exports.
108 The capital-labor ratio is understated for motor cars and other motor vehicles, because the capital stock 
measure uses only motor vehicle capital stock and does not include other motor vehicles. The actual 
capital stock measure is probably closer to that for parts for tractors and motor vehicles.
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The theoretical model loses some o f its explanatory power for US exports o f  
the low capital-labor ratio goods, apparel, furniture and related products, and leather 
and allied products. The United States has a complementary FDI-export relationship 
for both high and low capital-labor ratio industries. It seems that the extreme capital- 
abundant nature o f the United States leads to an overwhelming complementarity effect 
for a wide range o f  industries. Perhaps the capital-abundant nature o f the US 
dominates, as it is the extreme case o f a capital-abundant country. It may be the case 
that even for these low capital-labor ratio industries, the United States continues to 
export capital-intensive intermediate goods to their subsidiaries for these goods. Future 
studies should look at whether extreme labor-abundant countries, like India or China, 
produce similar results for low capital-labor ratio industries.
There were som e data limitations that led to some deficiencies in this research. 
The optimal FDI variable is obviously firm-level or industry-level. This was not 
available, unfortunately. This is perhaps the biggest shortcoming o f the data set. The 
second deficiency o f the model is the inherent constant elasticity that is imposed on the 
coefficients by using the multiplicative form o f the gravity model. In future works, it is 
recommended to test and allow for non-linear parameters for all the variables, or for the 
core gravity variables at least. Moreover, in a time series specification this is all the 
more likely that these parameters will change over time and not be constants. And 
lastly, the translog specification o f the gravity model was tested and rejected because o f  
multicollinearity issues. It is recommended that for future exercises with the gravity 
model, a translog specification be performed. In future tests, some key variables may
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be left in their nature form while the rest o f the variables are logged. This may 
prevent some multicollinearity from occurring.
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APPENDIX A
Acronyms and Definitions o f Econom ic Terms
Armington assumption - goods are differentiated by country o f origin.
CUSFTA - Canada - US Free Trade Agreement
Factor Price Equalization Theorem - when the prices o f the output goods are equalized 
between countries, as when countries m ove to free trade, then the prices o f the factors 
(capital and labor) will also be equalized between countries.
Heckscher - Ohlin Theorem - if the price o f the capital-intensive good rises (for 
whatever reason) then the price o f  capital, the factor used intensively in that industry, 
will rise, while the wage rate paid to labor w ill fall.
Home Market Effect - a firm (or country) operating under increasing returns to scale 
and positive transportation costs will seek to locate closest to its largest market. By 
doing so it can reap the benefits o f econom ies o f scale and m inim ize transportation 
costs. In trade theory specifically, the home market effect is equivalent to the 
observation that a country will export that good for which it already has a large 
domestic market.109
Linder Hypothesis - Trade o f manufactured goods will be inversely related to the 
difference in their per capita incomes.
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement
Rybczynski Theorem - an increase in a country's endowment o f a factor w ill cause an 
increase in output o f the good which uses that factor intensively, and a decrease in the 
output o f the other good.
Reciprocal dumping - a imperfect competition model with segmented markets. 
Dumping by definition means the exporting o f a good below world market prices. 
Stolper - Samuelson Theorem - an increase in the price o f a good will cause an increase 
in the price o f the factor used intensively in that industry and a decrease in the price of 
the other factor.
Trade creation - As a result o f enacting a free trade agreement, a country imports more 
goods from a country than before. This increase in imports occurs at the cost o f  
reduced domestic consumption or reduced imports from other countries.
Trade diversion - If countries A  and B join a free trade agreement and country A  stops 
importing some good from country C and begins importing it from country B. This is 
trade diversion. O f particular interest to trade theorists is whether trade diversion 
results in efficient trade patterns. If both B and C had the same trade barriers (toward 
A) before the free trade agreement, then it can be deduced that A  is importing from C 
because C is the most efficient producer o f the good. But if A  is now importing from B, 
then A is no longer importing from the cheapest, most efficient producer. There is a 
loss o f efficiency.
109 Krugman (1980) p. 955.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX B
Chronology of World Trade Events
01-01-58 Treaty o f Rome signed forming the European Community (EC)
05-03-60 European Free Trade Area (EFTA) is enacted
01-01-73 Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom accession into European
Community.
01-01-73 Law for the Promotion o f M exican Investment. Limited areas where
foreign investment was allowed. Capped foreign ownership at 49%. 
100% ownership was allowed in the automotive industry, given certain 
conditions were met, like using local suppliers 
01-01-77 M exican Automotive Decree o f  1977 enacted
01-01-81 Greece accession into European Community
01-01-86 M exico joins the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
01-01-86 Portugal and Spain accession into European Community
01-02-88 CUSFTA signed by Canada and the US
01-01-89 CUSFTA is enacted
01 -01 -89 M exican Automotive Decree o f  1989 enacted
10-01-89 US - M exico sign Understanding Regarding Trade and Investment 
Facilitation Talks
02-01-91 Canada, M exico and US announce that NAFTA negotiations will begin
06-12-91 Official trilateral negotiations begin for NAFTA in Toronto, Canada
11-29-91 MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) is enacted
08-12-92 Trilateral negotiations for NAFTA end in Washington DC, US
12-17-92 NAFTA signed by Canada, M exico and US
03-01-93 Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) is enacted
01-01-94 NAFTA is enacted
05-01-94 M exico admitted into the Organization o f Econom ic and Development
12-20-94 M exico devalues peso
01-01-95 Austria, Finland and Sweden accession into European Union
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